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i0.1 Preface
The theory of optimal transport was born towards the end of the 18th century,
its founding father being Gaspard Monge [33].
Optimal transport theory has connections with PDEs, kinetic theory, fluid
dynamics, geometric inequalities, probability and many other mathematical
fields as well as in computer science and economics. As such, it has attracted
many leading mathematicians in the last decades.
There are several very good textbooks and monographs on the subject. For
the novice we recommend, as an appetizer, the first book of C. Villani [45],
titled ”Topics in optimal Transport”. This book describes, in a vivid way, most
of what was known on this subject on its publication date (2003). For a dy-
namical approach we recommend the book of Ambrosio, Gigli and Savare [2],
dealing with paths of probability measures and the vector-field generating them.
This fits well with the thesis of Alessio Figalli on optimal transport and action
minimizing measures [16]. The main treat is, undoubtedly, the second monster
book [46] of Villani published in 2008. This book emphasizes the geometric
point of view and contains a lot more. For the reader interested in application
to economics we recommend the recent book [17] of A. Galichon, while for those
interested in connections with probability theory and random processes we rec-
ommend the book of Rachev and Raschendorf [36]. As a desert we recommend
the recent book of F. Santambrogio [38], which provides an overview of the main
landmarks from the point of view of applied mathematics, and includes also a
description of several up-to-date numerical methods.
In between these courses the reader may browse through countless number of
review papers and monographs, written by leading experts in this fast growing
subject.
In the current book I suggest an off-road path to the subject. I tried to
avoid prior knowledge of analysis, PDE theory and functional analysis, as much
as possible. Thus I concentrate on discrete and semi-discrete cases, and always
assume compactness for the underlying spaces. However, some fundamental
knowledge of measure theory and convexity is unavoidable. In order to make it
as self-contained as possible I included an appendix with some basic definitions
and results. I believe that any graduate student in mathematics, as well as
advanced undergraduate students, can read and understand this book. Some
chapters can also be of interest for experts.
It is important to emphasize that this book cannot replace any of the books
mentioned above. For example the very relevant subject of elliptic and parabolic
PDE (the Monge-Amper and the Fokker-Plank equations, among others) is
missing, along with regularity issues and many other subjects. It provides,
however, an alternative way to the understanding of some of the basic ideas
behind optimal transport and its applications and, in addition, presents some
extensions which cannot be found elsewhere. In particular, the subject of vector
transport, playing a major role in part II of this book is, to the best of my
knowledge, new. The same can be said about some applications discussed in
chapter 8 and Part III.
ii
Starting with the the most fundamental, fully discrete problem I attempted
to place optimal transport as a particular case of the celebrated stable marriage
problem. From there we proceed to the partition problem, which can be for-
mulated as a transport from a continuous space to a discrete one. Applications
to information theory and game theory (cooperative and non-cooperative) are
introduced as well. Finally, the general case of transport between two compact
measure spaces is introduced as a coupling between two semi-discrete transports.
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0.2 How to read this book?
The introduction (Chapter 1) provides an overview on the content of the book.
Chapters 2, 3 are independent of the rest of this book.
Other than that, chapter 4 is the core of this book, and it is a pre-requisite
for the subsequent chapters.
The readers who are mainly interested in the applications to economics and
game theory may jump from chapter 4 to part IV, starting from section 11.1 and
taking Theorem 11.1 for granted, and also section 10.4. Some of these readers
may find also an interest in Chapter 6, which, unfortunately, is not independent
of Chapter 5,
The reader interested in application to learning theory may skip from Chap-
ter 4 to section 8.1, but it is recommended to read part II (or, at least go
over the definitions in Chapter 5) before reading section 8.2 on the information
bottleneck
It is also possible to read Part III after Chapter 4 which, except section 10.6,
is independent of the rest.
0.3 Notations
The following is a (non-exhaustive) list of notations used throughout the book.
Other notations will be presented at the first time used.
1. R is the field of real numbers. R+ the real non-negative numbers, R++
the real positive numbers, R− the real non positive and R−− the real
negatives.
2. For x, y ∈ R, min(x, y) := x ∧ y. max(x, y) := x ∨ y
3. ∆N (γ) := {(x1, . . . xN ) ∈ RN+ ,
∑N
i=1 xi = γ}.
4. ∆N (γ) := {(x1, . . . xN ) ∈ RN+ ,
∑N
i=1 xi ≤ γ}.
5. M+(N, J) := RN+ ⊗ RJ+. It is the set of N × J matrices of non-negative
real numbers. Likewise, M′(N, J) := RN ⊗RJ - the set of N × J matrices
of real numbers.
6. For ~M = {mi,j} ∈M+(N, J) and ~P = {pi,j} ∈M′(N, J),
~P : ~M := tr( ~M~Pt) =
∑N
i=1
∑J
j=1 pi,jmi,j .
7. (X,B) is a compact measure space, and B the Borel σ−algebra on X.
8. M(X) the set of non-negative Borel measures on X. µ ∈M(X) contains
no atoms (i.e µ({x}) = 0 for any x ∈ X). M1 ⊂M is the set of probability
measures, namely µ(X) = 1.
9. µ¯ := (µ(1), . . . µ(J)) ∈MJ(X) such that ∑Jj=1 µ(j) := µ.
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Introduction
1.1 The fully discrete case 1
Imagine a set Im composed of N men and a set Iw composed of N women.
Your task is to form N married pairs {ii′} ⊂ Im × Iw out of these set, where
each pair is composed of a single man i ∈ Im and a single woman i′ ∈ Iw, and
make everybody happy. This is the celebrated stable marriage problem.
What is the meaning of ”making everybody happy”? There is, indeed, a
very natural definition for it, starting from the definition of a blocking pair.
A blocking pair is an unmarried couple (a man and a woman) who prefers
each other over their assigned spouses. The existence of a blocking pair will
cause two couples to divorce and may start an avalanche destabilizing all the
assigned matchings.
The definition of a stable marriage (which, in our case, is a synonym to
”happy marriage”) is
There are no blocking pairs.
The main focus in this book is on the transferable model, which assumes a
somewhat materialistic point of view.
A married couple ii
′ ∈ Im × Iw can share a reward θ(i, i′) ≥ 0 (say, in
US dollars).
Suppose now that you assigned man i to woman i
′
and man j 6= i to the
woman j
′ 6= i′ . A necessary condition for a stable marriage is
θ(i, i
′
) + θ(j, j
′
) ≥ θ(i, j′) + θ(j, i′) . (1.1)
Indeed, assume the couple ii
′
splits the reward between themselves, so that i cuts
ui = αθ(i, i
′
) dollars while i
′
cuts vi′ = (1− α)θ(i, i
′
) dollars, where α ∈ (0, 1).
1Part of this chapter was published by the author in [49]
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Likewise the couple jj
′
splits their reward according to the cuts uj = βθ(j, j
′
)
and vj′ = (1− β)θ(j, j
′
) where β ∈ (0, 1). If θ(i, i′) + θ(j, j′) < θ(i, j′) + θ(j, i′)
then
θ(i, j
′
) + θ(j, i
′
) > ui + vi′ + uj + vj′
so either θ(i, j
′
) > ui + vj′ or θ(j, i
′
) > uj + vi′ (or both). In any case at least
one of the new pairs ij
′
, ji
′
can share a reward bigger than the one they could
get from their former matching, and thus improve their individual cuts. Hence
at least one of the pairs ij
′
or ji
′
is a blocking pair.
From the above argument we conclude that (1.1) for any two matched pairs
is a necessary condition for the marriage to be stable. Is it also sufficient?
Suppose the pairs (i1i
′
1), . . . (iki
′
k), k ≥ 2 are matched. The sum of the
rewards for these couples is
∑k
l=1 θ(il, i
′
l). Suppose they perform a ”chain
deal” such that man il marries woman i
′
l+1 for 1 ≤ l ≤ k − 1, and the last
man ik marries the first woman i
′
1. The net reward for the new matching is∑k−1
l=1 θ(il, i
′
l+1) + θ(ik, i
′
1). A similar argument implies that a necessary condi-
tion for a stable marriage is that this new reward will not exceed the original
net reward for these matching, that is
For any choice of matched pairs i1i
′
1, . . . iki
′
k,
k∑
l=1
θ(il, i
′
l)− θ(il, i
′
l+1) ≥ 0 (1.2)
(where i
′
k+1 := i
′
1)
Condition (1.2) generalizes (1.1) to the case k ≥ 2. It is called cyclical
monotonicity. It is remarkable that cyclical monotonicity is, indeed, equivalent
to the stability of matching {ii′} (i.e to the absence of blocking pairs).
From cyclical monotonicity we can conclude directly an optimality charac-
terization of stable matching. In fact, this is an equivalent definition of stable
marriage in the transferable case:
The marriage {ii′} is stable if and only if it maximizes the total reward
among all possible 1− 1 matchings i ∈ Im → τ(i) ∈ Iw, that is
N∑
i=1
θ(i, i
′
) ≥
N∑
i=1
θ(i, τ(i)) (1.3)
Another very important notion for the marriage problem (and, in general,
for any cooperative game) is the notion of feasibility set and core.
The feasibility set is the collection of men’s cuts ui and women’s cuts vj′
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which satisfy the feasibility condition:
ui + vj′ ≥ θ(i, j
′
) (1.4)
for all ij
′ ∈ Im × Iw. The core of a given matching {ii′} is composed of all
such cuts (u1, . . . uN ; v1 . . . vN ) in the feasibility set which satisfies the equality
ui + vi′ = θ(i, i
′
) for any matched pair ii
′
.
The matching {ii′} ⊂ {Im × Iw} is stable if and only if the associated
core is not empty.
There is another, dual optimality formulation for a stable matching via the
feasibility set:
The cuts u01, . . . u
0
N ; v
0
1 . . . v
0
N is a core if and only if it is a minimizer of
the total cut
∑N
1 ui + vi within the feasibility set (1.4):
N∑
1
u0i + v
0
i ≤
N∑
1
ui + vi . (1.5)
In particular if u01, . . . v
0
N is such a minimizer then for any man i ∈ Im
there exists at least one woman i
′ ∈ Iw and for any woman i′ ∈ Iw there
exists at least one man i ∈ Im for which the equality u0i + v0i′ = θii′
holds, and the matching {ii′} ⊂ Im × Iw is stable.
Each of the two dual optimality characterization (1.3, 1.5) of stable matching
guarantees that for any choice of the rewards {θ(i, j)}, a stable matching always
exists.
There are other ways to define a blocking pair. A natural way is the non-
transferable marriage. In the non-transferable marriage game each man and
woman have a preference list, by which he/she rates the women/men in the
group. This is the celebrated marriage problem of Gale and Shapley (who won
a Nobel price in economics in 2012).
We may quantify the Gale and Shapley game (after all, we live in a mate-
rialistic world). Assume a paring of man i and woman j
′
will guarantee a cut
θm(i, j
′
) to the man and θw(i, j
′
) to the woman. This will induce the preference
list for both men and women: Indeed, the man i will prefer the woman i
′
over
j
′
if and only if θm(i, i
′
) > θm(i, j
′
). Likewise, the woman i
′
will prefer the
man i over j if and only if θw(i, i
′
) > θw(j, i
′
). A blocking pair for a matching
{ii′} ⊂ Im × Iw is, then, a pair ij′ such that j′ 6= i′ and both
θm(i, j
′
) ≥ θm(i, i′) and θw(i, j′) ≥ θw(j, j′)
are satisfied (were at least one of the inequalities is strong).
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GS (Gale-Shapley) stability for a set of rewards {θm, θw} does not imply the
stability of the transferable game where θ = θm + θw where each couple is
permitted to share their individual rewards (and neither the opposite).
A simple example (N = 2):
θm w1 w2
m1 1 0
m2 0 1
;
θw w1 w2
m1 1 5
m2 0 1
The matching {11, 22} is GS stable. Indeed θm(1, 1) = 1 > θm(1, 2) = 0
while θm(2, 2) = 1 > θm(2, 1) = 0, so both men are happy, and this
is enough for GS stability, since that neither {12} nor {21} is a block-
ing pair. On the other hand, if the married pairs share their rewards
θ(i, j
′
) = θm(i, j
′
) + θw(i, j
′
) we get
θ w1 w2
m1 2 5
m2 0 2
so
θ(1, 1) + θ(2, 2) = 4 < 5 = θ(1, 2) + θ(2, 1) ,
thus {21, 12} is the stable marriage in the transferable setting.
On top of it, there exists a whole world of marriage games which contains
the transferable and GS games as special cases.
There is a deep theorem which guarantees the existence of a stable mar-
riage for a wide class of partially transferable games, starting from the fully
transferable, all the way to Gale-Shapley. The proof of this theorem is much
simpler in the transferable case (due to the optimality characterization) and
the Gale Shapley case (due to the celebrated Gale-Shapley algorithm, which is
described in Section 2.1). However, there is an essential difference between the
transferable game and all other cases. As far as we know:
The transferable marriage game is the only one which is variational, i.e
whose stable solutions are characterized by an optimality condition.
A discussion on the marriage problem and some of its generalizations is given
in Chapter 2.
1.2 Many to few: Partitions
We may extend the marriage paradigm to a setting of matching between two
sets of different cardinality. Suppose I = {1, . . . N} is a set representing experts
(or sellers) and X is a much larger (possibly infinite) set representing, say, the
geographical space in which the customers (or consumers) live.
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We consider (X,B, µ) as a measure space, equipped with a σ−algebra B and
a positive measure µ. We shall always assume that X is also a compact space
and B a Borel. In the expert-customers interpretation µ(B) it is the number of
customers living in B ∈ B.
We also associate any i ∈ I with a capacity mi > 0. This can be understood
as the maximal possible number of customers the expert i can serve.
A measurable matching τ : X → I can be represented by a partition ~A =
(A0, A1, . . . AN ) where Ai = τ
−1({i}) ∈ B, i ∈ I∪{0} are pairwise disjoint. The
set Ai, i ∈ I represents the geographical domain in X served by the expert i,
and µ(Ai) represents the number of customers served by i. The set A0 represents
a domain which is not served by any of the experts. A feasible partition must
satisfy the constraint2
µ(Ai) ≤ mi , i ∈ I . (1.6)
Let us consider the generalization of the transferable marriage game in this
context. The utility of the assignment of x ∈ X to i ∈ I is given by the function
θ ∈ C(X ×I). This function is assumed to be non-negative. We usually denote
θ(x, i) := θi(x) for i ∈ I, x ∈ X and θ0(x) ≡ 0 is the utility of non-consumer.
The optimal partition A01, . . . A
0
N is the one which realizes the maximum
N∑
i=1
∫
A0i
θi(x)dµ ≥
N∑
i=1
∫
Ai
θi(x)dµ (1.7)
for any feasible subpartition A1, . . . AN verifying (1.6).
The assumption Ai ⊂ X seems to be too restrictive. Indeed, an expert can
serve only part of the customers at a given location. So, me may extend the
notion of partition to a weak partition. A weak partition is represented by N
non-negative measures µi on (X,B) verifying the constraints
µi ≥ 0,
N∑
i
µi ≤ µ , µi(X) ≤ mi . (1.8)
Of course, any strong partition A1, . . . AN is a weak partition, where µi = µbAi
(the restriction of µ to Ai).
The general notion of stable marriage in the fully discrete case (Im, Iw) can
be generalized to stable partition in the semi-discrete case (X, I).
A natural generalization of (1.6) leads to a stable weak partition ~µ0 :=
(µ01, . . . µ
0
N ) obtained by maximizing the total utility
N∑
i=1
∫
X
θi(x)dµ
0
i ≥
N∑
i=1
∫
X
θi(x)dµi (1.9)
for any feasible subpartition verifying (1.8).
2See section 1.3.1 below for a discussion in the case of inequality (1.6) vs. equality.
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As in the fully discrete setting of the marriage problem, we may consider
other, non-transferable partitions. In particular, the Gale-Shapley marriage
game is generalized as follows:
Assume that I stands for a finite number of firms and X the set of potential
employees. Let e(x, i) be the reward for x if hired by i, and f(x, i) the reward of
firm i employing x. The condition for a strong, stable partition A1, . . . AN under
non-transferable assumption, subjected to the capacity constraint µ(Ai) ≤ mi
is
Either e(x, i) ≥ e(x, j) for x ∈ Ai, j ∈ I or there exists y ∈ Aj ,
j 6= i where f(y, j) > f(x, j) .
In Chapter 3 we consider the partition problem for both the completely
transferable and non transferable cases.
In chapter 4, as well as in the rest of the book, we restrict ourselves to
the fully transferable case. There we lay the foundations of duality theory for
optimal partitions. In the case of equality in (1.6,1.8)3 and
∑
mi = µ(X), this
dual formulation takes the form of minimizing the convex function
(p1, . . . pN ) ∈ RN 7→ Ξ(p1, . . . pN ) +
N∑
i=1
pimi ∈ R (1.10)
where
Ξ(p1, . . . pN ) :=
∫
X
max
1≤i≤N
(θi(x)− pi) dµ .
In the agents-customers interpretation, the optimal pi stand for the equilibrium
price charged by the agent i for her service. The inequality
Ξ(p1, . . . pN ) +
N∑
i=1
pimi ≥
M∑
i=1
∫
Ai
θi(x)dµ (1.11)
plays a fundamental in part II.
1.3 Optimal transport in a nutshell
Both the transferable marriage and partition problems are special cases of the
Monge problem in optimal transport.
The original formulation of the Monge problem is very intuitive. It can be
stated as follows:
3cf. section 1.3.1 below
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Given a pile of sand X and a container Y , of the same volume, what
is the best plan of moving the sand from the pile in order to fill the
container?
What do we mean by ”a plan”?
Let µ ∈ M(X) be a measure on X signifying the distribution of sand. Let
ν ∈M(Y ) be a measure on Y signifying the distribution of free space in the con-
tainer. The balanced condition, representing statement ”same volume” above,
takes the form
µ(X) = ν(Y ) . (1.12)
A strong plan is a mapping T : X → Y which transport the measure µ to ν,
that is
T#µ = ν namely µ(T
−1(B)) = ν(B) (1.13)
for every measurable set B ⊂ Y .
The ”best plan” is the one which minimizes the average distance∫
X
|x− T (x)|µ(dx)
among all other plans.
The interest of Monge was mainly geometrical. In his only (known) paper
on this subject [33] he discovered some fundamental properties of the minimizer
and connected the notion of transport rays and wavefronts in optics to this
geometrical problem.
In the generalized version of the Monge problem the distance function (x, y) 7→
d(x, y), x, y ∈ X is replaced by a cost of transportation (x, y) 7→ c(x, y), where
x ∈ X, y ∈ Y . In particular, X and Y can be different domains. The Monge
problem takes the form of minimization problem
c(µ, ν) := min
T
∫
X
c(x, T (x))µ(dx) (1.14)
among all maps transporting the probability measure µ on X to ν on Y (i.e.
T#µ = ν).
In the context of expert-customer (which we adopt throughout most of this
book), it is more natural to replace the cost c by the utility θ which we want
to maximize. Evidently, one may switch from c(x, y) to θ(x, y) = −c(x, y) and
from (1.14) to
θ(µ, ν) := max
T#µ=ν
∫
X
θ(x, T (x))µ(dx) . (1.15)
After this pioneering publication of Monge, the problem fell asleep for about
160 years, until Kantorovich’s paper in 1941 [27]. Kantorovich fundamental
observation was that this problem is closely related to a relaxed problem on the
set of two-points probability measures pi = pi(dxdy)
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θ(µ, ν) := max
pi∈Π(µ,ν)
∫
X
∫
Y
θ(x, y)pi(dxdy) (1.16)
where Π(µ, ν) is the set of ”weak plans” composed of point distributions on
X × Y whose marginals are µ and ν:
Π(µ, ν) := {pi ∈M(X × Y );
∫
X
pi(dxdy) = ν(dy) ,
∫
Y
pi(dxdy) = µ(dx) } .
(1.17)
The optimal measure pi(A×B) represents the probability of transporting goods
located in the measurable set A ⊂ X to B ⊂ Y . The disintegration
pi(A,B) =
∫
A
Px(B)µ(dx) (1.18)
reveals the conditional probability Px of the transportation from x ∈ X to B ⊂
Y . Thus, we can interpret Kantorovich’s transport plan as a stochastic trans-
port. In contrast, deterministic transport T via Monge’s paradigm is the special
case where the conditional probability Px takes the form Px(dy) = δy−T (x).
The transferable marriage problem is a simplified version of an optimal trans-
port plan. Here we replaced the atoms x ∈ X and y ∈ Y by a finite, discrete sets
of men i ∈ Im and women i′ ∈ Iw of the same cardinality N . The measures µ, ν
are just the uniform discrete measures µ({i}) = ν({j′}) = 1 for all i ∈ Im and
j
′ ∈ Iw, while the utility θ(x, y) is now represented by N × N matrix θ(i, j′).
The Monge plan verifying (1.16) takes now the form of the assignment given in
terms of a permutation i
′
= τ(i) which maximizes the total reward of matching
τ ⇒
N∑
i=1
θ(i, τ(i)) . (1.19)
The Kantorovich program replaces the deterministic assignment by a prob-
abilistic one: pij
′
i := pi({i}, {j
′}) ≥ 0 is the probability of assigning i to j′ . The
optimal solution is then reduced to the linear programming of maximizing
N∑
i=1
N∑
j′=1
pij
′
i θ(i, j
′
) (1.20)
over all stochastic N ×N matrices {pij
′
i }, i.e. these matrices which satisfy the
3N linear constraints
N∑
i=1
pij
′
i =
N∑
j′=1
pij
′
i = 1, pi
j
′
i ≥ 0
The Birkhoff Theorem4 assures us that the optimal solution of this stochastic
assignment problem (1.20) is identical to the solution of the deterministic version
4See section 4.6.2
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(1.19). In particular, the optimal stochastic matrix {piji } is a permutation matrix
δτ(i)−j associated with the permutation τ .
Likewise, the transferable partition in the balanced case
∑
i∈Imi = µ(X)
corresponds to a solution of the Kantorovich problem where the target space
Y is given by the discrete space I of finite cardinality N . The measure ν is
given by the capacities mi := ν({i}). The utility θ(x, y) is represented by θi(x)
where i ∈ I. A strong partition in X corresponds to a transport (1.13), where
Ai = T
−1({i}). The optimal partition (1.7) corresponds to the solution of
Monge problem(1.15).
The weak optimal partition (1.9) is nothing but the Kantorovich relaxation
(1.16) to the deterministic transport partition problem. Indeed, the set Π(µ, ν)
(1.17) is now reduced to the the set of all weak partitions pi(dx×{i}) := µi(dx)
via
Π(µ, ~m) := {~µ := (µ1, . . . µN ), µi(X) = mi,
N∑
1
µi = µ} .
As a particular example we may assume that X = {x1, . . . xN∗} is a dis-
crete case as well. In that case we denote θi(xj) := θ(i, j), µ({xi}) := m∗i .
In the balanced case
∑N
i=1mi =
∑N∗
i=1m
∗
i we get the optimal weak partition
µ0i ({xj}) := (pi0,1i , . . . pi0,N
∗
i ) as
{pi0.ji } = arg max{mji}
N∑
i=1
N∗∑
j=1
piji θ(i, j)
where {piji } verifying (1.8) in the case of equality
piji ≥ 0 ;
N∗∑
j=1
piji = m
∗
i ,
N∑
i=1
piji = mj ; (i, xj) ∈ I ×X . (1.21)
We may recover the fully discrete transferable marriage (1.19) in the particular
case N∗ = N and mi = m∗j = 1 for 1 ≤ i, j ≤ N .
The Birkhoff Theorem hints that the case where the optimal partition ~µ0 in
(1.9) is a strong subpartition µ0i = µbA0i is not so special, after all....
1.3.1 Unbalanced transport
The case of unbalanced transport µ(X) 6= ν(Y ) deserves a special attention.
Note, in particular, that in (1.6) we used the inequality µ(Ai) ≤ mi. If the
utilities θi are non-negative and if
∑N
1 mi ≤ µ(X) then it is evident that the
optimal partition will satisfy the equality µ(A0i ) = mi (same for (1.8, 1.9)). This
presents no conceptual new case, since we can define m0 := µ(X)−
∑N
1 mi and
A0 := X − ∪N1 Ai constrained by µ(A0) = m0, representing the non-consumers
in the populations. This reduces the problem to the case of equality
∑N
0 mi =
µ(X), where the utility of non-consuming is θo ≡ 0. In the dual formulation
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we may assign, in the case m0 > 0, the price p0 = 0 for non consuming. The
inequality (1.11) will take, in this way, the same form as in (1.11) where we
integrate only on the positive part of θi−pi, i.e. (θi(x)−pi)+ := (θi(x)−pi)∨0.
Thus, Ξ is replaced by
Ξ+(p1, . . . pN ) :=
∫
X
max
1≤i≤N
(θi(x)− pi)+ dµ .
In the same way we may adopt in the Monge problem (1.15) the case µ(X) >
ν(Y ) by adding an auxiliary point y0 to Y and extend ν to Y ∪ {y0} such that
ν({y0}) = µ(X)− ν(Y ), together with θ(x, y0) = 0 for any x ∈ X.
The case µ(X) < ν(Y ) is treated similarly. We just add a virtual point x0
to X, assign µ({x0}) = ν(Y ) − µ(X) and θ(x0, y) = 0 for any v ∈ Y . In the
semi-discrete case
∑N
1 mi > µ(X) this changes (1.11) into
Ξ(p1, . . . pN ) +
N∑
i=1
pimi −m0 min
i
pi ≥
M∑
i=1
∫
Ai
θi(x)dµ
where m0 :=
∑N
1 mi − µ(X) in that case.
1.4 Vector-valued Transport and Multipartitions
A natural generalization of the optimal transport is optimal vector-valued trans-
port. Here we replace the measures µ, ν by RJ+-valued measures
µ¯ := (µ(1), . . . µ(J)) ∈MJ(X), ν¯ := (ν(1), . . . ν(J)) ∈MJ(Y ) ,
and we denote µ = |µ¯| := ∑J1 µ(j), ν = |ν¯| := ∑J1 ν(j). The set Π(µ, ν) (1.17)
is generalized into
Π(µ¯, ν¯) := {pi ∈M(X × Y );
∫
X
dµ(j)
dµ
(x)pi(dxdy) = ν(j)(dy)} . (1.22)
where dµi/dµ, dνi/dν stands for the Radon-Nikodym derivative.
In general the set Π¯(µ¯, ν¯) can be an empty one. If Π(µ¯, ν¯) 6= ∅ then we say
that µ¯ dominates ν¯. This is an order relation (in particular transitive), denoted
by
µ¯  ν¯ . (1.23)
The generalization of the Kantorovich problem (1.16) takes the form
θ(µ¯, ν¯) := max
pi∈Π(µ¯,ν¯)
∫
X
∫
Y
θ(x, y)pi(dxdy) .
θ(µ¯, ν¯) =∞ if µ¯ 6 ν¯.
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Several recent publications deal with a notion of vector valued (or even
matrix-valued) optimal transport. See, in particular [50] as well as related works
[9, 23, 42, 10, 35, 11]. There is, however, a fundamental difference between our
notion of vector transport and those publications, since (1.22) implies a single
transport plan for all components of the vector.
A possible motivation for studying such a transport concerns some applica-
tion to learning theory. A vector-valued measure µ¯ := (µ(1), . . . µ(J)) on a set
X is interpreted as a distribution of a classifier of a label j ∈ {1, . . . J} given a
sample x in some feature space X. The object of learning is to model this clas-
sifier by a simpler one on a finite sample space I, while preserving as much as
possible the information stored in the given classifier. This subject is discussed
in chapter 8.
In part II we consider an implementation of RJ+-valued transport to multi-
partitions. Here we replace the space Y with the discrete space I = {1, . . . N},
and the RJ -valued measure ν¯ is represented by an N × J matrix ~M := {m(j)i },
where m
(j)
i stands for ν
(j)({i}).
A multi partition of X subjected to ~M is a partition of X into mutually
disjoint measurable sets A1, . . . AN ⊂ X satisfying
µ(j)(Ai) = m
(j)
i , for i = 1, . . . N, j = 1 . . . J , ∪Ai = X . (1.24)
Similarly, a weak multi partitions stands forN non-negative measures µ1, . . . µN
verifying
N∑
1
µi = µ :=
J∑
j=1
µ(j) . (1.25)
The induced weak partition µ¯i := (µ
(1)
i , . . . µ
(J)
i ), i = 1, . . . N is defined by
µ
(j)
i (dx) :=
dµi
dµ
(x)µ(j)(dx) such that .
Such a weak partition is assumed to satisfy
µ
(j)
i (X) = m
(j)
i , i = 1 . . . N, j = 1 . . . J . (1.26)
An optimal multi partition ~µ0 := (µ01, . . . µ
0
N ) is a natural generalization of (1.8):
It is the one which maximizes
θ(µ¯; ~M) :=
N∑
i=1
∫
X
θi(x)dµ
0
i ≡ max
~µ
N∑
i=1
∫
X
θi(x)dµi (1.27)
among all weak partitions ~µ = (µ1, . . . µN ) verifying (1.26) for the as-
signed µ¯, ~M := {m(j)i }.
At the first step, we should ask ourselves if such a weak multi partition exists
at all. By (1.25) we can see that a necessary condition for this is the component-
wise balance
∑N
i=1m
(j)
i = µ
(j)(X) for 1 ≤ j ≤ J . In general, however, this is
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not a sufficient condition. If a weak partition verifying (1.26) exists for a pair
µ¯, ~M, we say that µ¯ dominates ~M and denote it by µ¯  ~M. The set of all
N × J matrices ~M satisfying µ¯  ~M is denoted by ∆N (µ¯). We denote µ N ν
if ∆N (µ¯) ⊃ ∆N (ν¯). The connection with (1.23) is:
Theorem: µ¯  ν¯ if and only if µ¯ N ν¯ for any N ∈ N.
The feasibility condition for (1.27), namely the condition ∆N (µ¯) 6= ∅ and
the characterization of ∆N (µ¯) in general is addressed in chapter 5. The function
Ξ0(~P; µ¯) :=
∫
X
max
1≤i≤N
~pi · dµ¯
dµ
dµ
plays a central rule. Here ~p ∈ RJ and ~P := (~p1, . . . ~pN ) ∈ RN×J is N×J matrix.
The main result of this chapter is the following:
The set ∆N (µ¯) is a closed and convex.
~M ∈ ∆N (µ¯) (i.e. µ¯  ~M) if and only if one of the following equivalent
conditions holds:
•
Ξ0(~P; µ¯)− ~P : ~M ≥ 0
where ~M := (m¯1, . . . m¯N ), m¯i := (m
(1)
i , . . .m
(J)
i ) and
~P : ~M :=∑N
i=1 ~pi · m¯i.
• For any convex function f : RN → R∫
X
f
(
dµ¯
dµ
)
dµ ≥
N∑
i=1
|m¯i|f
(
m¯i
|m¯i|
)
where |m¯i| =
∑J
j=1m
(j)
i .
The existence of strong partitions verifying (1.24) is discussed in Chapter 6.
In particular we obtain
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If µ¯  ~M and
µ (x ∈ X; ~p · dµ¯/dµ = 0) = 0 for any ~p ∈ RJ , ~p 6= 0 , (1.28)
then there exists a strong partition A1, . . . AN verifying (1.24) corre-
sponding to ~M.
Moreover, if there exists ~P0 := (~p
0
1, . . . ~p
0
N ) 6= 0 which verifies
Ξ0(~P0; µ¯)− ~P0 : ~M = 0
and satisfies ~p0i 6= ~p0j for i 6= j then the strong partition is unique.
More generally, if I is decomposed into k disjoint subsets I1, . . . Ik and
~p0i 6= ~p0j if i ∈ Im, j ∈ In and n 6= m then there exists a unique
k−partition A1, . . .Ak of X such that any partition verifying (1.24) cor-
responding to ~M satisfies
Ai ⊂ Am if and only if i ∈ Im .
In Chapter 7 we consider the optimization problem for multi partitions. The
function
Ξθ(~P; µ¯) :=
∫
X
max
1≤i≤N
[
θi(x) + pi · dµ¯
dµ
]
+
dµ
plays a central rule for the optimization. One of the main results of this chapter
are
If µ¯  ~M then the optimal transport (1.27) is given by
θ(µ¯, ~M) = inf
~P
Ξθ(~P; µ¯)− ~P : ~M . (1.29)
Moreover, if (1.28) holds then there is a strong partition which verifies
(1.27).
1.5 Cooperative and non-cooperative partitions
In Part IV we return to the scalar transport case J = 1 and discuss partitions
under both cooperation and competition of the agents. Taking advantage on
the uniqueness result for partition obtained in Chapter 7.2 we define, in Chapter
13.3, the individual value Vi of an agent i as the surplus value she creates for
her customers:
Vi :=
∫
Ai
θi(x)dµ
where Ai is the set of the customers of i under the optimality condition. We
address the following question:
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What is the effect of increase of the utility θi(x) of agent i on its indi-
vidual value Vi, assuming the utilities of the other agents, as well as the
capacities mk = µ(Ak) are preserved for all agents?
The answer to this question is somewhat surprising. It turns out that the
individual value may decrease in that case. In Theorem 11.2-11.4 we establish
sharp quantitative estimates of the change of the individual value.
In Chapter 12 we deal with different possibilities of sharing the individual
value Vi produced by the agent i with her customers Ai. The most natural
strategy is ”flat price”, where the agent i charge a constant price pi from all her
customers, so her profit is Pi := piµ(Ai). Since µ(Ai) is determined by the prices
p1, . . . pN imposed by all other agents, we obtain a competitive game where each
agent wishes to maximize her profit. This leads us naturally to the notion of
Nash equilibrium. We also discuss other strategies, such as commission, where
the agent i charges a certain portion qiθi where qi ∈ (0, 1), hence Pi = qiVi.
Motivated by these results we ask the natural question regarding cooperation
of agents: Suppose a subgroup of agents J ⊂ I := {1, . . . N} decide to form
a coalition (cartel), such that the utility of this coalition is the maximum of
utilities of its agents: θJ (x) := maxj∈J θj(x), and the capacity is the sum of the
capacities mJ :=
∑
i∈J mi. The stability of the grand coalition θI = maxj∈I θj
and mI = µ(X) is addressed in Chapter 13. This leads us to discuss cooperative
games for transferable utilities. In some special cases we establish the stability
of the grand coalition J = I.
Part I
Stable marriage and
optimal partitions
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Chapter 2
The stable marriage
problem
Obviously, marriage is not a synonym for morality. But stable marriages and families
do encourage moral behavior (Gary Bauer)
2.1 Marriage without sharing
Consider two sets of N elements each: A set of men (Im) and women (Iw). Each man
in i ∈ Im lists the women according to his own preference: For any j1, j2 ∈ Iw
j1 i j2 iff i prefers j1 over j2 . (2.1)
Likewise, each woman j ∈ Iw lists the men in Im according to her preference: For any
i1, i2 ∈ Im
i1 j i2 iff j prefers i1 over i2 . (2.2)
Here i,j are complete order relations, namely:
1. Any i ∈ Im and j1 6= j2 ∈ Iw either j1 i j2 or j2 i j1 (but not both),
2. j1 i j2, j2 i j3 implies j1 i j3 for any distinct triple j1, j2, j3 ∈ Iw.
3. Likewise for j where j ∈ Iw.
A matching τ is a bijection i ↔ τ(i): Any man i ∈ Im marries a single woman
τ(i) ∈ Iw, and any woman j ∈ Iw is married to a single man τ−1(j) ∈ Im.
A blocking pair (i, j) ∈ Im × Iw is defined as follows:
• j and i are not married (j 6= τ(i)).
• i prefers j over his mate τ(i): j i τ(i)
• j prefer i over her mate τ−1(j): i j τ−1(j) .
Definition 2.1.1. A marriage τ is called stable if and only if there are no blocking
pairs.
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This is a very natural (although somewhat conservative) definition of stability, as
the existence of a blocking pair will break two married couples and may disturb the
happiness of the rest.
The question of existence of a stable marriage is not trivial. It follows from a
celebrated, constructive algorithm due to Gale and Shapley [15], which we describe
below:
2.1.1 Gale-shapley algorithm
Freedom’s just another word for nothin’ left to lose, Jenis Joplin
1. At the first stage, each man i ∈ Im proposes to the woman j ∈ Iw at the top
of his list. At the end of this stage, some women got proposals (possibly more
than one), other women may not get any proposal.
2. At the second stage, each woman who got more than one proposal, bind the man
whose proposal is most preferable according to her list (who is now engaged).
She releases all the other men who proposed. At the end of this stage, the men’s
set Im is composed of two parts: engaged and released.
3. At the next stage each released man makes a proposal to the next woman in his
preference list (whenever she is engaged or not).
4. Back to stage 2.
It is easy to verify that this process must end at a finite number of steps. At the end
of this process all women and men are engaged. This is a stable matching!
Of course, we could reverse the role of men and women in this algorithm. In both
cases we get a stable matching. The algorithm we indicated is the one which is best
from the men’s point of view. Of course, the reversed case is best for the women. In
fact (see e.g.[33, 22])
Theorem 2.1. For any stable matching τ the rank of the woman τ(i) according to
man i is at most the rank of the woman matched to i by the above, men proposing
algorithm.
Example 2.1.1. .
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men preference
• w1 1 w2 1 w3
• w3 1 w2 1 w1
• w1 1 w2 1 w3
women preference
• m2 1 m3 1 m1
• m1 1 m2 1 m3
• m1 1 m2 1 m3
Men propose:
(
m1
w1
)(
m2
w3
)(
m3
w1
)
⇒
(
m1
w2
)(
m2
w3
)(
m3
w1
)
Women propose:
(
m2
w1
)(
m1
w2
)(
m1
w3
)
⇒
(
m2
w1
)(
m1
w2
)(
m2
w3
)
⇒
(
m2
w1
)(
m1
w2
)(
m3
w3
)
In particular we obtain
Theorem 2.2. A stable matching always exists.
2.2 Where money comes in...
Assume that we can guarantee a ”cut” ui for each married man i, and a cut vj for
each married woman j (both in, say, US dollars). In order to define a stable marriage
we have to impose some conditions which will guarantee that no man or woman can
increase his or her cut by marrying a different partner. For this let us define, for each
pair (i, j), a bargaining set F (i, j) ⊂ R2 which contains all possible cuts (ui, vj) for a
matching of man i with woman j.
Assumption 2.2.1. .
i) For each i ∈ Im and j ∈ Iw, F (i, j) are closed sets in R2. Let F0(i, j) the interior
of F (i, j).
ii) F (i, j) is monotone in the following sense: If (u, v) ∈ F (i, j) then (u′ , v′) ∈ F (i, j)
whenever u
′ ≤ u and v′ ≤ v.
iii) There exist C1, C2 ∈ R such that
{(u, v); max(u, v) ≤ C2} ⊂ F (i, j) ⊂ {(u, v);u+ v ≤ C1}
for any i ∈ Im, j ∈ Iw.
The meaning of the feasibility set is as follows:
Any married couple (i, j) ∈ Im×Iw can guarantee the cut u for i and v for j,
provided (u, v) ∈ F (i, j).
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! < #$% < #&
u
v (#$, #&)
(a) Non-transferable
u
v
! + # ≤ %! + # > %
(b) Transferable
𝑢 + 𝑣 ≤ 𝜃
(c) Case 1
U+≥≥uuuu דלקההאוושמןאכ .
u+v≤θ
(d) Case 2
Figure 2.1: pairwise bargaining sets
Definition 2.2.1. . A matching τ : Im → Iw is stable iff there exists a vector
(u1, . . . uN , v1 . . . vN ) ∈ R2N such that (ui, vj) ∈ R2−F0(i, j) for any (i, j) ∈ Im×Iw,
and (ui, vτ(i)) ∈ F (i, τ(i)) for any i ∈ Iw.
We now demonstrate that Definition 2.2.1 is a generalization of stable marriage
in the non-transferable case, as described in section 2.1 above. For this we quantify
the preference list introduced in (2.1, 2.2). Assume that a man i ∈ Im will gain the
cut θm(i, j) if he marries the woman j ∈ Iw. So, the vector θm(i, 1), . . . θm(i,N) is a
numeration of (2.1). In particular, j1 i j2 iff θm(i, j1) > θm(i, j2).
Likewise, we associate a cut θw(i, j) for a woman j ∈ Iw marrying a man i ∈ Im,
such that i1 j i2 iff θm(i, j1) > θm(i, j2).
Define the feasibility sets
F (i, j) := {u ≤ θm(i, j); v ≤ θw(i, j)} (2.3)
see Fig [2.1-a]. Suppose now τ is a stable matching according to Definition 2.2.1.
Let (u1, . . . uN , v1, . . . vN ) as given in Definition 2.2.1. We obtain that for any man
i, (ui, vτ(i)) ∈ F (i, τ(i)) which, by (2.3) is equivalent to ui ≤ θm(i, τ(i)) and vτ(i) ≤
θw(i, τ(i)). Likewise, for any woman j, (uτ−1(j), vj) ∈ F (τ−1(j), j) which, by (2.3) is
equivalent to uτ−1(j) ≤ θm(τ−1(j), j) and vj ≤ θw(τ−1(j), j).
If j 6= τ(i) then, by definition again, (ui, vj) 6∈ F0(i, j) which means, by (2.3), that
either ui ≥ θm(i, j) and/or vj ≥ θw(i, j). Hence either θm(i, τ(i)) ≥ θm(i, j) and/or
θw(τ
−1(j), j) ≥ θw(i, j). According to our interpretation it means that either man i
prefers woman τ(i) over j, or woman j prefers man τ−1(j) over i. That is, (i, j) is not
a blocking pair.
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2.3 Marriage under sharing
In the case we allow sharing (transferable utility) we assume that each married couple
may share their individual cuts. Thus, if θm(i, j), θw(i, j) are as defined in the non-
transferable case above, man i can transfer a sum w to woman j (in order to prevent
a gender bias we assume that w can be negative as well). Thus, the man’s cut from
this marriage is θm(i, j) − w, while the woman’s cut is θw(i, j) + w. Since we do not
prescribe w, the feasibility set for a pair (i, j) takes the form
F (i, j) := {(u, v) : u+ v ≤ θ(i, j)} (2.4)
where
θ(i, j) := θm(i, j) + θw(i, j) ,
c.f. Fig 2.1-b. The definition of a stable marriage in the transferable case is implied
from Definition 2.2.1 in this special case:
Definition 2.3.1. A matching τ is stable iff there exists (u1, . . . uN , v1, . . . vN ) ∈ R2N
such that ui + vτ(i) = θ(i, τ(i)) for any i, and ui + vj ≥ θ(i, j) for any i, j.
It turns out that there are several equivalent definitions of stable marriages in the
sense of Definition 2.3.1. Here we introduces three of these
Theorem 2.3. τ is a stable marriage in the sense of Definition 2.3.1 iff one of the
following equivalent conditions is satisfied:
i) Optimality: There exists (u01, . . . v
0
N ) ∈ R2N satisfying
u0i + v
0
τ(i) = θ(i, τ(i))
for any i ∈ Im which minimizes ∑i∈I(ui + vi) over the set
W := {(u1, . . . vN ) ∈ R2N ; ui + vj ≥ θ(i, j) ∀(i, j) ∈ Im × Iw} .
ii) Efficiency: τ maximizes
∑N
i=1 θ(i, σ(i)) on the set of all matchings σ : Im → Iw.
iii) Cyclic monotonicity: For any chain i1, . . . ik ∈ {1, . . . N}, the inequality
k∑
j=1
(θ(ij , τ(ij))− θ(ij , τ(ij+1)) ≥ 0 (2.5)
holds, where ik+1 = i1.
In particular
Corollary 2.3.1. A stable matching according to Definition 2.3.1 always exists.
For the proof of Theorem 2.3 see section 2.6. In fact, the reader may, at this point,
skip sections 2.4-2.5 and chapter 3 as the rest of the book is independent of these.
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2.4 General case
In the general case of Assumption 2.2.1, the existence of a stable matching follows
from the following Theorem:
Theorem 2.4. Let V ⊂ R2N defined as follows: (u1, . . . uN , v1, . . . vN ) ∈ V
⇔ ∃ an injection τ : Im → Iw such that (ui, vτ(i)) ∈ F (i, τ(i)) ∀ i ∈ Im .
Then there exists (u1, . . . uN , v1, . . . vN ) ∈ V such that
(ui, vj) ∈ R2 − F0(i, j) (2.6)
for any (i, j) ∈ Im × Iw.
The set of vectors in V satisfying (2.6) is called the core. Definition 2.2.1 can now
be recognized as the non-emptiness of the core, which is equivalent to the existence of
a stable matching.
Theorem 2.4 is, in fact, a special case the celebrated Theorem of Scarf [39] for
cooperative games, tailored to the marriage scenario. As we saw, it can be applied to
the fully non-transferable case (2.3), as well as to the fully transferable case (2.4).
There are other, sensible models of partial transfers which fit into the formalism
of Definition 2.2.1 and Theorem 2.4. Let us consider several examples:
1. Transferable marriages restricted to non-negative cuts : In the transferable case
the feasibility sets may contain negative cuts for the man u or for the woman v
(even though not for both, if it is assumed θ(i, j) > 0). To avoid the undesired
stable marriages were one of the partners get a negative cut we may replace the
feasibility set(2.4) by
F (i, j) := {(u, v) ∈ R2;u+ v ≤ θ(i, j) , u ≤ θ(i, j) , v ≤ θ(i, j)} ,
see Fig [2.1-c]. It can be easily verified that if (u1, . . . vN ) ∈ V contains negative
components, then ([u1]+, . . . [vN ]+), obtained by replacing the negative compo-
nents by 0, is in V as well. Thus, the core of this game contains vectors in V of
non-negative elements.
2. In the transferable case (2.4) we allowed both men and women to transfer money
to their partner. Indeed, we assumed that the man’s i cut is θm(i, j) − w and
the woman’s j cut is θw(i, j) +w, where w ∈ R. Suppose we wish to allow only
transfer between men to women, so we insists on w ≥ 0.1 In that case we choose
(Fig 2.1-d)
F (i, j) := {(u, v) ∈ R2; u+ v ≤ θ(i, j); u ≤ θm(i, j)} .
3. Let us assume that the transfer w from man i to woman j is taxed, and the tax
depends on i, j. Thus, if man i transfers w > 0 to a woman j he reduces his cut
by w, but the woman cut is increased by an amount βi,jw, were βi,j ∈ [0, 1].
Here 1− βi,j is the tax implied for this transfer. It follows that
ui ≤ θm(i, j)− w ; vj ≤ θw(i, j) + βi,jw , w ≥ 0
1Of course we could make the opposite assumption w ≤ 0. We leave the reader to change
this example according to his view on political correctness...
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Hence
F (i, j) := {(u, v) ∈ R2; ui + β−1i,j vj ≤ θβ(i, j), ui ≤ θm(i, j)} ,
where θβ(i, j) := θm(i, j)+β
−1
i,j θw(i, j). This is demonstrated by Fig 2.1-d where
the dashed line is tilted.
2.5 Stability by fake promises
We now describe a different notion of stability. Suppose a man can make a promise
to a married woman (which is not his wife), and v.v. The principle behind it is that
each of them does not intend to honor his/her own promise, but, nevertheless, believes
that the other parti will honor her/his promise. It is also based on some collaboration
between the set of betraying couples.
For simplicity of presentation we assume that the matching τ is given by ”the
identity” τ(i) = i, where i ∈ Im represent a man, and i = τ(i) ∈ Iw represents that
matched woman. Evidently, we can always assume this by ordering the list of men (or
women) in a different way.
Let us repeat the definition of stability in the context of non-transferable matching
(Definition 2.1.1). For this, we recall the definition of a blocking pair (i, j):
θm(i, j) > θm(i, i) and θw(i, j) > θw(j, j) ,
which we rewrite as
∆(0)(i, j) := min{θm(i, j)− θm(i, i), θw(i, j)− θw(j, j)} > 0 . (2.7)
Assume that a man i ∈ Im can offer some bribe b to any other women j he might be
interested in (except his own wife, so j 6= i). His cut for marrying j is now θm(i, j)−b.
The cut of the woman j should have been θw(i, j) + b. However, the happy woman
should pay some tax for accepting this bribe. Let q ∈ [0, 1] be the fraction of the bribe
she can get (after paying her tax). Her supposed cut for marrying i is just θw(i, j)+qb.
Woman j will believe and accept offer from man i if two conditions are satisfied: the
offer should be both
1. Competitive, namely θw(i, j) + qb ≥ θw(j, j).
2. Trusted, if woman j believes that man i is motivated. This implies θm(i, j)−b ≥
θm(i, i).
The two conditions above can be satisfied, and the offer is acceptable, if
q(θm(i, j)− θm(i, i)) + θw(i, j)− θw(j, j) > 0 . (2.8)
Symmetrically, man i will accept an offer from a woman j 6= i if
q(θw(i, j)− θw(i, i)) + θm(i, j)− θm(j, j) > 0 . (2.9)
Let us define the utility of the exchange i↔ j:
∆(q)(i, j) := min
{
q(θm(i, j)− θm(i, i)) + θw(i, j)− θw(j, j)
q(θw(i, j)− θw(j, j)) + θm(i, j)− θm(i, i)
}
, (2.10)
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so, a blocking-q pair (i, j) is defined by the condition that the utility of exchange is
positive for both parties:
∆(q)(i, j) > 0 . (2.11)
Evidently, if q = 0 there is no point of bribing, so a blocking pair corresponding to
(2.11) is equivalent to condition (2.7) for the non-transferable case, as expected. For
the other extreme case (q = 1) where the bribe is not penalized, the expected profit
of both i, j is the same, and equals
∆(1)(i, j) = θm(i, j)− θm(i, i) + θw(i, j)− θw(j, j) . (2.12)
We now consider an additional parameter p ∈ [0, 1] and define the real valued
function on R:
x 7→ [x]p := [x]+ − p[x]− (2.13)
Note that [x]p = x for any p if x ≥ 0, while [x]1 = x for any real x.
Definition 2.5.1. Let 0 ≤ p, q ≤ 1. The matching τ(i) = i is (p, q)−stable if for any
k ∈ N and i1, i2, . . . ik ∈ {1, . . . N}
k∑
l=1
[
∆(q)(il, il+1)
]
p
≤ 0 where ik+1 = i1
where ik+1 := i1.
What does it mean? Within the chain of pairs exchange
(i1, i1)→ (i1, i2), . . . (ik−1, ik−1)→ (ik−1, ik), (ik, ik)→ (ik, i1)
each of the pair exchange (il, il) → (il, il+1) yields a utility ∆(q)(il, il+1) for the new
pair. The lucky new pairs in this chain of couples exchange are those who makes a
positive utility. The unfortunate new pairs are those whose utility is non-positive.
The lucky pairs, whose interest is to activate this chain, are ready to compensate
the unfortunate ones by contributing some of their gained utility. The chain will be
activated (and the original marriages will break down) if the mutual contribution of
the fortunate pairs is enough to cover at least the p− part of the mutually loss of utility
of the unfortunate pairs. This is the condition
∑
∆(q)(il,il+1)>0
∆(q)(il, il+1) + p
∑
∆(q)(il,il+1)<0
∆(q)(il, il+1) ≡
k∑
l=1
[
∆(q)(il, il+1)
]
p
> 0 .
 Definition 2.5.1 grantees that no such chain is activated.
In order to practice this definition, lets look at the extreme cases:
• p = 0, q = 0. In particular, there is no bribing: A (0, 0)−stable marriage is
precisely the stability in the non-transferable case introduced in Section 2.1.
• p = q = 1. Definition 2.5.1 implies stability if and only if
k∑
l=1
∆(1)(il, il+1) ≤ 0 (2.14)
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for any k−chain and any k ∈ N. Let θ(i, j) := θm(i, j) + θw(i, j). Then, (2.10)
implies that (2.14) is satisfied if and only if
k∑
l=1
θ(il, il+1)− θ(il, il) ≤ 0 where ik+1 = i1 , (2.15)
(check it!).
By point (iii) of Theorem 2.3 and Corollary 2.3.1 we obtain the (not really surprising)
result
Corollary 2.5.1. A matching is (1,1) stable iff it is stable in the completely transfer-
able case (2.4). In particular, there always exists a (1, 1)−stable matching.
The observation (2.7) and the definition [x]0 := [x]+ imply, together with Theorem
2.2,
Corollary 2.5.2. A matching is (0,0) stable iff it is stable in the non-transferable
case (2.3). In particular, there always exists a (0, 0)−stable matching.
We now point out the following observation
Theorem 2.5. If τ is (p, q)−stable, then τ is also (p′ , q′)−stable for p′ ≥ p and
q
′ ≤ q.
The proof of this Theorem follows from the definitions (2.10, 2.13) and the following
Lemma 2.1. For any , i 6= j and 1 ≥ q > q′ ≥ 0,
(1 + q)−1∆(q)(i, j) > (1 + q
′
)−1∆(q
′
)(i, j).
Proof. For a, b ∈ R and r ∈ [0, 1] define
∆r(a, b) :=
1
2
(a+ b)− r
2
|a− b| .
Observe that ∆1(a, b) ≡ min(a, b). In addition, r 7→ ∆r(a, b) is monotone not increas-
ing in r. A straightforward calculation yields
min(qa+ b, qb+ a) = ∆1(qa+ b, qb+ a) = (q + 1)∆ 1−q
1+q
(a, b) ,
and the Lemma follows from the above observation, upon inserting a = θm(i, j) −
θm(i, i) and b = θw(i, j)− θw(j, j).
What can be said about the existence of s (p, q)− stable matching in the general
case? Unfortunately, we can prove now only a negative result:
Proposition 2.1. For any 1 ≥ q > p ≥ 0, a stable marriage does not exist uncondi-
tionally.
Proof. We only need to present a counter-example. So, let N = 2. To show that the
matching τ(1) = 1, τ(2) = 2 is not stable we have to show[
∆(q)(1, 2)
]
p
+
[
∆(q)(2, 1)
]
p
> 0 (2.16)
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while, to show that τ(1) = 2, τ(2) = 1 is not stable we have to show[
∆(q)(1, 1)
]
p
+
[
∆(q)(2, 2)
]
p
> 0 . (2.17)
By definition (2.10) and Lemma 2.1
∆(q)(1, 2) = (q + 1)∆r (θm(1, 2)− θm(1, 1), θw(1, 2)− θw(2, 2))
∆(q)(2, 1) = (q + 1)∆r (θm(2, 1)− θm(2, 2), θw(2, 1)− θw(1, 1))
where r = 1−q
1+q
. To obtain ∆(q)(1, 1),∆(q)(2, 2) we just have to exchange man 1 with
man 2, so
∆(q)(2, 2) = (q + 1)∆r (θm(2, 2)− θm(2, 1), θw(2, 2)− θw(1, 2))
∆(q)(1, 1) = (q + 1)∆r (θm(1, 1)− θm(1, 2), θw(1, 1)− θw(2, 1)) .
All in all, we only have 4 parameters to play with:
a1 := θm(1, 2)− θm(1, 1), a2 = θw(1, 2)− θw(2, 2) ,
b1 = θm(2, 1)− θm(2, 2), b2 = θw(2, 1)− θw(1, 1) ,
so the two conditions to be verified are
[∆r(a1, a2)]p + [∆r(b1, b2)]p > 0 ; [∆r(−a1,−b2)]p + [∆r(−b1,−a2)]p > 0 .
Let us insert a1 = a2 := a > 0. b1 = b2 := −b where b > 0. So
[∆r(a1, a1)]p = a, [∆r(b1, b2)]p = −pb ,
while ∆r(−a1,−b2) = ∆r(−b1,−a2) = b−a2 − r2 (a + b). In particular, the condition
a
b
< 1−r
1+r
implies [∆r(−a1,−b2)]p = [∆r(−b1,−a2)]p > 0 which verifies (2.17). On the
other hand, if a − pb > 0 then (2.16) is verified. Both conditions can be verified if
1−r
1+r
> p. Recalling q = 1−r
1+r
we obtain the result.
Based on Theorem 2.5 and Proposition 2.1 we propose:
Conjecture: There always exists a stable (p, q)− marriage iff q ≤ p.
2.6 The discrete Monge problem
In Theorem 2.3 now encountered, for the first time, the Monge problem in its discrete
setting:
Let {θ(i, j)} be an N × N matrix of rewards. The reward of a given bijection
τ : Im ↔ Iw is defined as
θ(τ) :=
N∑
i=1
θ(i, τ(i)) . (2.18)
Definition 2.6.1. A bijection τ is a Monge solution with respect to {c} if it maximizes
τ 7→ θ(τ) among all bijections.
CHAPTER 2. THE STABLE MARRIAGE PROBLEM 27
P=1
q=1
Non-existence
?
Figure 2.2: Conjecture: Is there an unconditional existence of stable marriages
in the gray area?
Theorem 2.3 claims, in particular, that τ is a Monge solution iff it is a stable
marriage with respect to transferable utility (2.4). To show it we first establish the
equivalence between Monge solutions (ii) to cyclically monotone matching, as defined
in part (iii) of this Theorem.
Again we may assume, with no limitation of generality, that τ(i) = i is a Monge
solution, namely
N∑
i=1
θ(i, i) ≥
N∑
i=1
θ(i, σ(i))
for any other matching σ. Given a k−chain {i1, . . . ik}, consider the associated cyclic
permutation σ(i1) = i2, . . . σ(ik−1) = ik, σ(ik) = i1. Then θ(σ◦τ) ≤ θ(τ) by definition.
On the other hand, θ(τ)− θ(σ ◦ τ) is precisely the left side of (2.5)
k∑
j=1
θ(ij , ij))− θ(ij , ij+1) ≥ 0 .
In the opposite direction: let
− u0i := inf
k−chains,k∈N
(
k−1∑
l=1
θ(il, il)− θ(il+1, il)
)
+ θ(ik, ik)− θ(i, ik) . (2.19)
Let α > −u0i and consider a k−chain realizing
α >
(
k−1∑
l=1
θ(il, il)− θ(il+1, il)
)
+ θ(ik, ik)− θ(i, ik) . (2.20)
By cyclic monotonicity,
∑k
l=1 θ(il, il)− θ(il+1, il) ≥ 0. Since ik+1 = i1,
k−1∑
l=1
θ(il, il)− θ(il+1, il) ≥ θ(i1, ik)− θ(ik, ik) ,
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so (2.20) implies
α > θ(i1, ik)− θ(i, ik) ≥ 0 ,
in particular u0i <∞.
Hence, for any j ∈ Im
α+ θ(i, i)− θ(j, i) >
(
k−1∑
l=1
θ(il, il)− θ(il+1, il)
)
+ θ(ik, ik)− θ(i, ik) + θ(i, i)− θ(j, i) ≥ −u0j (2.21)
where the last inequality follows by the substitution of the k + 1−cycle i, i1 . . . ik
(whereik+1 = i) in (2.19). Since α is any number bigger than −u0i it follows
− u0i + θ(i, i)− θ(j, i) ≥ −u0j , (2.22)
To prove that the Monge solution is stable, we define v0j := θ(j, j)− u0j so
u0j + v
0
j = θ(j, j) . (2.23)
Then (2.22) implies (after interchanging i and j)
u0i + v
0
j = u
0
i + θ(j, j)− u0j ≥ u0i − u0i + θ(i, j) = θ(i, j) (2.24)
for any i, j. Thus, (2.23,2.24) establish that τ(i) = i is a stable marriage via Definition
2.3.1.
Finally, to establish the equivalence of the optimality condition (i) in Theorem 2.3
to condition (ii) (Monge solution), we note that for any (u1, . . . vN ) ∈ W , ∑Ni=1 ui +
vi ≥∑Ni=1 θ(i, i), while (u01, . . . v0N ) calculated above is in W and satisfy the equality.
Chapter 3
Many to few: Stable
partitions
The employer generally gets the employees he deserves (J. Paul Getty)
3.1 A non-transferable Partition problem
We now abandon the gender approach of chapter 2. Instead of the men-women groups
Im, Iw, let us consider a set I of I ∈ N agents (firms) and set of consumers (employees)
X. We do not assume, as in Chapter 2, that the two sets are of equal cardinality. In
fact, we take the cardinality of X to be much larger than that of I. It can also be
(and in general is) an infinite set.
Let us start from the ordinal viewpoint: We equip X with a sigma-algebra A ⊂ 2X
such that X ∈ A as well as, for any x ∈ X, {x} ∈ A, and an atomless, positive measure
µ:
(X,A, µ) ; µ : A → R+ ∪ {0} . (3.1)
In addition, we consider the structure of preference list generalizing (2.1, 2.2): Each
firm i ∈ I orders the potential employees X according to a strict preference list. Let
i be a strict, measurable order relation on X. That is,
Definition 3.1.1. .
i) non-symmetric: For any x 6= y either x i y or y i x (but not both).
ii) Transitive: x i y, y i z implies x i z for any distinct triple x, y, z ∈ X.
iii) ∀y ∈ X, i ∈ I, Ai(y) := {x ∈ X; x i y} ∈ A.
iv) If x1 i x2 then µ (y; (y i x2) ∩ (x1 i y)) > 0.
In addition, for any x ∈ X we also assume the existence of order relation x on I
such that
Definition 3.1.2. .
29
CHAPTER 3. MANY TO FEW: STABLE PARTITIONS 30
i) non-symmetric: For any i 6= j either i x j or j x i (but not both).
ii) Transitive: i x j, j x k implies i x k for any distinct triple i, j, k ∈ I.
iii) ∀i 6= j ∈ I, {x ∈ X; i x j} ∈ A.
Thus
The firm i prefers to hire x ∈ X over y ∈ X iff x i y. Likewise, a candidate
x ∈ X prefers firm i over j as a employer iff i x j.
What is the extension of a bijection τ : Im ↔ Iw to that case? Since the cardinality
of X is larger than that of I, there are no such bijections. We replace the bijection τ
by a measurable mapping τ : X → I.
We can think about such a surjection as a partition
~A := {Ai ∈ A, i ∈ I, Ai ∩Aj = ∅ if i 6= j, ∪i∈IAi = X , }
where Ai := τ
−1(i). We also consider cases where τ is not a surjection, so there are
unemployed people A0 and ∪i∈IAi ⊂ X.
Another assumption we make is that the capacity of the firms can be limited. That
is, for any firm i ∈ I, the number of its employees are not larger than some mi > 0:
µ(Ai) ≤ mi.
Note that we do not impose any condition on the capacities mi (except positivity).
In particular,
∑
i∈Imi can be either smaller, equal or bigger than µ(X). Evidently, if∑
i∈Imi < µ(X) then there is an unemployed set of positive measure.
Let us define a ”fictitious firm” {0} which contains all unfortunate candidates
which are not accepted by any firm. The order relation (X,x) is extended to I ∪{0}
as i x 0 for any i ∈ I and any x ∈ X (i.e we assume that anybody prefers an
employment by any firm over unemployment).
Definition 3.1.3. Let ~m := (m1, . . .mN ) ∈ RN+ . Let ~A := (A1, . . . AN ) be a subparti-
tion and A0 := X − ∪i∈IAi.
Such a sub-partition ~A is called an ~m−subpartition if µ(Ai) ≤ mi for any i ∈ I,
and µ(A0) = 0 ∨ {µ(X)−∑i∈Imi}.
Definition 3.1.4. A subpartition is called stable if, for any i 6= j, i, j ∈ I ∪ {0} and
any x ∈ Ai, either i x j or y j x for any y ∈ Aj.
Theorem 3.1. For any ~m ∈ RN+ there exists a stable ~m−subpartition.
The proof of this Theorem, outlined in section 3.1.1 below, is a constructive one. It
is based on a generalization of the Gale-Shapley algorithm, described in section 2.1.1.
For describing this algorithm we need few more definitions: For any i ∈ I and
A ∈ A, the set C(1)i (A) ∈ A is the set of all candidates in A whose i is the first choice:
C
(1)
i (A) := {x ∈ A;∀j 6= i, i x j} .
By recursion we define C
(k)
i (A) to be the set of employees in A such that i is their
k−choice: C(k)i (A) :=
{x ∈ A; ∃Ik−1 ⊂ I; i 6∈ Ik−1; |Ik−1| = k − 1;
∀j ∈ Ik−1, j x i; ∀j ∈ I − (Ik−1 ∪ {i}), i x j} .
By definition, C
(k)
i (A) ∈ A for any i ∈ I, k = 1, . . . N and A ∈ A.
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3.1.1 The Gale-Shapley algorithm for partitions
At the beginning of each step k there is a subset Xk−1 ⊂ X of free candidates. At the
beginning of the first step all candidates are free so X0 := X.
At the first stage, each x ∈ X0 applies to the firm at the top of his list. So, at
the end of this stage, each firm i gets an employment request from C
(1)
i (X0) (which,
incidentally, can be empty).
At the second part of the first stage, each firm evaluates the number of requests
she got. If µ(C
(1)
i (X0)) < mi she keeps all candidates and we define A
(1)
i := C
(1)
i (X0).
Otherwise, she ejects all less favorable candidates until she fill her quota mi: Let
A
(1)
i := ∪y∈X
{
Ai(y) ∩ C(1)i (X0); µ(Ai(y) ∩ C(1)i (X0)) ≤ mi
}
.
where Ai(y) as in Definition 3.1.1-(iii).
Note that A
(1)
i ∈ A. Indeed, let α(y) := µ(Ai(y) ∩ C(1)i (X0)) and
mi := sup
y∈X
{α(y); α(y) ≤ mi} .
Then there exists a sequence yn ∈ X such that α(yn) is monotone non-decreasing and
limα(yn) = mi. We obtain that
A
(1)
i ≡ ∪n
{
Ai(yn) ∩ C(1)i (X0)
}
so A
(1)
i ∈ A since Ai(yn) and C(1)i (X0) are both in A.
The set of candidates who where rejected at the end of the first step is the set of
free candidates
X1 := X − ∪i∈IA(1)i .
At the k + 1 stage we consider the set of free candidates Xk as the set who where
rejected at the end of the k stage. Each employee in Xk was rejected n times, for some
1 ≤ n ≤ k. So each x ∈ Xk who was rejected n times, proposes to the firm i if i is the
next (n+ 1) firm on its priority list, that is, if x ∈ C(n+1)i (X). Note that for any such
person there exists a chain 1 ≤ l1 < l2 < . . . < ln = k such that
x ∈ ∩j≤nXlj − (∪1≤q<k;q 6=ij ;1≤j≤nXq) := Xl1,...ln .
So, the firm i obtains, at the end of the first part of the k + 1 step, the candidate
Aˆ
(k+1)
i who is composed of her previous candidates A
(k)
i , and the new candidates.
Thus
Aˆ
(k+1)
i := A
(k)
i ∪n≤k ∪{l1,...ln};1≤l1<...ln=kC(n+1)i (Xl1,...ln) .
At the second step of the k + 1 stage, the firm i evaluates again its candidates
set Aˆ
(k+1)
i . If µ
(
Aˆ
(k+1)
i
)
≤ mi then A(k+1)i = Aˆ(k+1)i . Otherwise she rejects all less
favorable candidates to obtain
A
(k+1)
i := ∩y∈X
{
Ai(y) ∩ Aˆi(k + 1); µ(Ai(y) ∩ Aˆ(k+1)i ) ≥ mi
}
.
Note that A
(k)
i ∈ A for k ≥ 1 by the same argument which implies A(1)i ∈ A.
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Proof. of Theorem 3.1:
Each candidate applies at most once to any of the firms. Candidates who applied,
after a finite number of steps, to all I firms will be rejected at all the next steps. Let
us call A0 the set of all these candidates.
So, for any x 6∈ A0 there exists i ∈ I such that x ∈ A(k)i for all k large enough.
Define
Ai := lim inf
k→∞
A
(k)
i .
It follows that µ(Ai) ≤ lim infk→∞ µ(A(k)i ) ≤ mi. If µ(A0) > µ(X) −
∑
i∈Imi then
µ(Ai) < mi for some i ∈ I. This, on the other hand, implies A0 = ∅ by the algorithm,
and a contradiction. Hence ~A is an ~m−subpartition.
Next, assume x ∈ Ai and j x i. By the algorithm, x had applied to j at some
step, and were rejected by j at some later step (otherwise he belongs to A
(k)
j for all k
large enough, hence x ∈ Aj). It follows that i x j. This completes the conditions of
Definition 3.1.3.
It can be shown that the stable partition obtained by the algorithm described in
Section 3.1.1 is the best one for the candidates. In fact the following can be obtained:
Theorem 3.2. If A˜1, . . . A˜N is another ~m−stable partition for the order relations
x,i, and if x ∈ A˜i for some i ∈ I ∪ {0}, then either x ∈ Ai or x ∈ Aj for some
i x j. Here A1, . . . AN is the ~m−partition obtained in Section 3.1.1.
The algorithm described in Section 3.1.1 can be reversed. If, at each step, the firms
propose to their favorable candidates (instead of the other way around), the algorithm
will converge to an ~m−stable partition as well. The last algorithm will be the best
from the point of view of the firms.
3.2 Transferable utilities
As we did in Chapter 2, it may be possible to quantify the utilities of firms and
candidates, and then allow a transfer of money between a firm and her employees, as
well as between different firms and employees.
We may generalize Definition 2.2.1 and define the feasibility sets
(i, x) ∈ I ×X ⇒ F (i, x) ∈ 2R2
where v is the utility of x, u the utility of i, and (u, v) ∈ F (i, x) iff x is employed by i.
At this stage we only assume that F (i, x) are closed, monotone sets in R2 and denote
F0(i, x) the interior of F (i, x). Recall that F (i, x) monotone means
(u, v) ∈ F (i, x) and u′ ≤ u, v′ ≤ v implies (u′ , v′) ∈ F (i, x) .
If we allow an unemployment, we extend the definition of F to
F (0, x) := R2−
for any x ∈ X. In that case, however, we must insist that F (i, x) ∩ R2++ 6= ∅ for any
x ∈ X and i 6= 0.
The definition of a stable partition is a direct generalization of Definition 2.2.1:
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Definition 3.2.1. A partition A0, . . . AN of X is stable iff there exists a function
v = v(x) : X → R and a vector (u1, . . . uN ) ∈ RN such that x ∈ Ai iff
1. (ui, v(x)) ∈ F (i, x),
2. (uj , v(x)) ∈ R2 − F0(j, x) for any j 6= i.
The existence of stable ~m−partition (recall Definition 3.1.3) in this general setting
is beyond the scope of this book. In non-transferable case we may generalize the
matrices θm, θw of section 2.2 and define a pair of functions
~ψ : I ×X → R+ , ~φ : I ×X → R+ where
ψi(x) := ψ(i, x) is the utility of the firm i for hiring x. Likewise, φi(x) :=
φ(i, x) is the utility of candidate x if hired by the firm i.
The order relation i x j is now replaced by φi(x) > φj(x), and x i y by
ψi(x) > ψi(y). However, the cases φi(x) = φj(y) and ψi(x) = ψi(y) violate condition
(i) in Definitions 3.1.1, 3.1.2. For x,i to be consistent with these Definitions we
omit from the set X all points for which there is an equality of ψi(x) = ψj(x) or
φi(x) = φi(y). Let
∆1(X) := {x ∈ X; ∃y 6= x, i ∈ I, φi(x) = φi(y)} ,
∆2(X) := {x ∈ X; ∃i 6= j ∈ I, ψi(x) = ψj(x)} ,
and define X0 := X − (∆1(X) ∪∆2(X)). Then
∀x, y ∈ X0, i, j ∈ I ; i x j iff φi(x) > φj(x), x i y iff ψi(x) = ψj(y) . (3.2)
As in section 3.1 we consider the ”null firm” {0} and φ0(x) = 0 for all x ∈ X, while
φi(x) > 0 for any x ∈ X, i ∈ I. Under the above definition, the non-transferable
partition model is obtained under the following definition of feasibility sets:
F (i, x) := {(u, v); u ≤ ψi(x) v ≤ φi(x)} , i ∈ I, x ∈ X0 (3.3)
where φi, ψi are assumed to be strictly positive, measurable functions on X0. The
existence of a stable ~m−partition under (3.3) is, then, guaranteed by Theorem 3.1.
The case where firms and employees share their utilities is a generalization of (2.4):
F (i, x) := {(u, v);u+ v ≤ θi(x)} (3.4)
where
θi(x) := φi(x) + ψi(x) .
The existence of stable ~m−partitions in the transferable case (3.4), and its gener-
alization, is the main topic of this book!
We may also attempt to generalize the notion of q−blocking pairs with respect to
a partition ~A ∈ PN . In analogy to (2.10), (x, y) is a blocking pair if x ∈ Ai, y ∈ Aj
and ∆(q)(x, y) > 0 where
∆(q)(x, y) := min
{
q(ψj(x)− ψi(x)) + φj(x)− φj(y)
q(φj(x)− φj(y)) + ψj(x)− ψi(x)
}
. (3.5)
Definition 2.5.1 is generalized as follows:
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Definition 3.2.2. Given a partition ~A, a k−chain is a sequence
xi1 . . . xik where xil ∈ Ail for any 1 ≤ l ≤ k, and xik = xi1 ,
(in particular, ik = i1).
A partition ~A in X0 is (p, q)−stable if for any k ∈ N, any k−chain
k∑
l=1
[
∆(q)(xil , xil+1)
]
p
≤ 0 ,
where [·]p as defined in (2.13).
What does it mean? Again let us assume first q = 0 (no bribing) and p = 0 (no
sharing). Then
A partition ~A is (0, 0)−unstable iff there exist x ∈ Ai, y ∈ Aj , i 6= j for
which ∆(0)(x, y) > 0. This implies that ψj(x) > ψi(x) and, in addition,
φj(x) > φj(y). Surly x will prefer the agent j over his assigned agent i,
and the agent j will prefer x over one of his assigned customer y as well.
So, j will kick y out and x will join j instead, for the benefit of both x
and j.
In particular,
Any stable (0, 0)−subpartition is a stable subpartition in the sense of
Definition 3.1.4.
What about the other extreme case p = q = 1? It implies (using ik+1 = i1)
k∑
l=1
∆(1)τ (xil , xil+1) ≡
k∑
l=1
ψil(xil+1)− ψil+1(xil+1) + φil(xil+1)− φil(xil) ≡
≡
k∑
l=1
θil(xil+1)− θil+1(xil+1) ≤ 0 (3.6)
where θi as defined in (3.4).
Let us define ~A to be θ−cyclic monotone iff for any k ∈ N, and k−chain (i1, . . . ik)
in I and any xi1 ∈ Ail , 1 ≤ l ≤ k,
k∑
l=1
θil(xil+1)− θil(xil) ≤ 0 .
In the complete cooperative economy, were a firm i and an employee x share
their utilities θi(x) = ψi(x) + φi(x), a partition ~A is (1, 1)−stable iff it is
cyclical monotone. It means that
Not all members of any given chain of replacements xi1 →
xi2 , xi2 → xi3 . . . xik → xik+1 ≡ xi1 , xil ∈ Ail will gain util-
ity, even if the other member are ready to share their benefits
(and losses) among themselves.
The connection between a stable partition in the (1, 1) sense and the (3.4) sense is
not evident. In the next chapter we discuss this subject in some details.
Chapter 4
Monge partitions
The purpose of a business is to create a customer. (Peter Drucker)
We pose some structure on X and the utility functions θi.
Standing Assumption 4.0.1. .
i) X is a compact topological space.
ii) The N utility functions θ1, . . . θN : X → R are continuous.
We find it convenient to change the interpretation of candidates/firms of Chapter
3 as follows: The set X is the set of customers (or consumers), and the set I is the
set of agents (or experts). The function θi : X → R represents the ”utility” of agent
i, namely, θi(x) it is the the surplus of the coupling of x to i.
Definition 4.0.1. An Open N Subpartition of X is a collection of N disjoint open
subsets of X. We denote the collection of all such subpartitions by
OSPN :=
{
~A = (A1, . . . , AN ), Ai is an open subset of X , Ai ∩Aj = ∅ if i 6= j
}
.
For any ~A ∈ OSPN we denote A0 := X − ∪i∈IAi.
Definition 4.0.2. An open subpartition ~A is stable iff it is cyclically monotone with
respect to A0, A1, . . . , AN , i.e, for any k ∈ N and any k−chain xi1 , . . . xik , il ∈ I ∪{0}
where xil is an interior point of Ail , 1 ≤ l ≤ k,
k∑
l=1
θil(xil)− θil+1(xil) ≥ 0 . (4.1)
Here θik+1 := θii and θ0 ≡ 0.
Note that, since Ai are open sets for i ∈ I, then the condition ”xil is an interior
point of Ail” simply means xil ∈ Ail if il 6= 0. If A0 has a null interior then we only
consider chains in I.
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4.1 Capacities
Here we assume that the agents have a limited capacity. This symbolizes the total
number of consumers each agent can serve. For this we define an additional structure
on the set X:
Standing Assumption 4.1.1. A is the Borel σ-algebra corresponding to the assumed
topology of X. µ is a given positive, regular and atomless Borel measure on (X,A),
and X = supp(µ).
Let us recall that if µ is regular positive Borel measure on X, then for any A ∈ A,
A 6= ∅ and any  > 0 there exists an open U ⊃ A and a compact K ⊂ A such that
µ(U) ≤ µ(A) + , µ(K) ≥ µ(A)−  .
An atom of µ is a point x ∈ X for which µ({x}) > 0. An atomless measure contains
no atoms.
Recall that supp(µ) is a closed set, obtain as the intersection of all compact sets
K ⊆ X for which µ(K) = µ(X).
The measure µ represents the distribution of the consumers: for A ∈ A, µ(A)
stands for the number of consumers in A (not necessarily an integer). The meaning
of a limited capacity mi > 0 for an agent i is µ(Ai) ≤ mi.
The set of open subpartitions subjected to a given capacity ~m := (m1, . . .mN ),
mi ≥ 0 is denoted by
OSPN{≤~m} = { ~A := (A1, . . .AN ) ∈ OSPN ; µ(Ai) ≤ mi} . (4.2)
More generally: For any closed set K ⊂ RN+ ,
OSPNK := { ~A := (A1, . . .AN ) ∈ OSPN ; (µ(A1) . . . , µ(AN )) ∈ K} . (4.3)
In particular, if
K = K~m := {~m ≥ ~s ≥ ~0} (4.4)
then OSPNK~m is reduced to OSPN{≤~m}.
We distinguish three cases: ~m is
Over Saturated (OS) if
∑
i∈I
mi > µ(X) , (4.5)
which means that the supply of the experts surpass the demand of the consumers.
Saturated (S) if
∑
i∈I
mi = µ(X) , (4.6)
which means that the supply of the experts and the demand of consumers are balanced,
and
Under-Saturated (US) if
∑
i∈I
mi < µ(X) , (4.7)
which means that the demand of the consumers surpass the supply of the experts.
If ~m is either S or US we denote OSPNK where K := {~m} by OSPN{~m}, i.e:
OSPN{~m} := { ~A := (A1, . . .AN ) ∈ OSPN ; µ(Ai) = mi} . (4.8)
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4.2 First Paradigm: The big brother
The big brother : The ”big brother” splits the consumers X between the experts
in order to maximize the total surplus, taking into account the capacity constraints.
If ~m is either US or S, then
Σθ(~m) := sup
~A∈OSPN{~m}
θ( ~A) (4.9)
where
θ( ~A) :=
∑
i∈I
∫
Ai
θi(x)dµ . (4.10)
is the total profit conditioned on the partition {Ai}. Note that, by this definition,
Σθ(~m) = −∞ if ~m is OS.1
More generally, for any closed K ⊂ RN+ ,
Σθ(K) := sup
~A∈OSPN
K
θ( ~A) = sup
~m∈K
Σθ(~m) . (4.11)
Remark 4.2.1. Let K = K~m (4.4). If ~m is S or US and, in addition, the utilities
θi are all non-negative on X then the maximizer ~A of (4.11) is also a maximizer of
(4.9), i.e. it satisfies µ(Ai) = mi for any i ∈ I (so ~A ∈ OSPN{~m}).
What is the relation between maximizers of (4.9) and stable subpartitions (in the
sense of Definition 4.0.2)?
Proposition 4.1. If ~A ∈ OSPN{~m} is a maximizer in (4.9) then it is a stable open
subpartition.
Proof. Let ~A be a maximizer of (4.9). If ~A is not stable then by Definition 4.0.2 there
exists a chain (xil , Ail) such that
k∑
l=1
θil(xil)− θil+1(xil) < 0 .
Since xi are interior points of Ai by assumption and µ is regular there exists  > 0
and open neighborhoods xi 3 Ui ⊂ Ai such that µ(Ui) = µ(U¯i) =  for any i ∈ I (here
U¯ is the closure of U). Since ~θ are continuous functions we can choose  sufficiently
small such that, for some δ > 0,
k∑
l=1
θil(x˜il)− θil+1(x˜il) < −δ
for any sequence x˜i ∈ U¯i, i ∈ I (again we set x˜ik+1 = x˜i1). In particular
k∑
l=1
∫
Uil
[
θil − θil+1
]
dµ < −δ (4.12)
1The supremum over a null set is always −∞.
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Define Bil := (Uil−1 ∪ Ail) − U¯il for l = 1, . . . k (recall i0 = ik), and Bj = Aj if j 6∈
{i1, . . . ik}. By definition µ(Bi) = mi for any i ∈ I so ~B := (B1, . . . BN ) ∈ OSPN{~m}.
By (4.12) we obtain
θ( ~B) :=
∑
i∈I
∫
Bi
θidµ ≤ θ( ~A)− δ
contradicting the maximality of θ( ~A) on OSPN~m.
4.3 Second paradigm: Free market
Suppose there is no big brother. The market is free, and each consumer may choose
his favorite expert to maximize his own utility. Each expert determines the price
she collects for consulting a consumer. Let pi ∈ R the price requested by expert i,
~p := (p1, . . . pN ) ∈ RN .
Remark 4.3.1. A price pi can be either positive, negative or zero. In the second case
−pi is a ”bonus”.
The utility of a consumer x choosing the expert i is, therefore, θi(x) − pi, if it is
positive. If θi(x)−pi ≤ 0 then the consumer will avoid the expert i, so he pays nothing
and get nothing form expert i. The net income of consumer x choosing expert i is,
therefore, [θi(x)− pi]+ := (θi(x)− pi)∨ 0. Since any consumer wishes to maximize his
income we obtain the income of any consumer x ∈ X by
ξ+(~p, x) := max
i∈I
[θi(x)− pi]+ . (4.13)
The set of consumers who give up counseling by any of the experts is
A+0 (~p) = {x ∈ X; θi(x)− pi < 0 for any i ∈ I} (4.14)
while the set of consumers who prefer expert i is, then
A+i (~p) := {x ∈ X; θi(x)− pi ≥ θj(x)− pj ∀j ∈ I} −A+0 (~p) . (4.15)
Let
~A(~p) :=
(
A+1 (~p), . . . , A
+
N (~p)
)
.
Note that the sets A+i (~p) are not necessarily disjoint (for i ∈ I) nor open. So ~A(~p) 6∈
OSPN , in general. We denote:
~A := (A1, . . . , AN ) ⊆ ~A(~p)⇔ Ai ⊆ A+i (~p) for any i ∈ I ∪ {0} , (4.16)
where A0 := X −∑i∈I Ai.
Definition 4.3.1. The vector ~p := {p1, . . . pN} ∈ RN is an equilibrium price vector
with respect to ~m if there exists ~A ∈ OSPN{~m} such that ~A ⊆ ~A(~p).
Conversely, if ~A ∈ OSPN{~m} and ~p ∈ RN satisfies (4.16), then ~A is a competitive
~m−subpartition with respect to ~p.
An easy consequence is:
Proposition 4.2. If ~p ∈ RN is an equilibrium price vector with respect to ~m, then
the corresponding subpartition in OSPN{~m} is stable.
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Proof. Let (i1, . . . ik) is a k−chain in I ∪ {0}, and xij ∈ Aij ⊆ A+ij (~p). Let ~p =
(p1, . . . pk) be an equilibrium vector and set p0 = 0. We may assume ij 6= ij−1. Then
by definition of A+i (~p) (4.14,4.15),
θij (xij+1)− pij ≤ [θij (xij+1)− pij ]+ ≤ [θij+1(xij+1)− pij+1 ]+ = θij+1(xij+1)− pij+1
while, (recall θ0 ≡ 0),if ij = 0, θij (xij+1)− pij = θij (xij )− pij = 0. Then
k∑
j=1
θij+1(xij+1)− θij (xij+1) ≡
k∑
j=1
[θij+1(xij+1)− pij+1 ]− [θij (xij+1)− pij ] ≥ 0
hence (4.1).
4.4 Big brother meets the Free market
Suppose the price vector is ~p ∈ RN . The profit of client x is ξ+(~p, x) (4.13). The
overall profit of the clients population is
Ξθ,+(~p) :=
∫
X
ξ+(~p, x)µ(dx) . (4.17)
Given the capacity vector ~m, suppose that the clients are grouped into a feasible
partition ~A ∈ OSPNK where, e.g., K := {~m}, where ~m is either S or US. The total
profit of the client’s population is θ( ~A) a defined in (4.10).
Can we compare θ( ~A) to Ξθ,+(~p)? The first result we state is that there, is, indeed,
such a comparison.
Proposition 4.3. For any given ~A ∈ OSPN{~m} and ~p ∈ RN ,
θ( ~A) ≤ Ξθ,+(~p) + ~p · ~m . (4.18)
Proof. By definition of ξ+(~p, x) (4.13),
θi(x) ≤ ξ+(~p, x) + pi . (4.19)
Integrate (4.19) with respect to µ over X and sum over I to obtain
θ( ~A) ≤
∑
i∈I
∫
Ai
[
ξ+(~p, x) + pi
]
µ(dx)
=
∫
∪i∈IAi
ξ+(~p, x)dµ+
∑
i∈I
piµ(Ai) ≤ Ξθ,+(~p) + ~p · ~m (4.20)
where we used ∪i∈IAi ⊂ X, (4.17) and ~A ∈ OSPN{~m}.
It follows that an equality in (4.18) at ~A = ~A0, ~p = ~p0 implies that ~A0 is a
maximizer of θ in OSPN{~m} and ~p0 is a minimizer of ~p 7→ Ξθ,+(~p) + ~p · ~m in RN .
Moreover
Proposition 4.4. There is an equality in (4.18) at ( ~A, ~p) = ( ~A0, ~p0) if and only if ~p0
is an equilibrium price vector with respect to ~m.
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Proof. If there is an equality in (4.18) then the inequalities in (4.20) turn into equalities
as well. In particular
θ( ~A0) ≡
∑
i∈I
∫
A0,i
θidµi =
∑
i∈I
∫
A0,i
[
ξ+(~p0, x) + p0,i
]
µ(dx) . (4.21)
But
θi(x) ≤ ξ+(~p0, x) + p0,i for any x ∈ X and θi(x) = ξ+(~p0, x) + p0,i iff x ∈ A+i (~p0)
(4.22)
by definition. Hence A0,i ⊆ A+i (~p0). In particular, ~p0 is an equilibrium price vector
corresponding to the subpartition ~A0 ∈ OSPN{~m}.
Conversely, suppose ~p0 is an equilibrium price vector with respect to ~m. Let
~A0 ∈ OSPN{~m} be the corresponding open subpartition. Then ξ+(~p0, x) + p0,i = θi(x)
for any x ∈ A0,i, and (4.21) follows. Since µ(A0,i) = mi and ξ+(~p0, x) = 0 on
A0,0 ⊂ A+0 (~p0) we obtain that the second inequality in (4.20) is an equality as well.
Given a convex K ⊂ RN+ , the support function of K is HK : RN → R given by
HK(~p) := max
~m∈K
~p · ~m . (4.23)
In particular, if K = Km (4.4) then
HK(~p) ≡
∑
i∈I
mi[pi]+ . (4.24)
Proposition 4.3 and (4.23) imply
Proposition 4.5. For any given K ⊂ RN+ , ~A ∈ OSPNK and ~p ∈ RN ,
θ( ~A) ≤ Ξθ,+(~p) +HK(~p) . (4.25)
In addition:
Proposition 4.6. If there is an equality (4.25) at ( ~A, ~p) then ~p is an equilibrium price
vector with respect to some ~m0 ∈ K verifying ~p · ~m0 = HK(~p), while ~A is a maximizer
of θ in OSPN{~m0}. If, in addition, θi are non-negative and K given by (4.4) then
i) If ~m ∈ RN++ is either saturated or under-saturated, then ~p ∈ RN+ .
ii) If ~m is over-saturated and if pi > 0 then µ(Ai) ≡ m0,i = mi while if pi < 0 then
µ(Ai) ≡ m0,i = 0. In particular, if 0 < m0,i < mi then pi = 0.
iii) In any of the above cases, if ~p ∈ RN satisfies the equality in (4.25) for some ~A,
then [~p]+ := ([p1]+, . . . [pN ]+) ∈ RN+ and ~A satisfies the equality in (4.25) as
well.
Let us linger a little bit about the meaning of (i,ii). In the (under)saturated
cases the market is in favor of the agents. In that case no agent will offer
a bonus (see Remark 4.3.1) at equilibrium. In the over-saturated case
the market is in favor of the consumers, so some agents may be tempted
to offer bonus to attract clients. However, these unfortunate agents will
have no clients (µ(Ai) = 0)! If an agent i requests a positive price pi > 0
at equilibrium, it means that he is fully booked (µ(Ai) = mi). All other
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agents neither offer a bonus nor charge a price for their service (pi = 0).
Finally, if the unfortunate agent i offer a bonus (pi < 0) and nevertheless
get no clients, she can obtain the same by giving his service for free pi = 0
(since she gets no profit anyway).
Proof. Since now ~A ∈ OSPNK we obtain, as in (4.20),
θ( ~A) ≤
∑
i∈I
∫
Ai
[
ξ+(~p, x) + pi
]
µ(dx)
=
∫
∪i∈IAi
ξ+(~p, x)µ(dx) +
∑
i∈I
piµ(Ai) ≤ Ξθ,+(~p) +HK(~p) , (4.26)
where we used ∪i∈IAi ⊂ X (hence Ξθ,+(~p) ≥
∫
∪i∈IAi ξ
+(~p, x)µ(dx)) and m0,i :=
µ(Ai) ≤ mi (hence HK(~p) ≥∑i∈I piµ(Ai)). Under the assumption θ( ~A) = Ξθ,+(~p) +
HK(~p) we obtain both∑
i∈I
piµ(Ai) = HK(~p) , Ξ
θ,+(~p) =
∫
∪i∈IAi
ξ+(~p, x)µ(dx) . (4.27)
In particular ~p · ~m0 = HK(~p). Moreover, (4.24) implies that pi ≥ 0 if M0,i > 0. If ~m is
(under)saturated then µ(Ai) = mi = mi,0 by Remark 4.2.1. Thus, ~m ∈ RN++ implies
pi ≥ 0 for any i ∈ I.
To prove the last part (iii) note thatHK([~p]+) = HK(~p) by (4.24), while Ξ
θ,+([~p]+) ≤
Ξ0ζ(~p) by definition. Hence, the right side of (4.25) is not increasing by replacing ~p with
[~p]+. Since we assumed that ~p satisfies the equality at (4.25) with a given ~A, it implies
that the same equality is satisfied for [~p]+ and, in particular, Ξ
θ,+(~p) = Ξθ,+([~p]+).
4.5 All the ways lead to stable subpartitions
Propositions 4.1 and 4.2 demonstrate two ways to test conditions for the stability of
a given subpartition ~A ∈ OSPN{~m}. The first is by showing that ~A maximizes θ over
OSPN{~m}, and the second by finding an equilibrium price vector ~p corresponding to ~A.
It turns out that, in fact, any stable subpartition in OSPN{~m} is a maximizer of θ,
and admits an equilibrium price vector:
Theorem 4.1. Let ~A ∈ OSPN{~m}. The following conditions are equivalent:
i) ~A is a stable partition.
ii) There exists ~p ∈ RN for which
θ( ~A) = Ξθ,+(~p) + ~p · ~m . (4.28)
iii) ~A is a maximizer of θ in OSPN{~m}.
iv) ~p is a minimizer of ~p 7→ Ξθ,+(~p) + ~p · ~m in RN , and ~A is the corresponding
competitive subpartition.
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Proof. We already know that (ii,iii,iv) are equivalent by Proposition 4.4. This and
Proposition 4.2 guarantee that (ii,iii,iv) imply (i) as well.
Suppose (i). Let
pi := sup
(
k−1∑
l=1
θil+1(xil)− θil(xil)
)
− θik (xik ) + θi(xik ) , (4.29)
where the supremum is taken over all k+1 chains (i0, i1, . . . ik) in I ∪{0}, k ∈ N∪{0},
satisfying i0 = 0 and xil ∈ Ail .
Note that, by cyclic subadditivity, p0 ≤ 0. In fact, p0 = 0 (why?). Let i ∈ I. Let
α < pi and consider a k−chain realizing
α <
(
k−1∑
l=1
θil+1(xil)− θil(xil)
)
− θik (xik ) + θi(xik ) .
By cyclic monotonicity (c.f. 4.1)
α− θi(xik ) + θ1(xik ) ≤ 0 ,
in particular pi <∞.
Hence, for any j ∈ I ∪ {0} and y ∈ Ai
α− θi(y) + θj(y) <
(
k−1∑
l=1
θil+1(xil))− θil(xil)
)
− θik (xik ) + θi(xik )− θi(y) + θj(y) ≤ pj (4.30)
where the last inequality follows by the substitution of the k+1−cycle (i1, i2, . . . , ik, ik+1 =
i) and xik+1 = y in (4.29). Since α is any number smaller than pi it follows
θi(y)− pi ≥ θj(y)− pj
for any y ∈ Ai. Taking j = 0 we obtain, in particular, θi(y)− pi ≥ 0 for any i ∈ I and
y ∈ Ai. Hence
[θi(y)− pi]+ ≥ [θj(y)− pj ]+
for any i, j ∈ I ∪ {0} and y ∈ Ai, so ~A ⊆ ~A(~p) so ~p is an equilibrium price vector
(Definition 4.3.1). The result follows now from Proposition 4.4.
4.6 Weak definition of partitions
Theorem 4.1-(iii) shows a direct way to obtain a stable open subpartition in OSPN{~m}:
Find such a subpartition which maximize θ in this set.
But how can we do it? Suppose we find a sequence of open subpartitions ~An ∈
OSPN{~m} such that
lim
n→∞
θ( ~An) = sup
~A∈OSPN{~m}
θ( ~A) ≡ Σθ(~m) . (4.31)
Can we identify an open subpartition ~A which, in some sense, is the ”limit” of some
subsequence of ~An? And, if we could, can we show that θ( ~A) = Σ
θ(~m)?
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In order to proceed, we need to assign some topology on OSPN{~m}. Suppose we
had some metric on X. It induces a natural metric on the set of subsets of X, namely
the Hausdorff distance between A1, A2 ⊂ X:
dH(A1, A2) := { sup
x∈A1
inf
y∈A2
d(x, y)} ∨ { sup
x∈A2
inf
y∈A1
d(x, y)} .
Surly, the Hausdorff distance can be applied to the set of subpartitions in OSPN{~m}
componentwise, and provides us with a metric on this set. However, the Hausdorff
distance does not respect the measure µ. In particular, if An → A in the Hausdorff
metric and µ(An) = m, then µ(A) 6= m, in general. Thus, OSPN{~m} is not a complete
metric space under the Hausdorff distance.
There is, perhaps, a more natural metric on the σ−algebra A which respect the
measure µ and does not involve any metric on X. Let
dµ(A1, A2) := µ(A1∆A2) := µ(A1 −A2) + µ(A2 −A1) .
It is not difficult to show that the functional A → ∫
A
θdµ is continuous on A with
respect to dµ, where θ is a bounded Borel measurable function on X. In particular,
it respects the measure µ itself (choose θ ≡ 1). The componentwise extension of dµ
to OSPN{~m} provides us, therefore, with a metric on OSPN{~m} such that ~A → θ( ~A)
is a continuous function. Indeed, OSPN{~m} is not a complete space with respect to
this metric, since a limit of open sets is not necessarily an open set, but we could
complete the ”space” of open subpartition to Borel subpartitions (as we do, in fact, in
Chapter 6), and obtain a complete metric space on which ~A→ θ( ~A) is preserved as a
continuous function.
Still, there is a fundamental difficulty. The set of Borel subpartitions is not compact
with respect to the metric induced by dµ. Thus, the maximizing sequence ~An in (4.31)
does not admits, in general, a converging subsequence.
So, we further relax the set of open subpartitions. If we introduce a subset A ∈ A
by its characteristic function
1A(x) :=
{
1 if x ∈ A
0 otherwise
then we can write dµ(A1, A2) as
dµ(A1, A2) =
∫
X
|1A1 − 1A2 | dµ .
If we relax the notion of a characteristic function of a set A ∈ A to that of a measurable
function f : X → [0, 1], and µ(A) to ∫
X
fdµ, then we have extended the metric dµ to
the space of these functions
dµ(f1, f2) :=
∫
X
|f1 − f2|dµ .
The first advantage is that, by doing so, we extended the sigma-algebra ~A to a convex
subset of a linear space. In fact, there is a 1 − 1 relation between non-positive, finite
measurable functions on a measure space (X,A, µ) to the set of absolutely continuous
measures ν << µ on X. This is the celebrated Radon-Nikodym theorem:
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Radon-Nikodym Theorem: If ν is absolutely continuous with respect to µ (that is,
µ(A) = 0 implies ν(A) = 0 for any A ∈ A), then there exists a measurable function f
such that ν(A) =
∫
A
fdµ for any A ∈ A.
The function f is called the Radon-Nikodym derivative of ν with respect to µ and
denoted by dν/dµ.
Thus, any measurable f : X → [0, 1] is the Radon-Nikodym derivative of a non-
negative measure ν ≤ µ,
dµ(ν1, ν2) :=
∫
X
∣∣∣∣dν1dµ − dν2dµ
∣∣∣∣ dµ
is also known as the total variation norm on the set of measures.
The total variation norm on the set of non-negative measures ν ≤ µmakes this set a
complete metric space. It is still not a compact set. However, if X is a compact space
(or, more generally, a separable space), then there exists another natural topology,
the weak−∗ topology on the set of Borel measure. This is the weakest topology
which makes the functional ν → ∫ φdν continuous on the set of continuous functions
φ ∈ C(X). In particular, νn ⇀ ν iff
∀φ ∈ C(X), lim
n→∞
∫
X
φdνn =
∫
X
φdν . (4.32)
By the Banach-Alaoglu theorem we obtained a weak topology which is compact and
embed the set of Borel subset A, such that
An ⇀ A⇔ ∀φ ∈ C(X), lim
∫
An
φdµ =
∫
A
φdµ .
This is the idea behind Kantorovich relaxation.
4.6.1 Kantorovich relaxation of (sub)partitions
Definition 4.6.1. A weak subpartition of (X,µ) of order N is a given by N non-
negative Borel measures µi on (X,A), i ∈ I which satisfy
~µ := (µ1, . . . µN ) , |~µ| :=
∑
i∈I
µi ≤ µ . (4.33)
SPw is the collections of all such weak partitions of (X,µ).
If there is an equality in (4.33) ~µ is called a weak partition. The set of weak partitions
is denoted Pw ⊂ SPw.
Motivated by the above we generalize (4.2) as follows: For any ~m = (m1, . . .mN ) ∈
RN+ ,
SPw≤~m := {~µ := (µ1, . . . µN ) ∈ SPw; µi(X) ≤ mi, i ∈ I} , (4.34)
and, more generally
SPwK := {~µ := (µ1, . . . µN ) ∈ SPw; ~µ(X) ∈ K} (4.35)
for a given closed set K ⊂ RN .
In addition, we extend the function θ (4.9) to SPw as
θ(~µ) :=
∑
i∈I
∫
X
θi(x)µi(dx) . (4.36)
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Remark 4.6.1. In this and the next chapter we do not need to assume the condition
that µ is an atomless measure declared in the Standing Assumption 4.1.1. In particular,
we may even assume that X is a finite discrete set.
Example 4.6.1. Let X be a finite set {x1, . . . xn}.
J := {1, . . . n}. Let,
µ :=
n∑
j=1
αjδxj , (4.37)
where αj > 0,
∑n
j=1 αj = 1 and δx is the Dirac measure at x ∈ X. A weak partition
is given by
µi :=
n∑
j=1
pi(i, j)δxj i ∈ I , (4.38)
where
∑N
i=1 pi(i, j) = αj and pi(i, j) ≥ 0 for any j ∈ J , i ∈ I.
Under the same setting we may present ~θ on X in terms of N × n matrix {θij}.
Hence θ(~µ) takes the form
θ(~µ) :=
N∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
ci,jpi(i, j) .
What is the point behind such a generalization? Recall (4.31). If we could prove
the existence of a maximizer ~A for θ in OSPN{~m}, we would have a stable (sub)partition
in our hand! The problem is that we dont have the tool to prove the existence of such
a maximizer in the set of open (sub)partitions OSPN{~m}.
However, we can obtain, quiet cheaply, the existence of a maximizer for θ on sets
of weak (sub)partitions. The advantage here is that there is the natural topology on
SPw such that, for a compact set K ⊂ RN+ ,
a) SPwK is a compact subsets of SPw.
b) θ is continuous on SPwK . That means that for any converging sequence ~µn ⇀ ~µ
in SPwK ,
lim
n→∞
∫
X
θ(~µn) = θ(~µ)
Indeed, let us consider a maximizing sequence ~µn satisfying
lim
n→∞
θ(~µn) = Σ¯θ(K) := sup
~µ∈SPw
K
θ(~µ) (4.39)
By (a) we get the existence of a subsequence of {~µn} converging to some ~µ ∈ SPwK ,
and from (b) we obtain Σ¯θ(K) = θ(~µ). Hence Σ¯
K
θ (~m) = θ(~µ) and ~µ is a maximizer!
This ”natural topology” is just the weak−∗ topology on the set of Borel measures
on X (4.31). This weak convergence naturally defines a convergence on SPw:
~µn := (µ
1
n, . . . µ
N
n ) ⇀ µ := (µ
1, . . . µN )⇔ µin ⇀ µi, ∀ i ∈ I .
The continuity (b) of θ on SPwK follows from Assumption 4.0.1-(ii). In particular:
Theorem 4.2. For any closed set K ⊂ RN there exists a maximizer ~µ of θ (4.36) in
SPwK .
So, to answer question 4.7-(1) affirmatively we just have to prove that this max-
imizer is, in fact, in OSPN~m. Such a result will guarantee, in particular, that Σ¯θ(K)
defined in (4.39) is equal to Σθ(K) defined in (4.11).
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4.6.2 Birkhoff Theorem
In the context of Example 4.6.1 the sets Pw{~m} can certainly be empty.
Consider the particular case of an empirical atomic measure
µ :=
N∑
i=1
δxi , and ~m := (1, . . . 1) . (4.40)
In that case we observe that we can embed any atomic weak partition (4.38) in the
set of N ×N doubly stochastic matrices
Π := {αi,j ≥ 0;
N∑
i=1
αi,j =
N∑
j=1
αi,j = 1} . (4.41)
A bijection τ : I ↔ {x1, . . . xN} corresponds to a matrix piτ in the set of permutation
matrices P:
τ ⇒ piτ (i, j) :=
(
1 if j = τ(i)
0 if j 6= τ(i)
)
∈ P ⊂ Π .
Now we compare (4.9) with θi(xj) := θ(i, j) and mi = 1 with (2.18).
Let
θ(pi) :=
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
θ(i, j)pi(i, j) . (4.42)
Then we obtain immediately that
θˆ(τ) :=
N∑
i=1
θi,τ(i) = θ(piτ ) .
In particular,
max
pi∈Π
θ(pi) ≥ max
τ∈P
θˆ(τ) . (4.43)
It is, however, somewhat surprising that there is, in fact, an equality in (4.43). This
follows from the following Theorem of Birkhoff:
Theorem 4.3. The set Π is the convex hull of P. Namely, for any pi ∈ Π there exists
a set of permutations {τj} ⊂ P and positive numbers {aj} satisfying ∑j aj = 1 such
that ∑
j
ajpiτj = pi .
Birkhoff’s Theorem implies
Proposition 4.7. There is an equality in (4.43).
From Theorem 4.2 applied to the case of Example 4.6.1 we obtain that a maximizer
p¯i of (4.42) is, in fact, a stable weak partition
~µ := (
N∑
j=1
p¯i(1, j)δxj , . . .
N∑
j=1
p¯i(N, j)δxj )
of (4.40). From the equality in (4.43) due to Birkhoff Theorem we get that p¯i is also
a permutation matrix which maximizes the right side of (4.43) as well. Then this
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permutation is the Monge solution τ in the sense of Definition 2.6.1. There are several
proofs (mostly algebraic) of Birkhoff Theorem in the literature. The following elegant
proof of Zhu is based on a variational argument, in the spirit of this book. Here is a
sketch of the argument of Zho:
Let pi ∈ Π be a doubly stochastic matrix. Define the function f on the set G of
real valued N ×N matrices:
f(G) := ln
(∑
τ∈P
eG:(pi−τ)
)
, G ∈ G .
The function f is differentiable and its derivative at G ∈ G is
f
′
(G) =
∑
σ∈P
λG(σ)(pi − σ)
where
λG(σ) :=
eG:(pi−σ)∑
τ∈P e
G:(pi−τ)
satisfies
∑
σ∈P λG(σ) = 1. Now, assume we know that there exists a minimizer G0 ∈ G
of f . Then f
′
(G0) = 0, namely∑
σ∈P
λG0(σ)(pi − σ) = 0 =⇒ pi =
∑
σ∈P
λG0(σ)σ
which implies Birkhoff’s Theorem. However, the assumption that there exists a min-
imizer of f of G is too strong. To justify this argument, Zho first claimed that f is
bounded from below on G, and then apply a very useful and elementary lemma:
Approximate Fermat principle: If f is differentiable on the entire space and
bounded from below, then for any  > 0 there exists an approximate critical point G
for which |f ′(G)| ≤ .
This, and the local compactness of G is enough to complete the argument. The fact
that f is bounded from below follows from another elementary argument of Zho which
implies that for any G ∈ G and pi ∈ Π there exists τ ∈ P for which G : (pi − τ) ≥ 0.
4.7 Summery and beyond
What did we learn so far?
If ~m ∈ RN+ is S or US, then
• By Proposition 4.3
sup
~A∈OSPN{~m}
θ( ~A) := Σ~θ(~m) ≤ inf
~p∈RN
Ξθ,+(~p) + ~p · ~m . (4.44)
• From Proposition 4.3 and Theorem 4.1: The equality in (4.44) is a necessary
condition for the existence of a stable subpartition in OSPN{~m}.
• From Theorem 4.2: There exists a maximizer on the set of weak sub-partitions
max
~µ∈SPwm
θ(~µ) ≥ sup
~A∈OSPN{~m}
θ( ~A)
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The questions still left open, at this stage, are
1. Is there a maximizer on the left side of (4.44)?
2. If so, is this maximizer unique in OSPN{~m}?
3. What about a minimizer ~p ∈ RN of the right side of (4.44)?
4. Same questions regarding the maximizer in OSPNK and minimizer in RN of
sup
~A∈OSPN
K
θ( ~A) := ΣK~θ (~m) ≤ inf
~p∈RN
Ξθ,+(~p) +HK(~p) (4.45)
for a given K ⊂ RN+ .
Part II
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Chapter 5
Weak multi-partitions
There are many ways of going forward, but only one way of standing still, (F.D.R)
5.1 Multi-partitions
Let us now generalize the definition of partitions and capacity (Section 4.2) in a natural
way.
Suppose the there is a set of goods J = {1, . . . J}. Each customer x ∈ X consumes
a given fraction ζj(x) ≥ 0 of j ∈ J . The consumption vector ζ¯ := (ζ1(x), . . . ζJ(x))
is defined such that
∑J
j=1 ζj(x) = 1, thus ζ¯(x) ∈ ∆J(1) for any x ∈ X. We further
assume
ζ¯ ∈ C(X; ∆J(1)), thus µ¯(dx) := ζ¯(x)µ(dx) ∈MN (X) . (5.1)
Each agent i ∈ I can supply each of the goods j ∈ J under a prescribed capacity.
Here m
(j)
i ≥ 0 is the capacity of agent i for goods j and
~mi := (m
(1)
i , . . .m
(J)
i ) ∈ RJ+ , i ∈ I .
Definition 5.1.1. The capacity matrix {m(j)i } := ~M := {~m1, . . . ~mN} is a N × J
matrix of positive entries. The set of all such matrices is denoted M+(N, J).
For an admissible weak (sub)partition ~µ := (µ1, . . . µN ) ∈ SPw, each agent should
be able to supply the part µi of the population. This implies
µi(ζj) :=
∫
X
ζj(x)µi(dx) ≤ m(j)i ; (i, j) ∈ I × J .
Let now K ⊂ M+(N, J). We generalize (4.34) for the set of weak sub-partitions
SPw,µ¯K :=
{
~µ := (µ1, . . . µN ) ∈ SPw; ~µ(ζ¯) ∈ K
}
. (5.2)
If K = { ~M} is a singleton then we denote the corresponding subpartitions by SPw,µ¯{ ~M}.
Let
~Mζ(~µ) := {µi(ζj)} ∈ M+(N, J) . (5.3)
The conditions on ~M ∈ M+(N, J) for which the corresponding subpartition sets are
not empty (feasibility conditions) are not as simple as (4.5-4.7). In particular, the
notions of saturation (S), under saturation (US) and over saturation (OS) presented
in Section 4.2 (4.7, 4.6, 4.5) should be generalized:
50
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Definition 5.1.2. The feasibility sets with respect to µ¯ := ζ¯µ are (c.f. (5.3))
∆N (µ¯) := { ~M = ~Mζ(~µ); ~µ ∈ Pw} , ∆N (µ¯) := { ~M = ~Mζ(~µ); ~µ ∈ SPw} .
Equivalently
∆N (µ¯) := { ~M; Pw,ζ{ ~M} 6= ∅} , ∆N (µ¯) := { ~M; SP
w,µ¯
{~m} 6= ∅ } .
Remark 5.1.1. Note that for any ~M ∈∆N (µ¯)∑
j∈J
m
(j)
i ≡
∑
j∈J
µi(ζj) = µi(X) (5.4)
while ∑
i∈I
m
(j)
i ≡
∑
i∈I
µi(ζj) ≤ µ(ζj) . (5.5)
By definition ∑
i∈I,j∈J
m
(j)
i =
∑
i∈I
µi
(∑
j∈J
ζj
)
=
N∑
i=1
µi(X) .
If ~M ∈∆N (µ¯) (so ∑i∈I µi = µ) we get an equality in (5.5):
N∑
i=1
m
(j)
i = µ(ζj) . (5.6)
Example 5.1.1. If J = 1 then ∆N is the simplex of all N− vectors
∆N = ∆
N (1) :=
{
~m := (m1, . . . ,mN ) ∈ RN+ ;
N∑
i=1
mi = 1
}
and ∆N (µ¯) is the sub-simplex
∆N = ∆
N (1) :=
{
~m := (m1, . . . ,mN ) ∈ RN+ ;
∑
i∈I
mi ≤ 1
}
.
The natural generalization of over saturation (4.5), saturation (4.6) and under
saturation (4.7) is as follows:
Over Saturated (OS) if ~M ∈ M+(N, J)−∆N (µ¯) . (5.7)
Saturated (S) if ~M ∈∆N (µ¯) . (5.8)
Under-Saturated (US) if ~M ∈∆N (µ¯)−∆N (µ¯) . (5.9)
Proposition 5.1. The sets ∆N (µ¯) ⊂ ∆N (µ¯) are both compact, bounded and convex
in M+(N, J). The set ∆N (µ¯) has a non-empty interior in M+(N, J).
Consider Example 5.1.1 again. Here ∆N (µ¯) is an N − 1 dimensional simplex in
RN , so it has an empty interior. It is not a-priori clear that the interior of ∆N (µ¯) is
not empty in the general case. However, it is the case by Corollary 5.2.2 below.
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5.2 Feasibility conditions
5.2.1 Dual Representation of Weak (Sub)partitions
Here we attempt to characterize the feasibility sets by a dual formulation. For this we
return to the ”market” interpretation of Chapter 4.3.
Definition 5.2.1. Let ~P be an N × J matrix of real entries. Any such matrix is
represented by its rows:
~P = (~p1, . . . ~pN )
where ~pi ∈ RJ . The set of all these matrices is denoted by M′(N, J).
M+(N, J) as given in Definition 5.1.1 and M
′
(N, J) are considered as dual spaces,
under the natural duality action
~P : ~M :=
∑
i∈I
~pi · ~mi ≡
N∑
i=1
J∑
j=1
p
(j)
i m
(j)
i
where ~p · ~m is the canonical inner product in RJ .
Let ζ¯ := (ζ1, . . . ζJ) : X → RJ+ verifies assumption (5.1). Define, for x ∈ X and
~P = (~p1, . . . ~pN ):
ξ0ζ (x, ~P) := max
i∈I
~pi · ζ¯(x) : X ×M
′
(N, J)→ R (5.10)
ξ0,+ζ (x,
~P) := ξ0ζ (x, ~P) ∨ 0 : X ×M
′
(N, J)→ R+ (5.11)
Ξ0ζ(
~P) := µ(ξ0ζ (·, ~P)) : M
′
(N, J)→ R . (5.12)
Ξ0,+ζ (
~P) := µ(ξ0,+ζ (·, ~P)) : M
′
(N, J)→ R+ . (5.13)
Here we see a neat, equivalent definition of the feasibility sets (5.1.2):
Theorem 5.1. ~M ∈∆N (µ¯) (resp. ~M ∈∆N (µ¯)) if and only if
a) Ξ0ζ(
~P)− ~P : ~M ≥ 0 ; resp. b) Ξ0,+ζ (~P)− ~P : ~M ≥ 0 (5.14)
for any ~P ∈ M′(N, J). Moreover, Ξ0ζ and Ξ0,+ζ are the support functions of ∆N (µ¯)
and ∆N (µ¯), respectively:
sup
~M∈∆N (µ¯)
~P : ~M = Ξ0ζ(
~P) ; sup
~M∈∆N (µ¯)
~P : ~M = Ξ0,+ζ (
~P) (5.15)
holds for any ~P ∈ M′(N, J).
Recall Definitions A.0.2 and A.0.8 in Appendix A.
Lemma 5.1. Ξ0ζ and Ξ
0,+
ζ are convex, continuous and positively homogeneous of order
1 functions on M
′
(N, J).
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Proof. By Proposition A.5 and (5.10, 5.11) we obtain that ~P 7→ ξ0ζ and ~P 7→ ξ0,+ζ
are convex (as functions of M
′
(N, J)) for any x ∈ X. Indeed, they are maximizers of
linear (affine) functions on M
′
(N, J). Hence Ξ0ζ , Ξ
0,+
ζ are convex on M
′
(N, J) as well
from definition (5.12, 5.13). Since X is compact then Ξ0ζ ,Ξ
0,+
ζ are finite valued for any
~P ∈ M′(N, J) so the essential domains of both coincides with M′(N, J). Hence both
functions are continuous by Proposition A.3. Both functions are positive homogeneous
of order one by definition.
Corollary 5.2.1. ~M is an inner point of ∆N (µ¯) if and only if
~P = 0 is the only case
where (5.14-b) holds with an equality.
Proof. (of Corollary): Since Ξ0,+ζ (
~P) − ~P : ~M is positively homogeneous by Lemma
5.1 it follows that ~P = 0 is a minimizer of (5.14-b) for any ~M ∈∆N (µ¯). If it is a strict
minimizer then Ξ0,+ζ (
~P)− ~P : ~M > 0 for any ~P 6= 0. Since Ξ0,+ζ is continuous at any
point in its essential domain (in particular at ~P = 0), there exists α > 0 such that
Ξ0ζ(
~P)− ~P : ~M > α for any ~P ∈ M′(N, J) , |~P| :=
∑
i∈I
|~pi| = 1 .
Hence there exists an open neighborhood O of ~M ∈ M+(N, J) and α′ > 0 for which
Ξ0,+ζ (
~P)− ~P : ~M′ > α′ for any ~M′ ∈ O and |~P| = 1. Hence
Ξ0,+ζ (
~P)− ~P : ~M′ > 0 for any ~P 6= 0. Hence ~M′ ∈∆N (µ¯) for any ~M
′ ∈ O, hence ~M
is an inner point of ∆N (µ¯) by Theorem 5.1.
Conversely, assume there exists ~P0 6= 0 for which Ξ0,+ζ (~P0) − ~P0 : ~M = 0. Then
Ξ0,+ζ (
~P0) − ~P0 : ~M′ < 0 for any ~M′ for which ~P0 : ( ~M − ~M′) < 0. By Theorem 5.1
it follows that ~M
′ 6∈∆N (µ¯) so ~M is not an inner point of ∆N (µ¯).
Since ~p · ~mi = µi(~p · ζ¯) it follows from (5.6,5.10, 5.12) that ~P : ~M = Ξ0ζ(~P) where
~P = (~p, . . . , ~p). If, in addition, ~p ∈ RJ+ then Ξ0,+ζ (~P) = Ξ0ζ(~P) so Ξ0,+ζ (~P)− ~P : ~M = 0
for any ~M ∈ ∆N (µ¯) and any such ~P. From Corollary 5.2.1 we obtain that ∆N (µ¯) is
not contain any point in the interior of ∆N (µ¯):
Corollary 5.2.2.
∆N (µ¯) ⊂ ∂∆N (µ¯) .
In particular, ∆N (µ¯) has no interior points in M+(N, J).
5.2.2 Proof of Theorem 5.1
Lemma 5.2. If ~M ∈∆N (µ¯) then
Ξ0ζ(
~P)− ~P : ~M ≥ 0
for any ~P ∈ M′(N, J). Likewise, if ~M ∈∆N (µ¯) then
Ξ0,+ζ (
~P)− ~P : ~M ≥ 0
for any ~P ∈ M′(N, J).
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Recalling Proposition A.11 we can formulate Lemma 5.2 as follows: The sets
∆N (µ¯) (resp. ∆N (µ¯)) are contained in the essential domains of the Legendre trans-
forms of Ξ0ζ (resp. Ξ
0,+
ζ ).
Proof. Assume ~M ∈∆N (µ¯). By definition, there exists ~µ ∈ SPw,µ¯{~m} such that µi(ζj) =
M
(j)
i . Also, since
∑
i∈I µi ≤ µ
Ξ0,+ζ (
~P) = µ(ξ0,+ζ (·, ~P)) ≥
∑
i∈I
µi(ξ
0,+
ζ (·, ~P))
while from (5.11) ξ0,+ζ (x,
~P) ≥ ~pi · ζ¯(x) so
Ξ0,+ζ (
~P) ≥
∑
i∈I
~pi · µi(ζ¯) = ~P : ~M .
The case for Ξ0ζ is proved similarly.
In order to prove the second direction of Theorem 5.1 we need the following defi-
nition of regularized maximizer:
Definition 5.2.2. Let ~a := (a1, . . . aN ) ∈ RN . Then, for  > 0,
max(~a) :=  ln
(∑
i∈I
eai/
)
Lemma 5.3. For any  > 0, max(·) is a smooth convex function on RN . In addition
max1(~a) ≥ max2(~a) ≥ maxi∈I(ai) for any ~a ∈ RN , 1 > 2 > 0 and
lim
↘0
max(~a) = max
i∈I
(ai) . (5.16)
Proof. Consider
max
~β
{
−
∑
i∈I
βi lnβi + ~β · ~a
}
(5.17)
where the maximum is taken on the simplex
~β := (β1 . . . βN ), βi ≥ 0,
N∑
1
βi = 1 .
Note that (5.17) is strictly concave function, and its unique maximizer is
β0i =
eai/∑
j e
aj/
< 1
for i ∈ I. Substitute this maximizer in (5.17)) to obtain max(~a). The convexity
of max(·) follows from A-A. Since βi ∈ [0, 1], −∑i∈I βi lnβi ≥ 0 so the term in
brackets in (5.17) is monotone non-decreasing in  > 0. In addition, −∑i∈I βi lnβi is
maximized at βi = 1/N (show it!), so 0 ≤ −∑i∈I βi lnβi ≤ lnN . It follows that
max

(~a) ∈ [max
i∈I
(ai),max
i∈I
(ai) +  lnN ] ,
and (5.16) follows.
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Definition 5.2.3.
ξζ(x, ~P) := max
(
~p1 · ζ¯(x), . . . ~pN · ζ¯(x)
)
: X ×M′(N, J)→ R (5.18)
Ξζ(~P) := µ(ξ

ζ(·, ~P)) : M
′
(N, J)→ R . (5.19)
Also, for each ~P ∈ M′(N, J) and i ∈ I set
µ
(~P)
i (dx) :=
e~pi·ζ¯(x)/∑
k∈I e
~pk·ζ¯(x)/
µ(dx) (5.20)
Likewise
ξ,+ζ (x,
~P) := max
(
~p1 · ζ¯(x), . . . ~pN · ζ¯(x), 0
)
: X ×M′(N, J)→ R+ (5.21)
Ξ,+ζ (
~P) := µ
(
ξ,+ζ (·, ~P)
)
: M
′
(N, J)→ R+ . (5.22)
and
µ
(~P,+)
i (dx) :=
e~pi·ζ¯(x)/
1 +
∑
k∈I e
~pk·ζ¯(x)/
µ(dx) (5.23)
Since max(·) is smooth due to lemma 5.3, Lemma 5.4 below follows from the
above definition via an explicit differentiation.
Lemma 5.4. For each  > 0, Ξζ (resp. Ξ
,+
ζ ) is a convex, smooth function on
M
′
(N, J). In addition
∂Ξζ(~P)
∂p
(j)
i
= µ
(~P)
i (ζj) resp.
∂Ξ,+ζ (
~P)
∂p
(j)
i
= µ
(~P,+)
i (ζj) .
The proof of Theorem 5.1 is obtained from Lemma 5.5 below, whose proof is an
easy exercise, using (5.17)
Lemma 5.5. For any , δ > 0 and ~M ∈ M+(N, J)
~P→ Ξζ(~P) + δ
2
|~P|2 − ~P : ~M (5.24)
is a strictly convex function on M
′
(N, J). In addition
Ξζ(~P) ≥ Ξ0ζ(~P) (5.25)
so, if (5.14) is satisfied, then
Ξζ(~P)− ~P : ~M ≥ 0 .
for any ~P ∈ M′(N, J). The same statement holds for Ξ,+ζ as well.
Proof. (of Theorem 5.1)
Lemma 5.2 gives us the ” only if” direction.
From Lemma 5.5 we obtain the existence of a minimizer ~P,δ ∈ M′(N, J) of (5.24)
for any , δ > 0, provided (5.14) holds. Moreover, from Lemma 5.4 we also get that
this minimizer satisfies
~mi =
∂
∂~p,δi
Ξζ + δ~p
,δ
i = µ
(~P,δ)
i (ζ¯) + δ~p
,δ
i (5.26)
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By convexity of Ξζ :
Ξζ(~0) ≥ Ξζ(~P)− ~P : ∇Ξζ(~P) for any ~P ∈ M
′
(N, J) . (5.27)
Apply ~p,δi to (5.26), use (5.27) and sum over i = 1, . . . N , recalling
~P,δ =
(
~p,δ1 , . . . ~p
,δ
N
)
,
~M := (~m1, . . . ~mN ):
~P,δ : ∇Ξζ(~P,δ) + δ
∣∣∣~P,δ∣∣∣2 − ~P,δ : ~M =≥ Ξζ(~P,δ)− Ξζ(~0) + δ ∣∣∣~P,δ∣∣∣2 − ~P,δ : ~M
(5.28)
It follows from (5.14, 5.25,5.28) that
−Ξζ(~0) + δ
∣∣∣~P,δ∣∣∣2 ≤ 0
hence
δ
∣∣∣~P,δ∣∣∣ ≤ √δ√Ξζ(~0) .
Hence (5.26) implies
lim
δ→0
µ
(~P,δ)
i (ζ¯) = ~mi
By compactness of C∗(X) and since
∑
i∈I µ
(~P,δ)
i = µ via (5.20 ) we can choose a
subsequence δ → 0 along which the limits
lim
δ→0
µ
(~P,δ)
i := µ
(~P)
i
holds for any i ∈ I. It follows that∑
i∈I
µ
(~P)
i = µ ; µ
(~P)
i (ζ¯) = ~mi
for any i = 1, . . . N , hence ~µ ∈ Pw~M so ~M ∈∆N (µ¯).
The proof for ~M ∈∆N (µ¯) is analogous.
Finally, the proof of (5.15) follows from (5.14) and Proposition A.11, taking advantage
on the homogeneity of Ξ0ζ (resp. the positive homogeneity of Ξ
0,+
ζ ).
5.3 Dominance
We now consider generalized (sub)partitions from another point of view.
A Stochastic N− Matrix S = {ski } is an N×N matrix of non-negative entries such
that
N∑
k=1
ski = 1 ∀i = 1, . . . N . (5.29)
We observe that if ~µ is a (sub)partition then
S~µ :=
(
N∑
i=1
s1iµi, . . .
N∑
i=1
sNi µi
)
is a (sub)partition as well. It follows from Definition 5.1.2 and (5.1.2) that if ~M ∈
∆N (µ¯) (resp. ~M ∈∆N (µ¯)) then
S ~M ∈∆N (µ¯) (resp. S ~M ∈∆N (µ¯)) .
Here S ~M :=
(
S ~m(1), . . . S ~m(J)
)
where ~M = (~m(1), . . . ~m(J)), ~m(j) ∈ RN+ .
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Definition 5.3.1. Let ~M, ~M ∈ M+(N, J). If there exists a stochastic matrix S such
that ~M = S ~M then ~M is said to dominate ~M ( ~M  ~M).
Assume S is such a stochastic matrix satisfying ~M = S ~M. Let
~mi := (m
(1)
i , . . .m
(J)
i ) ∈ RJ+, mi :=
J∑
j=1
m
(j)
i . (5.30)
(and similarly for ~mi,mi). The following
~mi =
N∑
k=1
sik ~mk (5.31)
holds (as an equality in RJ). Summing the components in RJ of both sides of (5.31)
and dividing by mi we obtain
N∑
k=1
sik
mk
mi
= 1 . (5.32)
Dividing (5.31) by mi we obtain
~mi
mi
=
N∑
k=1
(
sik
mk
mi
)
~mk
mk
. (5.33)
The Jensen’s inequality and (5.32, 5.33) imply
F
(
~mi
mi
)
≤
N∑
k=1
(
sik
mk
mi
)
F
(
~mk
mk
)
for any convex function F : RJ+ → R. Multiplying the above by mi and summing over
i = 1, . . . N we get, using (5.29)
N∑
i=1
miF
(
~mi
mi
)
≥
N∑
i=1
miF
(
~mi
mi
)
. (5.34)
We obtained that if ~M  ~M then (5.34) holds for any convex function on RJ+. It can
be shown, in fact, that the reversed direction holds as well:
Proposition 5.2. ~M  ~M iff (5.34) holds for any convex F : RJ+ → R.
The definition of dominance introduced above is an extension of a definition given
by H.Joe ([24], [25]). In these papers Joe introduced the notion of w−dominance on
RN+ as follows: For a given a vector ~w ∈ RN++, the vector ~x ∈ RN+ is said to ~w−dominant
~y ∈ RN+ (~x w ~y) iff there exists a stochastic matrix S preserving ~w and transporting
~x to ~y, i.e
S~x = ~y, and S ~w = ~w .
Evidently, it is a special case of our definition where J = 2. The condition of ~x w ~y
is shown to be equivalent to
N∑
j=1
wjψ
(
yj
wj
)
≤
N∑
j=1
wjψ
(
xj
wj
)
(5.35)
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for any convex function ψ : R+ → R. The reader should observe that (5.35) follows
from (5.34) in the case J = 2 upon defining ~m1 = ~x, ~m1 = ~y, ~m2 = λ~w−~x, ~m2 = λ~w−~y
(where λ is large enough such that both ~m2, ~m2 ∈ RJ+) 1 and setting ψ(x) = F (s/λ, 1−
s/λ).
We now present a generalization of Proposition 5.2:
Let ζ¯ := (ζ1, . . . ζN ) : X → RJ+ be a measurable function, as defined in (5.1).
Consider ~M := {m(j)i } satisfying (5.4, 5.5). Recall (5.30).
Theorem 5.2. ~M ∈∆N (µ¯) (resp. ~M ∈∆N (µ¯)) if and only if
µ(F (ζ¯)) ≥
∑
i∈I
miF
(
~mi
mi
)
. (5.36)
is satisfied for any convex F : RJ+ → R (resp. F : RJ+ → R+).
Recall Remark 4.6.1. Note that if we choose X = I := {1, . . . N}, µ({i}) := mi,
the ”deterministic” partition µi({k}) := µ({i})δi,k and m(j)i := ζj({i})µ({i}) then
Theorem 5.2 implies Proposition 5.2.
Proof. By definition of ∆N (µ¯) there exists a weak partition ~µ = (µ1, . . . µN ) such
that m
(j)
i = µi(ζj). In particular mi = µi(X). Since F is convex we apply Jensen’s’s
inequality
µi(F (ζ¯)) ≥ µi(X)F
(∫
ζ¯dµi
µi(X)
)
:= miF
(
~mi
mi
)
. (5.37)
Summing over i ∈ I and using µ = ∑i∈I µi we obtain the result.
If ~M ∈ ∆N (µ¯) then there exists a weak subpartition ~µ = (µ1, . . . µN ) such that
m
(j)
i = µi(ζj) and
∑N
i=1 µi ≤ µ. In that case the inequality (5.36) still follows from
(5.37), taking advantage on F ≥ 0.
Suppose now ~M := (~m(1), . . . ~m(N)) 6∈ ∆N (µ¯). By Lemma 5.2 there exists ~P =
(~p1, . . . ~pN ) ∈ M′(N, J) such that
Ξ0ζ(
~P) < ~P : ~M :=
∑
i∈I
~pi · ~mi . (5.38)
Define the function F = F (ζ¯) : RJ+ → R:
F (ζ¯) := max
i∈I
~pi · ζi (resp. F+(ζ¯) := max
i∈I
[~pi · ζi]+ ≡ F (ζ) ∨ 0) . (5.39)
So, F, F+ are a convex function on RJ+. By definition (5.12)
Ξ0ζ(
~P) = µ(F (ζ¯)) (resp. Ξ0,+ζ (
~P) = µ(F+(ζ¯))) . (5.40)
Next, using (5.30) we can write ~M as
~M =
(
m1
~m1
m1
, . . .mN
~mN
mN
)
Then
~P : ~M =
∑
i∈I
mi~pi ·
~mi
mi
. (5.41)
1Since ~w ∈ RJ++ by assumption
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By definition
F
(
~mi
mi
)
≥ ~pi · ~mi
mi
resp. F+
(
~mi
mi
)
≥
[
~pi · ~mi
mi
]
+
(5.42)
for any i ∈ I. From (5.38, 5.40-5.42) we obtain a contradiction to (5.36).
Let us extend the definition of dominance from the set of N×J matricesM+(N, J)
to the set of RJ+ valued function on the general measure space X:
Definition 5.3.2. Let µ¯ = (µ(1), . . . µ(J)), ν¯ = (ν(1), . . . ν(J)) be a pair of RJ−valued
measures on measure spaces X,Y respectively. (X, µ¯)  (Y, ν¯) iff there exists a measure
pi ∈M(X × Y ) such that∫
x∈X
dµ(j)
dµ
(x)pi(dxdy) = ν(j)(dy) ; j = 1, . . . J
where µ =
∑J
1 µ
(j).
The following Theorem is an extension of Theorem 5.2. Some version of it appears
in Blackwell [6]:
Theorem 5.3. (X, µ¯)  (Y, ν¯) iff∫
X
F
(
dµ¯
dµ
)
dµ ≥
∫
X
F
(
dν¯
dν
)
dν , (5.43)
for any convex F : RJ → R. Here ν := ∑Jj=1 ν(j).
Letting F (~x) := ±~1 · ~x we obtain from Theorem 5.3
Corollary 5.3.1. A necessary condition for the dominance (X, µ¯)  (Y, ν¯) is the
balance condition
µ¯(X) = ν¯(Y ) .
By Theorem 5.2 (and its special case in Proposition 5.2) we obtain the following
characterization:
Corollary 5.3.2. . Let (X, µ¯)  (Y, ν¯). Then ∆N (µ¯) ⊇∆N (~η) for any N ∈ N.
In fact, the other direction holds as well:
Theorem 5.4. (X, µ¯)  (Y, ν¯) if, and only if, ∆N (µ¯) ⊇∆N (~η) for any N ∈ N.
Definition 5.3.3. Two weak partitions ~µ = (µ1, . . . µN ), ~ν = (ν1, . . . νN ) of (X,µ)
and (Y, ν), resp., are µ¯− ν¯ congruent iff∫
X
dµ¯
dµ
dµi =
∫
Y
dν¯
dν
dνi , i = 1, . . . N .
We denote this relation by ~µ⊗ µ¯ ∼ ~ν ⊗ ν¯.
We may now reformulate Theorem 5.4 as follows:
Theorem 5.5. (X, µ¯)  (Y, ν¯) if, and only if, for any weak partition ~ν of (Y, ν¯) there
exists a partition ~µ such that ~µ, ν are µ¯− ν¯ congruent.
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Proof. The ”only if” direction is clear. For the ”if” direction, let us consider a sequence
of N−partitions νN of ν such that∫
Y
F
(
dν¯
dν
)
dν = lim
N→∞
N∑
1
νNi (Y )F
(
1
νNi (Y )
∫
Y
dν¯
dν
dνNi
)
(5.44)
for any continuous function F . Such a sequence can be obtain, for example, by taking
fine strong partitions {ANi } of Y such that νN = µbANi (c.f Chapter 6). For any such
partition let µN the congruent µ¯− ν¯ partition ~µ of µ. Let now F be a convex function.
By Jensen’s inequality∫
X
F
(
dµ¯
dµ
)
dµNi ≥ µNi (X)F
(
1
µNi (X)
∫
X
dµ¯
dµ
dµNi
)
while
µNi (X)F
(
1
µNi (X)
∫
X
dµ¯
dµ
dµNi
)
= νNi (Y )F
(
1
νNi (Y )
∫
Y
dν¯
dν
dνNi
)
by congruency. Using µ =
∑N
1 µ
N
i and summing over i we get the inequality (5.43)
via (5.44).
5.3.1 Minimal elements
Let λ ∈ M(Y ) and λ(Y ) = µ(X). By Theorem 5.3 and the Jensen’s inequality we
obtain:
Proposition 5.3.
µ¯(X)λ ≺ µ¯ ,
where µ¯ as in (5.1).
We can apply this proposition to the discrete spaces X = Y = I := {1, . . . N}. Let
mi := µ({i}), m(j) := µ(j)(X), ~m = (m1, . . .mN ) and m¯ = (m(1), . . .m(J)). Consider
the set
Π(~m, m¯) :=
{
~M ∈ M+(N, J);
∑
i∈I
m
(j)
i = m
(j) ∀j ∈ J ;
∑
j∈J
m
(j)
i = mi ∀i ∈ I
}
.
It follows from Proposition 5.3 that
Corollary 5.3.3. λ(j)({i}) := {mim(j)/m} is the minimal point in Π(~m, m¯) with
respect to the order relation , where m = ∑i∈Imi. That is, for any ν¯ satisfying
ν(j)({i}) = m(j)i , λ¯ ≺ ν¯.
Chapter 6
Strong multi-partitions
6.1 Strong partitions as extreme points
A Strong N−subpartition ~A of X is a subpartition of X into N measurable subsets
which are essentially disjoint:
~A := (A1, . . . AN ), Ai ∈ A(X); ∪i∈IAi ⊂ X, µ(Aj ∩Ai) = 0 for i 6= j .
The set of all strong subpartitions of X is denoted by
SPN :=
{
~A; ~A is a strong N sub-partition of X
}
. (6.1)
A strong N− partition is a strong N−subpartition of X which satisfies µ(∪N1 Ai) =
µ(X). We denote the set of all strong N−partitions by PN .
We shall omit the index N where no confusion is expected.
For any K ⊂ M+(N, J), the set K−valued strong subpartitions is
SPζK :=
{
~A ∈ SPN ,
(∫
A1
ζ¯dµ, . . . ,
∫
AN
ζ¯dµ
)
∈ K
}
.. (6.2)
and the set of strong K−valued partitions is PζK.
These definitions should be compared with (5.2). Note that PζK can be embedded
in Pw,ζK in a natural way. Just define ~µ = (µ1, . . . µN ) ∈ Pw,ζK by µi := µbAi, i.e. the
restriction of µ to Ai. Likewise, SPζK is embedded in SPw,µ¯K .
Motivated by the above we extend the definition of ~Mζ (5.3) to strong (sub)partitions:
~Mζ( ~A) := {
∫
Ai
ζjdµ} ∈ M+(N, J) . (6.3)
Now, we are in a position generalize (5.1.2) to the Strong Feasibility sets
∆sN (µ¯) :=
{
~M ∈ M+(N, J); Pζ ~M 6= ∅
}
;
∆sN (µ¯) :=
{
~M ∈ M+(N, J); SPζ~M 6= ∅
}
(6.4)
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By the remark above we immediately observe that
∆sN (µ¯) ⊆∆N (µ¯) and ∆sN (µ¯) ⊆∆N (µ¯) (6.5)
(recall (5.1.2)). These inclusions are, in fact, equalities:
Theorem 6.1.
∆sN (µ¯) = ∆N (µ¯) and ∆
s
N (µ¯) = ∆N (µ¯)
Thus we omit, from now on, the index s form ∆sN (µ¯) and ∆
s
N (µ¯).
Proof. We have to prove the opposite inclusion of (6.5). If ~M ∈ ∆N (µ¯) then Pw,ζ{ ~M}
is not empty. By Radon-Nikodym Theorem, any ~µ = (µ1, . . . µN ) ∈ Pw,ζ{ ~M} is charac-
terized by ~h = (h1, . . . hN ) where hi are the Radon-Nikodym derivatives of µi with
respect to µ, namely µi = hiµ. Since µi ≤ µ then 0 ≤ hi ≤ 1 µ a.e. on X. Now
Pw,ζ{ ~M} is convex and compact in the weak topology C
∗(X). By Krein-Milman Theorem
there exists an extreme point ~µ in Pw,ζ{ ~M}. We show that an extreme point is a strong
partition, namely hi ∈ {0, 1} µ-a.e on X, for all i ∈ I. Since ∑N hi = 1 µ-a.e on
X for any ~µ ∈ Pw,ζ{ ~M}, it is enough to show that for i 6= j, hi and hj cannot both be
positive on a set of positive µ measure.
Let  > 0, B ⊂ X measurable, µ(B) > 0 such that both hj >  and hi >  for
some i 6= j. Since hj + hi ∈ [0, 1] it follows also that hj , hi are smaller than 1−  on
B as well.
The vector-Lyapunov convexity theorem states that the range of a nonatomic
vector measures with values in a finite dimensional space is compact and convex [30].
In particular the set
R(B) :=
{(∫
A
ζ¯dµ1, . . . ,
∫
A
ζ¯dµN
)
; A ∈ A(X), A ⊂ B
}
⊂ M+(N, J)
is compact and convex. Obviously, R(B) contains the zero point ~0 ∈ M+(N, J) since
∅ ⊂ B and ~µ(∅) = ~0. Hence we can find a subset C ⊂ B such that∫
C
ζjdµ
(j) =
1
2
∫
B
ζjdµ
(j),
∫
C
ζidµi =
1
2
∫
B
ζidµi .
Set w := 1B − 21C where 1A stands for the indicator function of a measurable set
A ⊂ X. It follows that w is supported on B , |w| ≤ 1 and
µ(j)(wζj) = µi(wζi) = 0 . (6.6)
By assumption, hj(x) ± w(x) ∈ [0, 1] and hi(x) ± w(x) ∈ [0, 1] for any x ∈ B. Let
~ν := (ν1, . . . νN ) where νj = µ
(j), νi = −µi and νk = 0 for k 6= j, i. Let ~µ1 := ~µ+ w~ν,
~µ2 := ~µ − w~ν. Then, by (6.6) both ~µ1, ~µ2 are in Pw,ζ{ ~M} and ~µ =
1
2
~µ1 +
1
2
~µ2. This is
in contradiction to the assumption that ~µ is an extreme point.
6.2 Structure of the feasibility sets
Assumption 6.2.1.
µ
[
x ∈ X; ~p · ζ¯(x) = 0] = 0 (6.7)
for any ~p ∈ RJ − {0}.
Assumption 6.2.1 is the key to our next discussion on cartels and fixed exchange
ratios.
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Cartels : By a coalition we mean a subset of agents I′ ⊂ I which decide to join
together and form a cartel. By a cartel we mean that the price vector −~pI′ ∈ RJ for
the list of goods is the same for all members of the coalition I′ . That is:
~pi ≡ ~pI′ ∀ i ∈ I
′
.
The capacity of a coalition I′ is just the sum of the capacities of its members
~mI′ =
∑
i∈I′
~mi
The price vector −~pI′ for the coalition I
′
is determined by the capacity ~mI′ of this
coalition (and these of the other coalitions, if there are any) via the equilibrium mech-
anism.
Exchange ratio A fixed price ratio emerges whenever the agent recognizes a fixed
exchange rate between the goods J . Suppose the agent can exchange one unite of the
good j for z units of the good k. This implies that the price −pj she charges for j is
just −zpk, where −pk is the price she charge for k. More generally, if ~z := (z1, . . . zJ)
is a fixed vector such that z = zk/zj is the exchange rate of j to k, then the price
vector charged by this agent is a multiple ~p = q~z, where the reference price q ∈ R is
determined, again, by the equilibrium mechanism.
6.2.1 Coalitions and Cartels
Assume the set of agents I is grouped into a coalitions ensemble, that is, a set D = {Ii}
of disjoint coalitions: Given such an ensemble D, no agent can be a member of two
different coalitions, that is
In ∩ In′ = ∅ for n 6= n
′
,
and any agent is a member of some coalition
∪nIn = I .
Definition 6.2.1. Given ~M := (~m1, . . . ~mN ) ∈ M+(N, J) and a coalitions ensemble
D composed of k := |D| coalitions D = (I1, . . . Ik)
D( ~M) := (~mI1 , . . . ~mIk ) ∈ M+(N, k) , ~mIn :=
∑
i∈In
~mi .
For such a coalition’s ensemble, the cartel price vector corresponding to ~P ∈
M
′
(N, k) is
D∗(~P) := (~p1, . . . ~pk) ∈ M
′
(N, J)
where ~pi ∈ M′(N, |Ii|) is the constant vector whose all components are equal to the i−
component of ~P.
We also consider a partial order on the set of coalition’s ensembles: D  D˜ if
for each component Il ∈ D there exists a component I˜l ∈ D˜ such that Il ⊆ I˜j. In
particular |D| ≥ |D˜|.
Note that the grand coalition D = {I} is the minimal one in this order, while the
coalition of individuals D = {{i} ∈ I} is the maximal one.
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By Definition 6.2.1 we obtain the following duality relation between these map-
pings:
Lemma 6.1. For any ~M ∈ M+(N, J), any coalitions set D and any ~P ∈ M′(N, |D|)
D∗(~P) : ~M = ~P : D( ~M) .
Consider now a coalition’s ensemble D = {I1, . . . I|D|} and a strong (sub)partition
~AD :=
(
AI1 , . . . AI|D|
)
Definition 6.2.2. ~µ is embedded in ~AD if
Supp
∑
i∈Ik
µi
 ⊆ AIk for k = 1 . . . |D| .
Theorem 6.2. Under Assumptions 6.2.1: Let ~M ∈ ∂∆N (µ¯). Then there exists a
unique maximal1 coalition’s ensemble D and a unique strong subpartition AD such
that any ~µ ∈ SPw,µ¯{ ~M} is embedded in AD.
Moreover, D( ~M) is an extreme point in D(∆N (µ¯)).
The full proof of Theorem 6.2 is given in Section 6.2.3.
6.2.2 Fixed exchange ratio
Suppose now each agent i ∈ I fixes the ratios of the prices she charge for the list of
goods J . For this, she determines a vector ~z(i) := (z
(i)
1 , . . . z
(i)
J ) ∈ RJ . The prices
~pi := (p
(1)
i , . . . p
(J)
i ) she charge her customers is a multiple of ~z
(i):
~pi = qi~z
(i) , qi ∈ R .
Definition 6.2.3. Given ~M := (~m1 . . . ~mN ) ∈ M+(N, J), let
~Z( ~M) :=
(
~z(1) · ~m1, . . . ~z(N) · ~mN
)
∈ RN .
The dual operation ~Z∗ : RN 7→ M′(N, J) acting on ~q := (q1, . . . qN ) ∈ RN is defined by
~Z∗(~q) :=
(
q1~z
(1), . . . qN~z
(N)
)
.
The duality ~Z, ~Z∗ satisfies
Lemma 6.2. For any ~M ∈ M+(N, J) and any ~q ∈ RN
~Z∗(~q) : ~M = ~q · ~Z( ~M) .
By Proposition 5.1, ~Z(∆N (µ¯)) (resp. ~Z(∆N (µ¯))) are closed convex sets in R
N .
We also observe that
∂~Z(∆N (µ¯)) ⊆ ~Z(∂∆N (µ¯)) . (6.8)
This inclusion is strict, in general.
1That is, there is no coalition’s ensemble D˜  D and a corresponding strong partition ~AD˜
corresponding to D( ~M).
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Assumption 6.2.2. ~z(i) ∈ RJ , i = i . . . N are pairwise independent (that is α~z(i) +
β~z(i
′
) = 0 for i 6= i′ iff α = β = 0). In addition, ~z(i) · ζ¯(x) > 0 for any x ∈ X, i ∈ I.
Theorem 6.3. Under Assumptions 6.2.1 and 6.2.2:
i)The boundary of ~Z(∆N (µ¯)) contained in R
N
++ is composed of extreme points of
~Z(∆N (µ¯)).
ii) If ~m ∈ ∂~Z(∆N (µ¯)) there exists a unique subpartition of X associated with this
point, and this subpartition is a strong one. In particular there is a unique
~M ∈∆N (µ¯) such that ~m = ~Z( ~M).
Remark 6.2.1. Note that unlike Corollary 5.2.2,
~Z(∆N (µ¯)) 6⊂ ∂~Z(∆N (µ¯))
in general.
6.2.3 Proofs
Recall the definitions (5.10-5.13) of ξ0ζ , ξ
0,+
ζ and Ξ
0
ζ , Ξ
0,+
ζ . For any
~P = (~p1, . . . ~pN ) ∈
M
′
(N, J) consider
Ai(~P) :=
{
x ∈ X; ~pi · ζ¯(x) > max
k∈I;k 6=i
~pk · ζ¯(x)
}
(6.9)
A+0 (~P) :=
{
x ∈ X; max
i∈I
~pi · ζ¯(x) ≤ 0
}
. (6.10)
A+i (~P) := Ai(~P)−A+0 (~P) . (6.11)
We first need the following result:
Lemma 6.3. . Under Assumption 6.2.1, if ~P := (~p1, . . . ~pN ) such that ~pi 6= ~pi′ for
i 6= i′ then Ξ0ζ (resp. Ξ0,+ζ ) is differentiable at ~P and
∇~piΞ0ζ =
∫
Ai(~P)
ζ¯dµ , resp. ∇~piΞ0,+ζ =
∫
A+i (
~P)
ζ¯dµ (6.12)
Proof. By definition of {Ai(~P)}, these sets are mutually essentially disjoint. By As-
sumption 6.2.1 and the assumption on ~P we obtain that µ(∪N1 Ai(~P)) = µ(X). More-
over,
∇~piξζ =
{
ζ¯(x) if x ∈ Ai(~P)
0 if ∃j 6= i, x ∈ Aj(~p) (6.13)
In particular, the ~pi derivatives of ξζ exists µ a.e in X, ∇~pξζ ∈ L1(X;M+(N, J))
for any ~P ∈ M′(N, J) and the partial derivatives are uniformly integrable. Since
Ξ0ζ := µ(ξζ) by definition, its derivatives exists everywhere and
∇~piΞ0ζ = µ
(
∇~piξζ(·, ~P)
)
=
∫
Ai(~P)
ζ¯dµ .
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Finally, note that Ξ0ζ is a convex function, and the existence of its partial derivatives
implies its differentiability (A.9).
In the case of Ξ0,+ζ we observe that (6.13) still holds for ξ
+
ζ and A
+
i (
~P), i ∈ I while
∇~piξ+ζ = 0 for any x ∈ A+0 (~P). Since µ(∪i∈I∪{0}A+i ) = µ(X) we obtain the same
result for the sup-partition induced by {A+i (~P)}, i ∈ I.
Corollary 6.2.1. Under Assumption 6.2.2, The function ~q → Ξ0,+ζ (~Z∗(~q)) is differ-
entiable at any ~q ∈ RN++.
Proof of Theorem 6.2 Given a price matrix ~P := (~p1, . . . ~pN ), we associate with
~p the coalitions I~p := {k ∈ I; ~pi = ~p}. The collection of pairwise disjoint coalitions
defined in this way constitutes the ensemble of coalitions D~P.
D~P := (I1, . . . I|D(~P)|) , (6.14)
where each Ii coincides with one of the (non-empty) coalitions I~p, ~p ∈ {~p1, . . . ~pN}.
We now recall Theorem 5.1 and Corollary 5.2.1: If, and only if, ~M is a boundary
point of ∆N (µ¯) then there exist a non zero
~P0 ∈ M′(N, J) such that, for any ~P ∈
M
′
(N, J)
Ξ0,+ζ (
~P0)− ~P0 : ~M = 0 ≤ Ξ0,+ζ (~P)− ~P : ~M . (6.15)
For any such (possibly non-unique) ~P0 we associate the coalitions set D := D~P0
as defined in (6.14). If there is another ~P
′ 6= ~P0 maximizing (6.15) then by convexity
of Ξ0ζ , (1 − )~P0 + ~P
′
is a maximizer as well for any  ∈ [0, 1]. By Definition 6.2.1
we get that for  > 0 sufficiently small D~P′+(1−)~P0  D, and the pair of coalition’s
ensemble agrees iff D = D~P′ . Thus, the maximal coalition’s ensemble is unique.
Let (µ1, . . . µ|D|) a subpartition associated with the maximal coalition D. In par-
ticular,
D( ~M)
(j)
i = µi(ζj) , i ∈ D, j ∈ J .
By definition of Ξ0,+ζ (5.13), (6.15) and Lemma 6.1 we get
Ξ0,+ζ (
~P0)− ~P0 : ~M = Ξ0,+ζ (D∗(~P0))− ~P0 ·D( ~M) ≡∑
i∈D
µi
[
ξ0,+ζ (x,
~P0)− ~P0,i · ζ¯
]
+ µ0
[
ξ0,+ζ (·, ~P0)
]
= 0 , (6.16)
where µ0 := µ −∑i∈D µi. From the definition of ξ0,+ζ we obtain that ξ0,+ζ (x, ~P0) ≥
~p
i,0
· ζ¯(x) or any (x, i) ∈ X × D as well as ξ0,+ζ ≥ 0 on X. Thus, (6.16) implies that
ξ0,+ζ (x,
~P0) = ~p
i,0
· ζ¯(x) a.e (µi), as well as ξ0,+ζ (x, ~P0) = 0 a.e (µ0).
On the other hand, we get via (6.11, 6.10) adapted to D that
ξ0,+ζ (x,
~P0) > ~p
i,0
· ζ¯(x) if x ∈ A+k (~P0) where for any k ∈ D ∪ {0} − {i}. Hence
Supp(µi) ⊂ X − ∪k∈D∪{0};k 6=iA+k (~P0) . (6.17)
Since, by definition, the components of ~P0 are pairwise different we get by Assump-
tions 6.2.1 and by (6.11, 6.10) that ∪i∈D∪{0}A+i (~P0) = X. This and (6.17) imply that
µi is the restriction of µ to A
+
i (
~P0), hence it is a strong partition. The uniqueness of
this partition follows as well.
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Finally, it follows from (6.15) that ~M ∈ ∂~P0Ξ
0,+
ζ . Since
~P0 6= 0 it follows from
Lemma 6.3 that Ξ0,+ζ is differentiable at
~P0. Hence ~M is an extreme point via Propo-
sition A.12.
The following Corollary to the proof of Theorem 6.2 refers to the case of maximal
coalition (c.f. Definition 6.2.1).
Corollary 6.2.2. If ~P0 := (~p1, . . . ~pN ) satisfies ~pi 6= ~pj for any i 6= j then there exists
a unique partition in Pζ{ ~M0} where ~M0 = ∇~P0Ξ0ζ . Moreover, this partition is a strong
one, given by (6.9) where ~P0 substituted for ~P.
Proof of Theorem 6.3 i) Assume that ~m ∈ ∂~Z(∆N (µ¯)) ∩ RN++.
Let ~M
′ ∈ ~Z−1(~m) ∩ ∂∆N (µ¯). By Theorem 5.1 we get
Ξ0,+ζ (
~P)− ~P : ~M′ ≥ 0
for any ~P ∈ M′(N, J). In particular, we substitute ~P = ~Z∗(~q) and we get, for any
~q ∈ RN ,
Ξ0,+ζ (
~Z∗(~q))− ~Z∗(~q) : ~M′ ≥ 0 .
From Lemma 6.2 (and since ~m = ~Z( ~M
′
) by definition):
Ξ0,+ζ (
~Z∗(~q))− ~q · ~Z( ~M′) = Ξ0,+ζ (~Z∗(~q))− ~q · ~m ≥ 0 (6.18)
holds for any ~q ∈ RN . Since, in addition, ~m ∈ ∂~Z(∆N (µ¯)) we get, as in the proof of
Corollary 5.2.1, that there exists a non-zero ~q0 ∈ RN for which
Ξ0,+ζ (
~Z∗(~q0))− ~q0 · ~m = 0 . (6.19)
We prove now that ~q0 ∈ RN++.
Surly, it is impossible that all components of ~q0 are non-positive. Assume with no
limitation of generality, that, q0,1 > 0. By Assumption 6.2.1 we can find δ > 0 such
that ~z(1) · ζ¯(x) > δ for any x ∈ X. Then ξζ(~Z∗(~q), x) ≥ q0,1~z(1) · ζ¯(x) > δq0,1 on X.
Suppose q0,j ≤ 0 for some j 6= 1, let  > 0 for which ~z(j) · ζ¯ < δq0,1 on X.
Then ξ0ζ (~Z
∗(~q0), x) = ξ0ζ (~Z
∗(~q0 + ~ej), x) on X. Here ~ej is the unit coordinate vector
pointing in the positive j direction. Indeed, both q0,j~z
(j) · ζ¯(x) and (q0,j + )~z(j) · ζ¯(x)
are smaller that ~q0,1~z
(1) · ζ¯(x) for any x ∈ X, so the j component does not contribute
to the value of ξ0ζ at any point x ∈ X. Hence Ξ0ζ(~q0) = Ξ0ζ(~Z∗(~q0 + ~ej)). so
Ξ0ζ(
~Z∗(~q0 + ~ej))− (~q0 + ~ej) · ~m = Ξ0ζ(~Z∗(~q0))− ~q0 · ~m− mj = −mj < 0
by (6.19) (recall mj > 0 by assumption). This contradicts (6.18), hence q0,j > 0 as
well and ~q ∈ RN+ .
We now prove that ~m ∈ ∂~Z(∆N (µ¯)) ∩ RN++ is an extreme point in ~Z(∆N (µ¯)).
Consider the function ~q → Ξ0,+ζ (~Z∗(~q)). By Assumptions 6.2.1, 6.2.2 and Corollary
6.2.1 we observe that this function is convex and differentiable at any ~q ∈ RN++. Its
essential domain is ~Z(∆N (µ¯)). Thus, (6.19) and Proposition A.12 imply that ~m is an
extreme point of ~Z(∆N (µ¯)).
ii) Let now (µ1, . . . µN ) a partition associated with ~m. In particular∫
~z(i) · ζ¯dµi = mi. By definition of Ξ0,+ζ (5.13) we get that
Ξ0,+ζ (
~Z∗(~q0))− ~q0 · ~m ≡ µ
[
ξ0,+ζ (x,
~Z∗(~q0))
]
−
∑
i∈I
q0,iµi
[
~z(i) · ζ¯
]
= 0 .
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On the other hand, since µ ≥∑i∈I µi, we get
µ0
(
ξ0,+ζ (x,
~Z∗(~q0))
)
+
N∑
i=1
µi
(
ξ0,+ζ (x,
~Z∗(~q0))− qi,0~z(i) · ζ¯
)
= 0
where µ0 = µ−∑i∈I µi. Since ξ0,+ ≥ 0 by definition (5.11) we obtain, in particular,
that ξ+,0(x, ~Z∗(~q0)) = 0 µ0 a.e. Thus, µ0 is supported in A+0 (~Z
∗(~q0)) via (6.10).
From the definition (5.11) of ξ0,+ζ we also obtain that ξ
0,+
ζ (x,
~Z∗(~q0)) ≥ qi,0~z(i) ·ζ¯(x)
or any x ∈ X. Thus, ξ0,+ζ (x, ~Z∗(~q0)) = qi,0~z(i) · ζ¯(x) for µi a.e. x.
On the other hand, from (6.11) (substitute ~Z∗(~q) for ~P) we get
ξ0,+ζ (x,
~Z∗(~q0)) < qk,0~z(k) · ζ¯(x) µi a.s. if x ∈ A+k (~Z∗(~q)) for any k 6= i. Hence
Supp(µi) ⊂ X − ∪k 6=iA+k (~Z∗(~q0)) . (6.20)
By (6.9-6.11) we obtain that the union of A+i (
~Z∗(~q0)), i ∈ {0} ∪ I, is of full µ
measure. This and (6.20) imply that µi is the restriction of µ − µ0 to Ai(~Z∗(~q0)),
hence it is a strong subpartition. The uniqueness follows since the same reasoning
holds for any subpartition corresponding to ~m.
Note that, unlike ∆N (µ¯), the set ~Z(∆N (µ¯)) ⊂ RN+ may contains interior points
(compare with Corollary 5.2.2).
Proposition 6.1. Under assumption 6.2.1, 6.2.2
RN++ ∩ ∂~Z(∆N (µ¯)) ⊂ ∂~Z(∆N (µ¯)) .
In particular, any sub partition corresponding to ~m ∈ ∂~Z(∆N (µ¯)) ∩ RN++ is a strong
partition.
Proof. Let ~m ∈ ∂~Z(∆N (µ¯)) ∩ RN++. Following the proof of Theorem 6.3 we get the
existence of ~q0 ∈ RN++ satisfying (6.19). If ~µ ∈ ~Z(SPw,µ¯{~m}) then
Ξ0,+ζ (
~Z∗(~q0)) ≡ µ
[
ξ0,+ζ (x,
~Z∗(~q0))
]
≥
∑
i∈I
µi
[
ξ0,+ζ (·, ~Z∗(~q0))
]
≥
∑
i∈I
q0,i · µi(~z(i) · ζ¯) = ~q0 · ~Z(~m) ≡ Ξ0,+ζ (~Z∗(~q0)) .
In particular
µ
(
ξ0,+ζ (x,
~Z∗(~q0))
)
=
∑
i∈I
µi
(
ξ0,+ζ (x,
~Z∗(~q0))
)
.
Since ~q0 ∈ RN++, Assumption 6.2.1 and the definition of ξ0,+ζ imply that ξ0,+ζ (·, ~Z∗(~q0))
is positive and continuous on X. This, and
∑
i∈I µi ≤ µ imply that, in fact,
∑
i∈I µi =
µ so ~µ ∈ Pw,ζ{~m} is a strong partition. In particular ~m ∈ ~Z(∆N (µ¯)). Since ~Z(∆N (µ¯)) ∩
∂~Z(∆N (µ¯)) ⊂ ∂~Z(∆N (µ¯)) then ~m ∈ ∂~Z(∆N (µ¯)) as well.
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6.2.4 An application: Two States for two Nations
Suppose X is a territory held by two ethnic groups living unhappily together, say J
and P. Let µ the distribution of the total population in X. Let ζJ : X → [0, 1] be the
relative density of the population J . Then ζP := 1 − ζJ the relative density of the
population P.
It was suggested by some wise men and women that the territory X should be
divided between the two groups, to establish a J−state AJ and a P−state AP :
AJ ⊂ X, AP ⊂ X ; AJ ∪AP = X, µ(AJ ∩AP) = 0
Under the assumption that nobody is forced to migrate from one point to another in
X, what are the possibilities of such divisions?
The question can be reformulated as follows. Let us assume that an AJ state is
formed whose J population is mJ and whose P population is mP :2∫
AJ
ζJ dµ = mJ ,
∫
AJ
ζPdµ = mP .
The evident constraints are
0 ≤ mJ ≤ µ(ζJ ) ; 0 ≤ mP ≤ µ(ζP) . (6.21)
Assuming for convenience that the total population µ is normalized (µ(X) = 1, so
µ(ζJ ) + µ(ζP) = 1), we may use Theorem 5.2 to characterize the feasibility set S in
the rectangle domain (6.21) by
(mJ ,mP) ∈ S ⇔ µ (F (ζJ , ζP)) ≥
(mJ +mP)F
(
mJ ,mP
mJ +mP
)
+ (1−mP −mJ )F
(
µ(ζJ )−mJ , µ(ζP)−mP
1−mJ −mP
)
.
(6.22)
From Proposition 5.3 we also obtain that the diagonal of the rectangle (6.21) is
always contained in S:
∪α∈[0,1]α(µ(ζJ ), µ(ζP)) ⊂ S .
c.f. Fig 6.1.
What else can be said about the feasibility set S, except being convex and contain-
ing the diagonal of the rectangle 6.21? If µ(ζ1(x)/ζ2(x) = r) = 0 for any r ∈ [0,∞],
then the assumption of Theorem 6.3 is satisfied with J = 2, ~z(1) = (1, 0), ~z(2) = (0, 1).
In particular we obtain
Proposition 6.2. All points of the boundary ∂S ∩R2++ are extreme points. For each
(mJ ,mP) ∈ ∂S ∩ R2++ there exists r ∈ [0,∞] such that the corresponding partition
AJ := {x ∈ X; ζJ (x)/ζP(x) ≥ r} , AP := {x ∈ X; ζJ (x)/ζP(x) ≤ r}
is unique.
In particular, S is contained in the parallelogram
inf
x∈X
ζJ (x)
ζP(x)
≤ mJ
mP
∧ µ(ζJ )−mJ
µ(ζP)−mP ≤
mJ
mP
∨ µ(ζJ )−mJ
µ(ζP)−mP ≤ supx∈X
ζJ (x)
ζP(x)
,
2Of course, the J −P populations of the P state are, respectively, MJ −mJ and MP−mP .
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Figure 6.1: Projection on the diagonal.
6.3 Further comments
The special case of Theorem 6.2 where N = 1 can be formulated as follows: Let
~σ(dx) := ζ¯(x)µ(dx) be an RJ−valued measure on X. The set ∆N (µ¯) corresponds, in
that case, to the image of ~σ over all measurable subsets of X:
∆N (µ¯) := {~σ(A) ; A ⊂ X is µ measurable } ⊂ RJ .
The geometry of such sets was discussed by several authors. In particular, several
equivalent sufficient and necessary conditions for the strict convexity of ∆N (µ¯) were
introduces at [40], [4], [5]. One of these conditions is the following:
Theorem 6.4. [[40], [4]] The set ∆N (µ¯) is strictly convex iff the following condition
holds: For any measurable set A ⊂ X for which ~σ(A) 6= 0 there exists measurable sets
A1, . . . AJ ⊂ A such that the vectors ~σ(A1), . . . ~σ(AJ) are linearly independent.
Theorem 6.4 can be obtained as a special case of Theorem 6.2. Indeed, if N = 1
then there is only one possible ”coalition”, composed of the single agent, hence the
strict convexity of this set (namely the property that any boundary point is an extreme
point) is conditioned on Assumption 6.2.1. Let us show that, for a continuous ζ¯ (5.1),
Assumption 6.2.1 is, indeed, equivalent to the assumption of Theorem 6.4.
If Assumption 6.2.1 fails then there exists a nonzero ~p ∈ RJ and a measurable set
A such that µ(A) > 0 and ~p · ζ¯(x) = 0 on A. Hence, for any measurable B ⊂ A,
~p ·~σ(B) ≡ ∫
B
~p · ζ¯dµ = 0 as well. Hence ~p is not spanned by any collection of J subsets
in A.
Conversely, suppose µ(A) > 0 and let k be the maximal dimension of Sp (~σ(A1) . . . ~σ(AJ))
where A1, . . . AJ run over all µ− measurable subsets of A. We can find k subsets
A1 . . . Ak of A such that the dimension of Sp (~σ(A1) . . . ~σ(Ak)) equals k. If k < J
then there exists ~p ∈ RJ such that ~p · ~σ(Ai) = 0 for i ∈ {1, . . . k}. If there exists a
measurable B ⊂ A such that ~p · ~σ(B) 6= 0 then the dimension of the space spanned by
~σ(Ai), i = 1, . . . k and ~σ(B) is k + 1. This contradicts the assumed maximality of k.
Thus, ~p · ~σ(B) = 0 for any measurable subset of A, which implies that ~p · ζ¯ = 0 on A.
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As a special case of Theorem 6.3 we may consider ~z(i) to be the principle co-
ordinates of RN (in particular, J = N). The set ~Z(∆N (µ¯)) in R
N is, then, given
by
~Z(∆N (µ¯)) =
{(∫
A1
ζ1dµ, . . .
∫
AN
ζNdµ
)}
,
where ~A := (A1, . . . AN ) runs over the set SPN of all strong subpartitions of X (c.f.
Section 6.1). Such sets are the object of study in [47]. The case of N = 2 is the case
we considered in section 6.2.4. A detailed study of this case can be found in [29].
Chapter 7
Optimal multipartitions
7.1 Optimality within the weak partitions
7.1.1 Extension to hyperplane
In order to consider the optimization of θ on Pw,ζ{ ~M0} where ~M0 ∈ ∆N (µ¯) (resp. on
SPw,µ¯{ ~M0} where ~M0 ∈∆N (µ¯)), we introduce the following extension of Theorem 5.1:
Let Q be a subspace of M
′
(N, J). Let Q⊥ ⊂ M+(N, J) be the subspace of annihi-
lators of Q, that is
Q⊥ := { ~M ∈ M+(N, J), ~P : ~M = 0 ∀~P ∈ Q} .
Given such Q and ~P0 ∈ M′(N, J), the following Theorem extends Theorem 5.1 to the
hyperplane Q+ s~P0.
Theorem 7.1. For any s ∈ R
inf
~Q∈Q
Ξ0ζ(
~Q + s~P0)− ~Q : ~M0 = sup
~M∈(Q⊥+ ~M0)∩∆N (µ¯)
s~P0 : ~M (7.1)
as well as
inf
~Q∈Q
Ξ0,+ζ (
~Q + s~P0)− ~Q : ~M0 = sup
~M∈(Q⊥+ ~M0)∩∆N (µ¯)
s~P0 : ~M . (7.2)
The case Q = M
′
(N, J) reduces to Theorem 5.1. Indeed, if ~M0 6∈ ∆N (µ¯) (resp.
~M0 6∈ ∆N (µ¯)) then the right side of (7.1, 7.2) is a supremum over a null set (since
Q⊥ = {0}) and, by definition of the supremum, it equals −∞.
If, on the other hand, (Q⊥ + ~M0) ∩∆N (µ¯) 6= ∅ (resp. (Q⊥ + ~M0) ∩∆N (µ¯) 6= ∅)
then the supremum on the right sides of (7.1) (resp. (7.2)) is always attended, since
both ∆N (µ¯),∆N (µ¯) are compact sets. Thus, there exists
~M∗ ∈ (Q⊥ + ~M0) ∩∆N (µ¯)
(resp. ~M∗ ∈ (Q⊥ + ~M0) ∩∆N (µ¯)) such that
s~P0 : ~M∗ = sup
~M∈(Q⊥+ ~M0)∩∆N (µ¯)
s~P0 : ~M
resp. s~P0 : ~M∗ = sup
~M∈(Q⊥+ ~M0)∩∆N (µ¯)
s~P0 : ~M (7.3)
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Remark 7.1.1. We can make a natural connection between reduction to coalition’s
ensemble introduced in section 6.2.1 and the duality with respect to affine subsets.
Indeed, given a coalition D we may define QD := D∗(M
′
(N, J)).
If we imply Theorem 7.1 in the special case s = 0 (and arbitrary ~P0) we can get
Theorem 6.2 from the following statement: For any ~M0 ∈ ∂∆N (µ¯) there exists a
unique maximal coalition ensemble D such that the inequality
Ξ0,+ζ (
~P)− ~P : ~M0 ≥ 0
holds for any ~P ∈ QD, and there exists a unique ~P 6= 0 in QD along which the above
inequality turns into an equality on the ray spanned by ~P (~P = {α~P}, α ≥ 0). This
~P induces the unique strong subpartition AD.
There is also a natural connection between Theorem 6.3 and Theorem 7.1 which is
explained below:
Let Q = ~Z∗(RN ) ⊂ M′(N, J). We may imply Theorem 7.1 for s = 0 and get Theorem
6.3 from the following statement: For any ~m0 ∈ ∂~Z(∆N (µ¯))∩RN+ there exists a unique
~M0 ∈ ~Z−1(~m0) such that the inequality
Ξ0,+ζ (
~P)− ~P : ~M0 ≥ 0
holds for any ~Q ∈ Q, and there exists a unique ~P 6= 0 in Q along which the above
inequality turns into an equality on the ray spanned by ~P (~P = {α~P}, α ≥ 0). This
~P induces the unique strong subpartition A ∈∆N (µ¯){ ~M0}.
The minimizer ~Q ∈ Q on the left side of (7.1, 7.2), however, is not necessarily
attained. Recall also Definition 4.6.1 of the weak (sub)partition sets Pw,SPw and
(5.2). Since ~M∗ ∈ ∆N (µ¯) (resp. in ∆N (µ¯)) then (7.3) implies that, for such pairs
( ~M0, ~P0) ∈ M+(N, J) ×M′(N, J), there exist ~M∗ ∈ Q⊥ + ~M0 and (sub)partitions ~µ
which maximizes s~P0 : ~Mζ(~µ)) on PwQ⊥+ ~M0 (resp. on SP
w
Q⊥+ ~M0
), i.e
s~P0 : ~Mζ(~µ)) = inf
~Q∈Q
Ξ0ζ(
~Q + s~P0)− ~Q : ~M0 ,
resp.
s~P0 : ~Mζ(~µ)) = inf
~Q∈Q
Ξ0,+ζ (
~Q + s~P0)− ~Q : ~M0 .
Letting s = 1 we obtain
Proposition 7.1. For each (~P0, ~M0) ∈ M′(N, J) × M+(N, J) there exists ~M∗ ∈
∆N (µ¯)∩( ~M0+Q⊥) (resp. ~M∗ ∈∆N (µ¯)∩( ~M0+Q⊥)) and ~µ ∈ Pw~M∗ (resp. ~µ ∈ SP
w
~M∗
)
such that ~µ maximizes ~P0 : ~Mζ(~µ) on PwQ⊥+ ~M0 (resp. on SP
w
Q⊥+ ~M0
), and, moreover,
~P0 : ~Mζ(~µ) = inf
~Q∈Q
Ξ0ζ(
~Q + ~P0)− ~Q : ~M0 ,
resp.
~P0 : ~Mζ(~µ) = inf
~Q∈Q
Ξ0,+ζ (
~Q + ~P0)− ~Q : ~M0 .
Let us consider (7.1) in the case s = 0 and Q ⊂ M′(N, J) a subspace 6= {0}. We
view Ξ0ζ as defined on the subspace Q whose dual is the quotient space M+(N, J)/Q
⊥.
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The action of Q on M+(N, J)/Q⊥ is define, naturally, as ~Q : ~M where ~Q ∈ Q and ~M
is any representative form M+(N, J)/Q⊥. Hence (7.1) reads
inf
~Q∈Q
Ξ0ζ(
~Q)− ~Q : ~M0 = 0 iff ~M0 ∈∆N (µ¯)/Q⊥ . (7.4)
In the general case we may view (~Q, s) → Ξ0ζ(~Q + s~P0) as a positively homogeneous
function on the space Q⊗ R. The dual of this space is
M+(N, J)/Q⊥ ⊕ R, and the duality action is
(~Q, t) : ( ~M, s) := ~Q : ~M + ts
where ~Q ∈ Q, ~M is any representative from M+(N, J)/Q⊥ and ts is just the product
of t and s in R.
Then (7.1) applied to all s ∈ R reads as
inf
(~Q,s)∈(Q⊕R)
Ξ0ζ(
~Q + s~P0)− (~Q, s) : ( ~M0, t) = 0
iff ( ~M0, t) ∈ ∆˜N (µ¯) ⊂ M+(N, J)/Q⊥ ⊗ R, where
∆˜N (µ¯) :=
{
( ~M0, t), ~M0 ∈∆N (µ¯)/Q⊥, inf
~M∈(Q⊥+ ~M0)
cP0 : ~M ≤ t ≤ sup
~M∈(Q⊥+ ~M0)
~P0 : ~M
}
.
(7.5)
Similarly
inf
(~Q,s)∈(Q⊕R)
Ξ0,+ζ (
~Q + s~P0)− (~Q, s) : ( ~M0, t) = 0
iff ( ~M0, t) ∈ ∆˜N (µ¯) ⊂ M+(N, J)/Q⊥ ⊗ R, where
∆˜N (µ¯) :=
{
( ~M0, t), ~M0 ∈∆N (µ¯)/Q⊥, inf
~M∈(Q⊥+ ~M0)
~P0 : ~M ≤ t ≤ sup
~M∈(Q⊥+ ~M0)
~P0 : ~M
}
.
(7.6)
Recalling Proposition A.11 we observe that ∆˜N (µ¯) (resp. ∆˜N (µ¯)) is the essential
domain of the Legendre transform of (~Q, s)→ Ξ0ζ(~Q+ s~P0) (resp. (~Q, s)→ Ξ0,+ζ (~Q+
s~P0)) as functions on Q⊗R. It is, in fact, an extension of ∆N (µ¯) (resp. ∆N (µ¯)) from
M+(N, J) to M+(N, J)/Q⊥ ⊗ R.
Proof of Theorem 7.1
The inequalities
inf
~Q∈Q
Ξ0ζ(
~Q + ~P0)− ~Q : ~M0 ≥ sup
~M∈(Q⊥+ ~M0)∩∆N (µ¯)
~P0 : ~M,
resp. inf
~Q∈Q
Ξ0,+ζ (
~Q + ~P0)− ~Q : ~M0 ≥ sup
~M∈(Q⊥+ ~M0)∩∆N (µ¯)
~P0 : ~M (7.7)
hold by Theorem 5.1. In order to prove the reverse inequality we need the Hahn-
Banach Theorem
Theorem 7.2. (Hahn-Banach) Let V be a real vector space, p : V → R a sublinear
function and f : U → R a linear functional on a linear subspace U ⊆ V s.t. f (x) ≤
p (x) for every x ∈ U . Then there exists a linear functional F ∈ V ∗ s.t. F (u) =
f (u) ∀u ∈ U and F (x) ≤ p (x)∀x ∈ V .
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Hahn-Banach Theorem is valid for any linear space. Here we use it for the finite
dimensional space V ≡ M′(N, J). Let
p(~P) := inf
~Q∈Q
Ξ(~P + ~Q)− (~P + ~Q) : ~M0
where Ξ stands for either Ξ0ζ or Ξ
0,+
ζ . Note that
p ≥ 0 on M′(N, J) (7.8)
by Theorem 5.1 since ~M0 ∈ S where S = ∆N (µ¯) (resp. S = ∆N (µ¯)). Recall that a
function p is sublinear iff
1. p(s~P) = sp(~P) for any ~P ∈ M′(N, J) and s > 0.
2. p(~P1 + ~P2) ≤ p(~P1) + p(~P2).
Note that Ξ is sublinear by definition (5.10-5.13). Since Q is a subspace it follows that
p(s~P) = inf
~Q∈Q
Ξ(s(~P + ~Q))− s(~P + ~Q) : ~M0 = sp(~P)
where s ≥ 0. For any  > 0 there exists ~Q1, ~Q2 ∈ Q such that
p(~P1) ≤ Ξ(~P1 + ~Q1)−(~P1 + ~Q1) : ~M0 +, p(~P2) ≤ Ξ(~P2 + ~Q2)−(~P2 + ~Q2) : ~M0 + ,
thus, by sub-linearity of Ξ and definition of p
p(~P1 + ~P2) ≤ Ξ(~P1 + ~P2 + ~Q1 + ~Q2)− (~P1 + ~P2 + ~Q1 + ~Q2) : ~M0
≤ Ξ(~P1+ ~Q1)−(~P1+ ~Q1) : ~M0+Ξ(~P2+ ~Q2)−(~P2+ ~Q2) : ~M0 ≤ p(~P1)+p(~P2)+2
(7.9)
so p is sub-linear on M
′
(N, J). Let U be the one-dimensional space of M
′
(N, J)
spanned by ~P0. Define f(s~P0) := sp(~P0) for any s ∈ R. Thus, f is a linear functional
on U and satisfies f(~P) ≤ p(~P) for any ~P ∈ U . Indeed, it holds with quality if
~P = s~P0 where s ≥ 0 by definition, while f(~P) ≤ 0 ≤ p(~P) if s ≤ 0 by (7.8). By
Hahn-Banach Theorem there exists a linear functional F ≡ ~M∗ ∈ M+(N, J) such that
~P : ~M∗ ≤ p(~P) for any ~P ∈ M′(N, J) while ~P0 : ~M∗ = p(~P0). Thus
~P : ~M∗ ≤ Ξ(~P + ~Q)− (~P + ~Q) : ~M0
holds for any ~P ∈ M′(N, J) and any ~Q ∈ Q. Thus
(~P + ~Q) : ( ~M∗ + ~M0) ≤ Ξ(~P + ~Q) + ~Q : ~M∗
holds for any ~P ∈ M′(N, J) and ~Q ∈ Q. Setting ~Q = 0 we obtain that ~M∗ + ~M0 ∈ S
by Theorem 5.1, and setting ~P = −~Q we obtain ~Q : ~M∗ ≥ 0 on Q. Since Q is a
subspace it follows that ~Q : ~M∗ = 0 for any ~Q ∈ Q, so ~M∗ ∈ Q⊥. We obtained that
sup
~M∈(Q⊥+ ~M0)∩S
~P0 : ~M ≥ ~P0 : ~M∗ = inf
~Q∈Q
Ξ(~P0 + ~Q)− ~Q : ~M0
This implies the opposite inequality to (7.7). 2
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7.1.2 Optimal multi-(sub)partitions: Extended setting
Given ζ¯ ∈ C(X,RJ+) as in (5.1), ~θ ∈ C(X,RN ) as in Assumption 4.0.1, we consider
the function
ζ̂ := (ζ1, . . . ζJ+N ) := (ζ¯, ~θ) ∈ C(X,RN+J) .
This definition suggests that we extend the set of ”goods” from J to J ∪ I. Thus,
we consider the extended spaces M̂′ := M
′
(N, J) ×M′(N,N), where M′(N, J) as in
Definition 5.2.1 and M
′
(N,N) ∼ RN2 parameterized by M′(N,N) = (~p∗,1, . . . ~p∗,N ),
~p∗,i ∈ RN . This space is parameterized as
P̂ := (~P, ~P∗) = (~p1, . . . ~pN ; ~p∗,1, . . . ~p∗,N ) ∼ RN(N+J)
(Recall ~pi ∈ RJ and ~p∗,i ∈ RN for 1 ≤ i ≤ N).
Similarly, the dual space M̂+ := M+(N, J)×M+(N,N), thus
M̂ := ( ~M, ~M
′
) = (~m1, . . . ~mN ; ~m∗,1, . . . ~m∗,N ) ∼ RN(N+J)
as well.
The duality action of (~P, ~P
′
) on ( ~M, ~M∗) is the direct sum
P̂ : M̂ := ~P : ~M + ~P
′
: ~M
′
:=
∑
i∈I
(~pi · ~mi)RJ +
∑
i∈I
(~p∗,i · ~m∗,i)RN
where the inner products refer to the corresponding spaces indicated for clarity.
Let
Ξ̂0ζ(
~P, ~P∗) := µ
(
max
i∈I
(
~pi · ζ¯ + ~p∗,i · ~θ
))
(7.10)
resp.
Ξ̂0,+ζ (
~P, ~P∗) := µ
(
max
i∈I
(
~pi · ζ¯ + ~p∗,i · ~θ,
)
∨ 0
)
. (7.11)
Comparing with (5.10-5.12) we observe that (7.10, 7.11) are just the application of
these definition to the current setting:
Definition 7.1.1. .
i) Q :=
{
(~P,~0M′ (N,N));
~P ∈ M′(N, J)
}
, then
Q⊥ :=
{
(~0 ~M,
~M∗); ~M∗ ∈ M+(N,N)
}
.
ii) P̂0 := (~0M′ (N,J), I
′
0) where I
′
0 is the identity N ×N matrix.
iii) M̂0 := ( ~M0,~0M+(N,N)) where
~M0 ∈ M+(N, J) is given.
With this notation we get (cf. Definition 7.1.3) below)
θ(~µ) ≡
∑
i∈I
µi(θi) ≡ P̂0 : ~µ
(
ζ̂
)
≡ I′0 : ~µ(~θ) . (7.12)
Let
ξθζ (x, ~P) := max
i∈I
{
θi(x) + ~pi · ζ¯(x), 0
}
(7.13)
ξθ,+ζ (x,
~P) := ξθζ (x, ~P) ∨ 0 (7.14)
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Then, (7.10, 7.11) can be written as:
Ξ̂0,+ζ
(
~P, I
′
0
)
= Ξθ,+ζ (
~P) := µ(ξθ,+ζ (·, ~P)) (7.15)
Ξ̂0ζ
(
~P, I
′
0
)
= Ξθζ(~P) := µ(ξ
θ
ζ (·, ~P)) . (7.16)
Proposition 7.1 can now be written as:
Theorem 7.3. Given ~M ∈ ∆N (µ¯) (resp. ~M ∈ ∆N (µ¯)), then the maximum of θ(~µ)
in Pw{ ~M0} (resp. the maximum of θ(~µ) in SP
w
{ ~M0}) is given by
Σθζ
+
( ~M0) = inf
~P∈M′ (N,J)
[
Ξθ,+ζ (
~P)− ~P : ~M0
]
, (7.17)
resp.
Σθζ( ~M0) = inf
~P∈M′ (N,J)
[
Ξθζ(~P)− ~P : ~M0
]
. (7.18)
In Theorem 7.3 we left open the question of existence of a minimizer ~P of (7.17,
7.18). See Theorem 7.4 below.
Definition 7.1.2. ~M ∈∆N (µ¯) is an an escalating capacity if there is no ~P minimiz-
ing (7.18).
The reason for this notation will be explained in section 7.1.3. See also the box
above Theorem 7.5 and section 7.2.1.
Definition 7.1.3. Given a weak (sub)partition ~µ. let ~M∗(~µ) ∈ M+′(N,N) given by
{µ(j)(θi)}1≤i,j≤N . The extended feasibility set is an extension of Definition 5.1.2
∆̂N (µ¯) := ∪~µ∈Pw
{
~M(~µ), ~M∗(~µ)
}
; ∆̂N (µ¯) := ∪~µ∈SPw
{
~M(~µ), ~M∗(~µ)
}
,
and
∆N (µ¯)
′
:= ∪~µ∈Pw
{
~M∗(~µ)
}
, resp. ∆N (µ¯)
′
:= ∪~µ∈SPw
{
~M∗(~µ)
}
.
The diagonal elements of ~M∗(~µ) are called the surplus values of the agents under the
(sub)partition ~µ:
Diag
(
~M∗(~µ)
)
≡ (µ1(θ1), . . . µN (θN ))
where µi(θi) is the surplus value of agent i.
Consistently with Definition 7.1.1 and (7.5, 7.6) we define
∆˜N (µ¯) :=
{
( ~M, t) ∈ M+(N, J)⊗ R; ( ~M, ~M∗) ∈ ∆̂N (µ¯); t = Tr( ~M∗))
}
,
resp.
∆˜N (µ¯) :=
{
( ~M, t) ∈ M+(N, J)⊗ R; ( ~M, ~M∗) ∈ ∆̂N (µ¯); t = Tr( ~M∗)
}
,
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Note: In terms of this definition, as well as with Definition 7.1.1-(ii)
θ(~µ) ≡ I′0 : ~M∗(~µ) ≡ Tr
(
~M∗(~µ)
)
is another equivalent formulation of (7.12). In particular, Theorem 7.3 implies the
following, alternative definition for the optimal value of θ(~µ) on Pw{ ~M} (resp. on SPw{ ~M}
).
Σθζ( ~M) := sup
( ~M, ~M∗)∈∆̂N (µ¯)
Tr( ~M∗) ≡ sup
{
t; ( ~M, t) ∈ ∆˜N (µ¯)
}
(7.19)
resp.
Σθζ
+
( ~M) := sup
( ~M, ~M∗)∈∆̂N (µ¯)
Tr( ~M∗) ≡ sup
{
t; ( ~M, t) ∈ ∆˜N (µ¯)
}
. (7.20)
From (7.20) we obtain that ( ~M,Σθζ
+
( ~M)) ∈ ∂∆˜N (µ¯) for any ~M ∈ ∆N (µ¯). It is also
evident that ( ~M,Σθζ( ~M)) ∈ ∂∆˜N (µ¯), since ∆N (µ¯) (hence ∆˜N (µ¯)) contains no interior
points. We now imply Corollary 5.2.1 to obtain
Corollary 7.1.1. ( ~M, t) is an inner point of ∆˜N (µ¯) if and only if (
~P, s) = 0 is the
only minimizer of
inf
(~P,s)∈(M′ (N,J)⊕R)
Ξ̂0,+ζ
(
~P, sI
′
0
)
− (~P, s) : ( ~M, t) = 0
Hence, for any ~M ∈∆N (µ¯) (resp. ~M ∈∆N (µ¯)) there exist (~P, s) 6= 0 such that
Ξ̂0,+ζ
(
~P, sI
′
0
)
= ~P : ~M + sΣθζ
+
( ~M) (7.21)
resp.
Ξ̂0ζ
(
~P, sI
′
0
)
= ~P : ~M + sΣθζ( ~M) . (7.22)
To understand the meaning of (7.21, 7.22) we compare it to Theorem 7.3. By
(9.11- 7.16) we may write
Ξ̂0,+ζ
(
~P, sI
′
0
)
= Ξsθ,+ξ (
~P) resp. Ξ̂0ζ
(
~P, sI
′
0
)
= Ξsθξ (~P)
so (7.21, 7.22) are equivalent to the following:
Theorem 7.4. For any ~M ∈ ∆N (µ¯) (resp. ~M ∈ ∆N (µ¯)) there exists (~P0, s0) 6= 0
such that
inf
(~P,s)∈M′ (N,J)×R
[
Ξsθ,+ζ (
~P)− sΣθζ+( ~M)− ~P : ~M
]
=
Ξs0θ,+ζ (
~P0)− s0Σθζ+( ~M)− ~P0 : ~M = 0, (7.23)
resp.
inf
(~P,s)∈M′ (N,J)×R
[
Ξsθζ (~P)− sΣθζ( ~M)− ~P : ~M
]
=
Ξs0θζ (
~P0)− s0Σθζ( ~M)− ~P0 : ~M = 0 . (7.24)
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Now: (~P0, s0) 6= 0 implies that either s0 6= 0 or ~P0 6= 0 (or both). If s0 6= 0 (in
that case the reader can show that, in fact, s0 > 0) we can divide (7.23, 7.24) by s0,
using (9.11- 7.16) to observe s−1Ξsθζ (~P) = Ξ
θ
ζ(~P/s), and conclude that there exists a
minimizer s−10 ~P0 to (7.17, 7.18) in Theorem 7.4.
In particular:
The case of escalation (Definition 7.1.2) corresponds to s0 = 0
(hence ~P0 6= 0) in Theorem 7.4.
The Theorem below implies another characterization of the optimal (sub)partition:
Theorem 7.5. Any optimal (sub)partition ~µ corresponding to ~M ∈ ∆N (µ¯) (resp.
~M ∈∆N (µ¯)) satisfies the following:
supp(µi) ⊂ Aθ,+i :={
x ∈ X; ~p0,i · ζ¯(x) + s0θi(x) = max
k∈I
[
~p0,k · ζ¯(x) + s0θk(x)
]
+
}
. (7.25)
resp.
supp(µi) ⊂ Aθi :={
x ∈ X; ~p0,i · ζ¯(x) + s0θi(x) = max
k∈I
~p0,k · ζ¯(x) + s0θk(x)
}
, (7.26)
where ~P0 = (~p0,1, . . . ~p0,N ) and s0 ∈ R are as given by Theorem 7.4.
Proof. Let ~µ := (µ1, . . . µN ) be an optimal (sub)partition and let µ0 = µ −∑i∈I µi.
By (7.23),
0 = Ξs0θ,+ζ (
~P0)− s0Σθζ+( ~M)− ~P0 : ~M
while, by (7.16) and since ~µ ∈ SPw{ ~M} and is an optimal (sub)partition
Ξs0θ,+ζ (
~P0) =
∑
i∈I∪{0}
µi
(
max
k∈I
(
[s0θk + ~p0,k · ζ¯]+
)) ≥
∑N
i=1
[
s0µi(θi) + µi(~p0,i · ζ¯)
]
= s0Σ
θ
ζ
+
( ~M) + ~P0 : ~M (7.27)
so the inequality above is an equality. In particular, for µi a.e
max
k∈I
[s0θk(x) + ~p0,k · ζ¯(x)]+ = s0θi(x) + ~p0,i · ζ¯(x).
By (7.25) and the continuity of ~θ, ζ¯ we obtain that supp(µi) ⊂ Aθ,+i .
The case ~M ∈∆N (µ¯) is proved similarly.
7.1.3 Price adaptation and Escalation
So far we considered the equilibrium vector ~p as a tool for achieving optimal (sub)partitions
(Sections 4.2, 4.3, see also Proposition 4.4). One may expect that, in the case of multi-
partition, the price −p(j)i should be interpreted as the equilibrium price charged by
agent i for the good j in order to obtain the required capacity m
(j)
0,i .
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However, we didn’t consider how the agent determines these prices. It is conceivable
that this process is made by trial and error. Thus, when the agent i ”guess” the price
vector −p(j)i for the good j ∈ J , she should consider the number of consumers of
j who accept this prices and compare it with the desired capacities m
(j)
0,i . If she
is underbooked, namely m
(j)
0,i is above the number of her consumers for j, she will
decrease the price in order to attract more consumers. If, on the other hand, she is
overbooked, then she will increase the price to get rid of some.
But how does the agent i determines the number of consumers of j who accept
the price −p(j)i ? Recall that each consumer x need the fraction ζj(x) of the good j.
Hence the price paid by consumer x to agent i for the basket J is −ζ¯(x) · ~pi. Thus,
she only need to determine the entire set of her consumers µi. Once µi is known, she
knows the current capacity m
(j)
i (
~P) = µi(ζj) for the current price matrix −~P.
Recalling (4.14) we obtain that the set of all candidates A+i (
~P) who may hire i at
the price level −~pi is the set of consumers who makes a non-negative profit for trading
with i, and this profit is at least as large as the profit they may get form trading with
any other agent. Thus
A+i (~P) := {x ∈ X; θi(x) + ~pi · ζ¯ ≥ [θk(x) + ~pk · ζ¯(x)]+ ∀k ∈ I} . (7.28)
In fact, there may be a set of ”floating” consumers who belong to two (or more)
such sets (note that µ(A+i (
~P) ∩ A+k (~P)) is not necessarily zero for i 6= k). The only
information on which i can be sure of, upon her choice of the price vector −~pi, is that
all her consumers are in the set A+i (
~P).
Note that Ξθζ and Ξ
θ
ζ
+
are convex functions. By Proposition A.8 (recalling (7.16)
and Definition A.0.7) we get that, under the choice ~P, the corresponding capacities
set ~M(~P) is given by the sub-gradient
~M(~P) ∈ ∂−~PΞθζ
+ 6= ∅ (7.29)
Let m
(j)
i (
~P) be in the (i, j) component of ~M(~P). According to the above reasoning,
the agent i will decrease p
(j)
i if
m
(j)
0,i > max
~M∈ ~M(~P)
m
(j)
i (
~P)
and will increase p
(j)
i if
m
(j)
0,i < min
~M∈ ~M(~P)
m
(j)
i (
~P) .
If
min
{
m
(j)
i (
~P) ; ~M ∈ ~M(~P)
}
≤ m(j)0,i ≤ max
{
m
(j)
i (
~P) ; ~M ∈ ~M(~P)
}
then i will, probably, not change p
(j)
i .
So, if −~P(t) is the value of the price matrix at time t and ~P0 is its initial value
at t = t0 we presume that the forward derivative d
+~P(t)/dt exists and would like to
state that d+~P(t)/dt ∈ ~M(~P(t))− ~M0. However, d+~P(t)/dt, if exists, is in the space
M
′
(N, J) while ~M(~P) and ~M0 are in M+(N, J). So, we have to identify M
′
(N, J) and
M+(N, J) in some way. For this we define a linear mapping J : M+(N, J)→ M′(N, J)
such that
J ~M : ~M > 0 ∀ ~M 6= 0 in M+(N, J) .
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This definition makes M+(N, J) and M
′
(N, J) inner product space, and
| ~M| :=
√
J ~M : ~M ; |~P| :=
√
~P : J−1~P (7.30)
are natural norms.
So, we presume that
d+
dt
~P(t) ∈ J
(
~M(~P(t))− ~M0
)
, t ≥ t0 ; ~P(t0) = ~P ∈ M
′
(N, J) . (7.31)
The condition (7.31) is an example of a differential inclusion. It is a generalization
of a system of Ordinary Differential Equations (ODE). In fact, by (7.29) we observe
that it is an ODE if the subgradient of Ξθζ
+
is a singleton, which is equivalent, via
Proposition A.9, to the assumption that Ξθζ
+
is differentiable anywhere.
The existence and uniqueness of ~P(·) satisfying (7.31) is a common knowledge, due
the convexity of Ξθζ
+
([2], [3]). For the sake of completeness we introduce below some
of the steps toward the proof of this result.
Let  > 0 and tj := t0 + j. If ~P(tj) is known, define
~P(tj+1) := min!~P∈M′ (N,J)
{
(2)−2
∣∣∣~P(tj)− ~P∣∣∣2 + Ξθζ+(−~P) + ~P : ~M0} . (7.32)
Since ~P → Ξθζ+(−~P) is convex, the term in brackets above is strictly convex and
~P(tj+1) is unique (c.f. Definition A.0.1). Moreover, it follows from (7.32) and (7.29)
that ~P(tj+1) satisfies the implicit inclusion
~P(tj+1) ∈ ~P(tj) + J
(
~M(~P(tj+1))− ~M0
)
. (7.33)
Next, we interpolate on time to define t→ ~P(t) for any t ≥ t0 as
~P(t) = 
−1
[
(t− tj)~P(tj+1) + (tj+1 − t)~P(tj)
]
for tj ≤ t < tj+1 , j = 0, 1, . . . .
Using (7.33) it can be proved that ~P(t) = lim→0 ~P(t) for any t ≥ t0 is the unique
solution of the inclusion (7.31).
It is also evident from (7.32) that
Ξθζ
+
(−~Ptj+1) + ~Ptj+1 : ~M0 ≤ Ξθζ
+
(−~Ptj ) + ~Ptj : ~M0
for any j = 0, 1, 2 . . .. Hence
t→ Ξθζ+(−~P(t)) + ~P(t) : ~M0
is non-increasing. Moreover by (7.29, 7.30, 7.31)
d+
dt
[
Ξθζ
+
(−~P(t)) + ~P(t) : ~M0
]
= −J
(
d+~P(t)/dt
)
:
(
∂−~P(t)Ξ
θ
ζ
+ − ~M0
)
=
−
∣∣∣( ~M(~P(t))− ~M0)∣∣∣2 . (7.34)
Recall from Theorem 7.3 that
Σθζ
+
( ~M0) = inf
~P∈M′ (N,J)
[
Ξθ,+ζ (
~P)− ~P : ~M0
]
≤ Ξθ,+ζ (~P(t))− ~P(t) : ~M0
for any t ≥ t0. We now obtain the reason for the terminology of ”escalating capacity”
in Definition 7.1.2:
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Theorem 7.6. The solution of (7.31) satisfies
lim
t↑∞
Ξθ,+ζ (
~P(t))− ~P(t) : ~M0 = Σθζ+( ~M0) .
If ~M0 is non-escalating then limt↑∞ ~P(t) = ~P0 where ~P0 is a minimizer of (7.17).
Otherwise, the limit of ~P(t) does not exist and limt↑∞ |~P(t)| =∞. However,
lim
t↑∞
~P(t)
|~P(t)|
:= ~P0
exists, where ~P0 is a minimizer of (7.23).
1
7.2 Optimal Strong multipartitions
Recall the definition of θ on the set of strong N−(sup)partitions:
θ( ~A) :=
N∑
i=1
∫
Ai
θidµ .
Let K ⊂ M+(N, J) be a compact convex set. The main question we address in this
section is:
Under which conditions there is a unique, strong (sub)partition ~A which max-
imizes θ in the set of weak (sub)partitions Pw,ζ{K} (resp. SPw,µ¯{K})?
Following the discussion of Chapter 4 and Theorems 7.4, 7.5, we focus on the
”natural suspects”
Aθi (~P) :=
{
x ∈ X; ~pi · ζ¯(x) + θi(x) > max
j 6=i
~pj · ζ¯(x) + θj(x)
}
(7.35)
Aθ,+i (
~P) := Aθi (~P)−Aθ0(~P) (7.36)
where
Aθ0(~P) :=
{
x ∈ X; ~pi · ζ¯(x) + θi(x) ≤ 0 ∀i ∈ I
}
.
Recall that the utility of a consumer x of agent i charging price ~pi is θi(x)− ~pi · ζ¯(x).
Thus, the set of (sub)partitions Aθi (−~P) (Aθ,+i (−~P)) represents subsets of consumers
who prefer the agent i over all other agents, given the price matrix ~P.
As suggested by Theorem 7.4, there is a close relation between optimal ~µ and
strong (sub)partitions of the form (7.35, 7.36). Thus we rephrase our question as:
Under which conditions there is a unique ~P ∈ M′(N, J) such that
(7.35) (resp. (7.36)) are θ optimal strong (sub)partitions in Pw,ζ{K} (resp.
SPw,µ¯{K})?
1Note that in case of escalating ~M0, s0 = 0 while ~P0 6= 0 in (7.23).
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At the first stage we concentrate in the case where K = { ~M} is a singleton. Recall
(7.17,7.18):
Σθζ
+
( ~M) = inf
~P∈M′ (N,J)
[
Ξθ,+ζ (
~P)− ~P : ~M
]
, (7.37)
Σθζ( ~M0) = inf
~P∈M′ (N,J)
[
Ξθζ(~P)− ~P : ~M
]
. (7.38)
where, from (7.15, 7.16)
Ξθ,+ζ (
~P) ≡ µ
(
ξθ,+ζ (x, ~p)
)
; ξθ,+ζ (x,
~P) ≡ max
i
(θi(x) + ~pi · ζ¯(x))+ (7.39)
Ξθζ(~P) ≡ µ
(
ξθζ (x, ~P)
)
; ξθζ (x, ~P) ≡ max
i
(θi(x) + ~pi · ζ¯(x)) (7.40)
We now consider the following adaptation of Assumption 6.2.1:
Assumption 7.2.1. .
i) For any i 6= j ∈ I and any ~p ∈ RJ ,
µ
(
x ∈ X ; ~p · ζ¯(x) + θi(x)− θj(x) = 0
)
= 0 .
ii) For any i ∈ I and any ~p ∈ RJ ,
µ
(
x ∈ X ; θi(x) = ~p · ζ¯(x)
)
= 0 .
By Assumption 7.2.1-(i) it follows that {Aθi (~P)} is, indeed, a strong partition for
any ~P ∈ M′(N, J). Likewise, Assumption 7.2.1-(i,ii) implies that {Aθ,+i (~P)} is a strong
subpartition. In particular
Aθi (~P) ∩Aθj (~P) = Aθ,+i (~P) ∩Aθ,+j (~P) = ∅ (7.41)
for i 6= j.
7.2.1 Example of escalation
Let ~P0, ~M0 be given as in Corollary 6.2.2. Then (A1(~P0), . . . AN (~P0)) given by (6.9)
where ~P0 substituted for ~P, is the only partition in Pζ{ ~M0}. Assume that θi − θj is
independent of the components of ζ¯ on A¯i(~P0) ∩ A¯j(~P0). 2This implies that for any
(λ1, . . . λN ) ∈ RN there exists x ∈ A¯i(~P0)∩ A¯j(~P0) such that θi(x)− θj(x) 6= ~λ · ζ¯(x).
Proposition 7.2. For ~M0 and θ as above, ~M0 is an escalating capacity for the given
θ.
Proof. If a minimizer ~P = (~p1 . . . ~pN ) of (7.18) exists then (7.35) is a partition in
SPζ{ ~M0} which, by Corollary 6.2.2 must be the same as Ai(~P0). In particular
A¯i(~P0) ∩ A¯j(~P0) = A¯θi (~P) ∩ A¯θj (~P) .
Any point in the set A¯θi (~P) ∩ A¯θj (~P) must satisfies
θi(x) + ~pi · ζ¯(x) = θj(x) + ~pj · ζ¯(x)
so θi(x)− θj(x) = (~pj − ~pi) · ζ¯(x). Since any such point is in A¯i(~P0)∩ A¯j(~P0) as well,
we obtain a contradiction to the assumption on θ.
2A¯ stands for the closure of the set A.
CHAPTER 7. OPTIMAL MULTIPARTITIONS 84
7.2.2 Uniqueness for a prescribed capacity
It turns that Assumption 7.2.1, standing alone, is enough for a uniqueness of optimal
subpartition for ~M ∈ ∆N (µ¯), provided ~M is an interior point of ∆N (µ¯). The key to
this result is the following observation, generalizing Lemma 6.3:
Lemma 7.1. Under Assumption 7.2.1-(i), Ξθζ is differentiable at any ~P ∈ M
′
(N, J)
and satisfies (7.42)-(a). If, in addition, Assumption 7.2.1-(ii) is satisfied than Ξθ,+ζ is
differentiable as well and (7.42)-(b) holds. Here
a)
∂Ξθζ
∂~pi
(~P) =
∫
Aθi (~p)
ζ¯dµ , b)
∂Ξθ,+ζ
∂~pi
(~P) =
∫
A
θ,+
i (~p)
ζ¯dµ . (7.42)
Remark 7.2.1. Notice that the conditions of Lemma 6.3 as well as Assumption 6.2.1,
are not required in Lemma 7.1.
Theorem 7.7. . Let Assumption 7.2.1(i+ii). If ~M is an interior point of ∆N (µ¯)
then there exists a unique subpartition which maximize θ in SPw,µ¯{ ~M}, and this sub-
partition is a strong one, given by {Aθ,+i (~P0)} (7.36) for some uniquely determined
~P0 ∈ M′(N, J).
Note that int(∆N (µ¯)) = ∅ so Theorem 7.7 is void for ~M ∈∆N (µ¯).
Proof. Let −Σθ,+ζ be the Legendre transforms of Ξθ,+ζ (−·), i.e
Σθ,+ζ (
~M) = inf
~P∈M′ (N,J)
Ξθ,+ζ (
~P)− ~P : ~M . (7.43)
We prove that the essential domain of −Σθ,+ζ is the same as the essential domain of
Σ0,+ζ , namely ∆N (µ¯). Indeed, by definition (7.39, 5.13)
Ξ0,+ζ (
~P) + ‖~θ‖∞µ(X) ≥ Ξθ,+ζ (~P) ≥ Ξ0,+ζ (~P)− ‖~θ‖∞µ(X)
hence
inf
~P∈M′ (N ,J)
Ξθ,+ζ (
~P)− ~P : ~M > −∞⇔ inf
~P∈M′ (N ,J)
Ξ0,+ζ (
~P)− ~P : ~M > −∞
which implies the claim via Theorem 5.1.
If ~M is an interior point in the essential domain of −Σθ,+ζ then, by (A.0.7) the
subgradient ∂ ~M(−Σθ,+ζ ) is not empty. Any ~P ∈ −∂ ~M(−Σθ,+ζ ) is a minimizer of (7.43).
Let ~P0 be such a minimizer. Let ~µ is a maximizer of θ in SPw,µ¯{ ~M}. Then, by (7.39)
Σθ,+ζ (
~M) = Ξθ,+ζ (
~P0)− ~P0 · ~M = µ(ξθ,+ζ (x, ~P0))− ~P0 · ~M ≥∑
i∈I
µi(ξ
θ,+
ζ (·, ~P0))− ~P0 · ~M ≥
∑
i∈I
µi(θi + ~p
0
i · ζ¯)− ~P0 · ~M . (7.44)
By Lemma 7.1 we obtain that Ξθ,+ζ is differentiable at
~P0 and, by (7.42):3
µi(ζ¯) =
∫
A
θ,+
i (
~P0)
ζ¯dµ = ~mi
3Here is the only place in the proof we use the differentiability of Ξθ,+ζ .
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Hence
(7.44) =
∑
i∈I
µi(θi) ≡ θ(~µ) = Σθ,+ζ ( ~M)
where the last equality follows from Theorem 7.3. Hence the middle inequality in
(7.44) is an equality. Since ξθ,+ζ (x,
~P) ≥ θi+ ~pi · ζ¯ everywhere by (7.39) we obtain that
ξθ,+ζ (x, ~p
0) = θi(x) + ~p
0
i · ζ¯(x) for any x ∈ supp(µi). That is, supp(µi) ⊇ Aθ,+i (~P0) by
(7.36). This, (7.41) and µi ≤ µ imply that µi is the restriction of µ to Aθ,+i (~P0). In
particular, the maximizer ~µ ∈ SPw,µ¯{ ~M} is unique, and is a strong subpartition given by
~Aθ,+(~P0).
As a byproduct of the uniqueness of the minimizers ~P0 of (7.43) and via Proposition
A.9 we obtain
Corollary 7.2.1. Σθ,+ζ is differentiable at any inner point of its essential domain
∆N (µ¯).
Combining both Theorems 6.2 and 7.7 we obtain
Theorem 7.8. Let Assumption 7.2.1 (i+ii) and 6.2.1 . If ~M ∈ ∆N (µ¯) then there
exists a unique, maximal coalition’s ensemble D and a strong subpartition ~AD such
that any ~µ ∈ SPw,µ¯{ ~M} which maximize θ in SP
w,µ¯
{ ~M} is embedded in
~AD.
Proof. If ~M is an interior point of ∆N (µ¯) then Theorem 7.7 implies the uniqueness of
the subpartition corresponding to the coalition’s ensemble of individuals, which is the
maximal possible coalition.
If ~M ∈ ∂∆N (µ¯) then Theorems 6.2 implies the uniqueness of maximal coalition’s
ensemble D and a unique strong subpartition ~AD corresponding to D( ~M). Evidently,
any subpartition in SPw,µ¯{ ~M} must be embedded in ~AD .
If each agent {i} agrees on a fixed exchange rate ~z(i) subject to Assumption 6.2.2,
then we can get unconditional uniqueness. In fact
Theorem 7.9. Under Assumption 7.2.1, 6.2.1 and 6.2.2: If ~m ∈ ~Z(∆N (µ¯)) then
there exists a unique subpartition which maximizes θ in ∪ ~M∈~Z−1(~m)SPw,µ¯{ ~M}, and this
subpartition is a strong one.
Proof. We may assume that all components of ~m are in RN++ for, otherwise, we restrict
to a subset of I on which the components of ~m are all positive, and note that all the
assumptions of the Theorem are valid also for the restricted system.
If ~m ∈ ∂~Z(∆N (µ¯)) then, by the above assumption and Theorem 6.3, there exists a
unique subpartition and there is nothing to prove. So, we assume ~m is an inner point
of ~Z(∆N (µ¯)). By Theorem 7.3
sup
~M
{
Σθ,+ζ (
~M) ; ~Z( ~M) = ~m
}
= sup
~µ
{
θ(~µ); µi(~zi · ζ¯) = mi
}
. (7.45)
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On the other hand
sup
~M
{
Σθ,+ζ (
~M) ; ~Z( ~M) = ~m
}
=
sup
~M
inf
~P
{
Ξθ,+ζ (
~P)− ~P : ~M ; ~P ∈ M′(N, J), ~M ∈ ~Z−1(~m)
}
(7.46)
In addition, if ~Z( ~M) = ~m then by Lemma 6.2
inf
~P
Ξθ,+ζ (
~P)− ~P : ~M ≤ inf
~q∈RJ
Ξθ,+ζ (
~Z∗(~q))−~Z∗(~q) · ~M = inf
~q∈RJ
Ξθ,+ζ (
~Z∗(~q))−~q · ~m (7.47)
Since ~m is an inner point of ~Z(∆N (µ¯)) (which is the essential domain of
Ξθ,+ζ ◦ ~Z∗) and Ξθ,+ζ is differentiable at any point by Lemma 7.1 and Proposition A.8
imply that the infimum of the right side of (7.47) is attained at some ~q0 ∈ RJ and
mj =
∂
∂qj
Ξθ,+ζ ◦ ~Z∗(~q0) =
∫
A
θ,+
j (
~Z∗(~q0))
~zj · ζ¯dµ .
However, ξθ,+ζ (x,
~Z∗(~q0)) = ~zj · ζ¯(x) for any x ∈ Aθ,+j (~Z∗(~q0)), hence
inf
~q∈RJ
Ξθ,+ζ (
~Z∗(~q))− ~q · ~m =
∑
i∈I
∫
A
θ,+
j (
~Z∗(~q0))
~zj · ζ¯(x)dµ
≤ sup
~µ
{
θ(~µ); µi(~zi · ζ¯) = mi
}
. (7.48)
(7.45-7.48) imply that {Aθ,+j (~Z∗(~q0))} is an optimal strong subpartition of θ in ∪ ~M∈~Z−1(~m)SPw,µ¯{ ~M}.
The uniqueness of this partition is proved as in Theorem 7.7.
7.2.3 Uniqueness within the feasibility domain
Let us recall the generalized definition of Under Saturation (US), Saturation (S) and
Over Saturation (OS) (5.9, 5.8, 5.7). Theorems 7.8, 7.9 deal with the existence and
uniqueness of a strong (sub)partition maximizing θ for each prescribed ~M ∈ ∆N (µ¯).
Here we discuss the uniqueness of optimal (sub)partition within closed convex sets
K ⊂ M+(N, J).
Recall that Σθ,+ζ (
~M) (7.43) is the maximal value of θ for subpartitions for a pre-
scribed ~M ∈∆N (µ¯). If we look for a subpartition maximizing θ on PζK (6.2) then it
must belong to Pζ ~M0 where ~M0 is a maximizer of Σ
θ,+
ζ on ∆N (µ¯) ∩ K. Granted the
uniqueness of a maximal subpartition of θ in Pζ{ ~M} for any ~M ∈∆N (µ¯) we obtain
The uniqueness of θ maximizer in PζK is equivalent to a uniqueness of the
maximizer of Σθ,+ζ on ∆N (µ¯) ∩ K.
Assumption 7.2.2. All the components of ~θ are non-negative on X and |~θ| :=∑
i∈I θi(x) > 0 for any x ∈ X.
Proposition 7.3. Under Assumption 7.2.2, if K ⊂ M+(N, J) is closed then any
maximizer of Σθ,+ζ on ∆N (µ¯)∩K is necessarily obtained at the boundary of K∩∆N (µ¯).
In particular, if K ⊃ ∆N (µ¯) then any such maximizer is in ∂∆N (µ¯). Moreover, in
that case any maximizing subpartition is a partition.
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Indeed, if ~M0 6∈ ∆N (µ¯) is such a maximizer then there is a strong subpartition
~A realizing the maximum of θ in Pζ{ ~M0}. In that case there exists a measurable set
A0 = X − ∪ni=1Ai such that µ(A0) > 0. Since at least one of the components of ~θ is
positive it follows that
∫
A
θidµ > 0,
∫
A
ζidµ =  for some i ∈ I, A ⊂ A0 and  > 0
small enough. If ~M0 is an internal point of ∆N (µ¯) ∩ K then ~M0 + ~ei ∈ ∆N (µ¯) ∩ K
and Σθ,+ζ (
~M0 + ~ei) > Σ
θ,+
ζ (
~M0), which is a contradiction.
We now extend Theorem 7.9 for a convex ~K ⊂ RN .
Theorem 7.10. Let ~K ⊂ RN be a closed convex set.
Under Assumptions 7.2.1, 6.2.1 and 6.2.2: If ~K ∩ ~Z(∆N (µ¯)) 6= ∅ there exists a
unique subpartition in SPw,µ¯~Z−1(K) which maximizes θ, and this subpartition is a strong
one.
If K ⊃ ~Z(∆N (µ¯)) and Assumption 7.2.2 is granted as well, then the above subpar-
tition is a partition. In the last case Assumption 7.2.1 can be replaced by Assumption
7.2.1-(i).
Proof of Theorem 7.10
By Theorem 7.9 we only have to prove the uniqueness of the maximizer of
~m 7→ Σθζ(~m) , ~m ∈ ~K ∩ ~Z(∆N (µ¯))
where
Σθζ(~m) := sup
~M
{
Σθζ( ~M) ; ~Z( ~M) = ~m
}
Let ~m0 be this maximizer. Then, by (7.45-7.47)
Σθζ(~m) = inf
~q∈RN
Ξθζ(~Z
∗(~q))− ~q · ~m
hence −Σθζ is the Legendre transform of Ξθζ ◦ θ(−~Z∗). By assumption this function is
differentiable at any point in RN (c.f 7.42), so Proposition A.9 in Appendix A imply
that Σθζ is strictly concave at any interior point of its essential domain, namely at any
~m ∈ Int
(
~Z(∆N (µ¯))
)
.
If ~m0 ∈ ∂~Z(∆N (µ¯)) then Theorem 6.3 implies that it is an extreme point. This,
and the strict concavity of Σθζ at inner points imply the uniqueness of ~m0. 2
7.2.4 The MinMax Theorem: A unified formulation
So we finally got our result regarding both existence and uniqueness of a strong gen-
eralized (sub)partition verifying the maximal allocation of consumers under given ca-
pacities of the agents.
The mere existence of optimal strong partition is achieved with little effort. Indeed,
Theorem 4.2 implies the existence of weak (sub)partition by ”soft” analysis. On the
other hand, the proof of Theorem 6.1 implies that for any feasible ~M the set of strong
(sub)partitions is the extreme points of the set Pw,ζ{ ~M} (SP
w,µ¯
{ ~M}) of weak ones. Since
the set of extreme points must contain the set of optimal partitions, we get existence
of strong partitions in a rather cheap way...
The main ”hard” analysis we had to go so far was in order to prove the uniqueness
of the optimal partitions, as well as their characterization by the dual problem on
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M
′
(N, J). One additional bonus we got is that these strong optimal (sub)partitions
are open (sub)partitions in the sense of Definition 4.0.1.
The duality formalism we extensively used is reflected in the MinMax Theorem.
The MinMax Theorem is of fundamental importance in optimization theory. This
theorem, basically follows from the Hahn-Banach Theorem, has many versions. For
our case we only need the following, restricted version:
MinMax Theorem: Let M
′
be a vector space over R, K a convex, compact domain.
Assume Θ : M
′ × K → R is convex in ~P ∈ M′ for any ~M ∈ K and concave in ~M for
any ~P ∈ M′(N, J). Then
inf
~P∈M′
max
~M∈K
Θ(~P, ~M) = max
~M∈K
inf
~P∈M′
Θ(~P, ~M) := α
Moreover, there exists ~M0 ∈ K such that
inf
~P∈M′
Θ(~P, ~M0) = α . (7.49)
In our case we take M
′
= M
′
(N, J), K a convex compact subset of M+(N, J) and
Θ(~P, ~M) := Ξθ,+ζ (
~P)− ~P : ~M
verifies the conditions of the MinMax Theorem. Indeed, we know, by now, that
inf~P∈M′ (N,J) Θ(~P, ~M) = −∞ unless ~M ∈∆N (µ¯) (that is, ~M is in the essential domain
of Σθζ( ~M) ≡ − inf~P∈M′ (N,J) Θ(~P, ~M)). Since ∆N (µ¯) is a compact subset of M+(N, J)
we may use the MinMax Theorem, replacing Θ by
Ξθ,+ζ (
~P) +HK(−~P) ,
where
HK(~P) := max
~M∈K
~P : ~M (7.50)
is the support function of K (compare with (4.23)).
Using the MinMax Theorem, Theorem 7.7 and Proposition 7.1 imply (7.43) which,
in turn, yields
max
~µ∈SPw,µ¯K
θ(~µ) = max
~A∈SPζK
θ( ~A) ≡ inf
~P∈M′ (N,J)
Ξθ,+ζ (
~P) +HK(−~P) (7.51)
In conclusion, we obtain a unified description finding the optimal sub-partition for
both the under-saturated (K ⊂ ∆N (µ¯)) and the over-saturated (K − ∆N (µ¯) 6= ∅)
cases. Likewise, if K ⊂ RN , then
~p 7→ Ξθ,+ζ (~Z∗(~p)) +HK(−~p) (7.52)
where
HK(~p) := max
~m∈K
~p · ~m (7.53)
is convex on RN .
The MinMax Theorem via (7.49) also guarantees the existence of ~M0 ∈ K∩∆N (µ¯)
for which (7.51) can be replaced by
inf
~P∈M′ (N,J)
Ξθ,+ζ (
~P)− ~P : ~M0 (7.54)
CHAPTER 7. OPTIMAL MULTIPARTITIONS 89
where the optimal partition is obtained via Theorems 7.8, 7.9, dealing with the case
of a singleton K = { ~M0} (resp. K = {~Z( ~M0)}). However, the uniqueness of this
~M0 is beyond the mere statement of the MinMax Theorem. This uniqueness, and the
uniqueness of the corresponding (sub)partition, is the subject of Theorem 7.10.
Even if we take for granted the uniqueness of ~M0, neither the existence nor unique-
ness of a minimizer ~P0 of (7.54) follows from the MinMax Theorem. In fact, by The-
orem 7.7 we know both existence and uniqueness of this minimizer only if ~M0 happen
to be an interior point of ∆N (µ¯). If
~M0 is a boundary point of ∆N (µ¯) then we know
the uniqueness and existence of an optimal partition by Theorems 6.2, 6.3, while an
equilibrium price vector ~P may not exists (see section 7.1.3).
Chapter 8
Applications to learning
theory
Where is the wisdom we have lost in knowledge? Where is the knowledge we have lost
in information? (T.S. Eliot)
8.1 Maximal likelihood of a classifier
Let X be the probability space. We can think about it as a space of random samples
(e.g. digital data representing figures of different animals). Let I be a finite set of
cardinality N . We can think of I as the set of labels, e.g. a lion, elephant, dog, etc.
Suppose that Z is a random variable on X×I. We can think about Z as a classifier:
For each given data point x ∈ X it produces the random variable x 7→ E(Z|x) on the
set of labels I (see below).
Let E(Z|X) be the X−marginal of Z. We can think of it as a random variable
predicting the input data in X. Likewise, E(Z|I) is the I−marginal of Z. It can be
considered as a random variable predicting the output labels in I. We assume that
the input distribution of E(Z|X) is given by the probability law µ on X.
The distribution of Z over X × I is given by a weak partition ~µ = (µ1, . . . µN ) of
(X,µ), where µ = |~µ| := ∑N1 µi. It means that the probability that a data x ∈ X will
trigger the label i ∈ I is dµi/dµ(x).
Let ~m = (m1, . . .mN ) ∈ ∆N (1) be the distribution of E(Z|I), namely mi := µi(X)
is the probability that Z = i. The Shannon information of E(Z|I) is
H(Z|I) = −
∑
i∈I
mi lnmi .
It represents the amount of information stored in a random process composed of in-
dependent throws of a dice of N = |I| sides, where the probability of getting output
i is mi. The Shannon information is always non-negative. Its minimal value H = 0
is attained iff there exists i ∈ I for which mi = 1 (hence mk = 0 for k 6= i, so the
dice falls always on the side i, and we gain no information during the process), and is
maximal H = ln |I| for a ”fair dice” where mi = 1/N .
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The information corresponding to Z where E(Z|X) is known is given by
H(Z|X) = −
∑
i∈I
∫
X
ln
(
dµi
dµ
)
dµi .
The marginal information of Z given X is defined by
IZ(X, I) := H(Z|I)−H(Z|X) =
∑
i∈I
∫
X
ln
(
dµi
dµ
)
dµi −
∑
i∈I
mi lnmi . (8.1)
This information is always non-negative via Jensen’s inequality and the convexity of
−H as a function of the distribution. This agrees with the interpretation that the
correlation between the signal X and the output label I contributes to the marginal
information. In particular, if the marginals E(Z|I) and E(Z|X) are independent (so
µi = miµ) then H(Z|X) = H(Z|I) so IZ(X, I) = 0.
Let θ(i, x) := θi(x) measures the level of likelihood that an input data x corre-
sponds to a label i. The average likelihood due to a classifier Z is, thus
~µ(~θ) :=
∑
i∈I
µi(θi) . (8.2)
The object of a learning machine is to develop a classifier Z which will produce a
maximal likelihood under a controlled amount of marginal information.
In the worst case scenario, a relevant function is the minimal possible marginal in-
formation for a given likelihood ~µ(~θ) = α. For this we define this minimal information
as
R(α) := inf
Z
{IZ(X, I), ~µ(~θ) = α,E(Z|I) = ~m,E(Z|X) = µ} .
From (8.1, 8.2) we may rewrite
R(α) = inf
~µ
{∑
i∈I
∫
X
ln
(
dµi
dµ
)
dµi; θ(~µ) = α, |~µ(X)| = ~m, |~µ| = µ
}
−
∑
i∈I
mi lnmi .
From this definition and the linearity of ~µ → ~µ(θ) it follows that R is a concave
function. The concave dual of R is
R∗(β) := inf
α
R(α)− αβ
which is a concave function as well. By the min-max theorem we recover
R(α) = sup
β
R∗(β) + αβ .
Proposition 8.1. Let
Q(β, φ) := β
∑
i∈I
mi ln
(∫
X
e
θi+φ
β dµ
)
−
∫
X
φdµ . (8.3)
Then
R∗(β) := inf
φ∈C(X)
Q(β, φ) . (8.4)
CHAPTER 8. APPLICATIONS TO LEARNING THEORY 92
Note that Q(β, φ) = Q(β, φ + λ) for any constant λ ∈ R. Thus, we use (8.3, 8.4)
to write
R∗(β) = inf
φ∈C(X);∫X φdµ=0β
∑
i∈I
mi ln
(∫
X
e
θi+φ
β dµ
)
. (8.5)
The parameter β can be considered as the ”temperature”, which indicates the
amount of uncertainty of the optimal classifier Z.
In the ”freezing limit” β → 0 we get
lim
β→0
β ln
(∫
X
e
θi+φ
β dµ
)
= max
x∈X
θi(x) + φ(x) ,
so
R∗(0) = inf∫
φdµ=0
{∑
i∈I
mi max
x∈X
[θi(x) + φ(x)]
}
. (8.6)
It can be shown that R∗(0) is obtained by the optimal partition of X corresponding
to the utility {θi} and capacities ~m which we encountered in Chapter 4:
R∗(0) = Σ
θ(~m) := sup
~A
{∑
i∈I
∫
Ai
θidµ; µ(Ai) = mi
}
(8.7)
where ~A = {Ai, . . . AN} is a strong partition of X. Indeed, a minimizing sequence of φ
in (8.6) converges pointwise to a limit which is a constant −pi on each of the optimal
components Ai in ~A, and these constants are the equilibrium prices which minimize
Ξ(~p)− ~p · ~m on RN , where
Ξ(~p) :=
∫
X
max
i∈I
[θi − pi]dµ .
Compare with (4.9, 4.10). In particular, the optimal classifier at the freezing state
corresponds to µi = µbAi where
Ai ⊂ {x ∈ X; θi(x)− pi = max
j∈I
θj(x)− pj} ,
and verifies the conditions of strong partitions Ai ∩Aj = ∅ for i 6= j and ∪iAi = X.
Thus, the optimal Z will predict the output i for a data x ∈ X with probability 1
iff x ∈ Ai, and with probability 0 if x 6∈ Ai.
In the limit β = ∞ we look for a classifier Z satisfying IZ(X, I) = 0, that is, the
amount of information H(Z|X) is the maximal one. Since
lim
β→∞
β ln
(∫
X
e
θi+φ
β dµ
)
=
∫
X
(θi + φ)dµ =
∫
X
θidµ
it follows that the optimal likelihood in the limit β =∞ is
R∗(∞) =
∑
i∈I
miµ(θi)
corresponding to the independent variables E(Z|X),E(Z|I), where ~µ = ~mµ.
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Proof. of Proposition 8.1: Let us maximize∑
i∈I
∫
X
θidµi − β
∑
i∈I
∫
X
ln
(
dµi
dµ
)
dµi +
∑
i∈I
∫
X
φdµi −
∫
X
φdµ (8.8)
under the constraints µi(X) = mi. Here θ ∈ C(X) is the Lagrange multiplier for the
constraint |~µ| = µ. Taking the variation of (8.8) with respect to µi we get
θi − β ln
(
dµi
dµ
)
+ φ = γi
where γi is the Lagrange multiplier due to the constraint |~µ(X)| = |~m|. Thus
dµi
dµ
=
mie
θi+φ
β∫
X
e
θi+φ
β dµ
.
Substitute this in (8.8) to obtain that (8.8) is maximized at Q(β, φ)−β∑i∈Imi lnmi.
Minimizing over φ ∈ C(X) we obtain (8.4).
8.2 Information bottleneck
The Information-Bottleneck (IB) method was first introduced by Tishby, Pereira and
Bialek [43] in 1999. Here we attempt to obtain a geometric characterization of this
concept.
Suppose a classifier U is given onX×J , where the label set J is finite of cardinality
|J | <∞. The object of a learning machine is to reduce the details of the data space
X to a finite space I whose cardinality is |I| ≤ |J |. Such a learning machine can
be described by a r.v V on X × I which is faithful, i.e the X− marginal of V on X
coincides with that of U :
E(U |X) = E(V |X) . (8.9)
We denote this common distribution on X by µ. Such a random variable will provide
a classifier W on I × J by composition:
Prob(i ∈ I, j ∈ J |W ) := E(U = (x, i), V = (x, j)|I,J ) .
We note on passing that such a composition never increases the marginal information,
so
IU (X,J ) ≥ IW (I,J ) (8.10)
(see below).
As in section 8.1 we represent the given distribution of U in terms of a weak
J−partition µ¯ := (µ(1), . . . µ(j)) where µ(j) is a positive measure on X and |µ¯| :=∑
j∈J µ
(j) = µ is the marginal distribution of U on X. Let us denote
ζj :=
dµ(j)
dµ
; ζ¯ := (ζ1, . . . ζJ)
so µ(j) = ζjµ and |ζ¯| := ∑j∈J ζj = 1 on X (compare with (5.1)).
The (unknown) distribution of the classifier V can be introduced in terms of weak
N partition of µ: ~µ = (µ1, . . . µN ) where |~µ| := ∑i∈I µi = µ via (8.9).
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The decomposition of U and V provides the classifier W on I×J . The distribution
of this classifier is given by N × J matrix ~M = {m(j)i } where
m
(j)
i := µi(ζj) (8.11)
is the probability that W = (i, j).
Let
~m(j) := (m
(j)
1 , . . .m
(j)
I ), |~m(j)| := m(j) = µ(j)(X)
m¯i := (m
(1)
i , . . .m
(J)
i ), |m¯i| := mi = µi(X) . (8.12)
The information of W and its I and J marginal are given by
H(W |I,J ) = −
∑
i∈I
∑
j∈J
m
(j)
i ln
(
m
(j)
i
)
,
H(W |I) +H(W |J ) = −
∑
j∈J
m(j) lnm(j) −
∑
i∈I
mi lnmi ,
The marginal information of W is given as
IW (I,J ) = H(W |I) +H(W |J )−H(W |I,J )
= −
∑
i∈I
mi lnmi −
∑
j∈J
m(j) lnm(j) +
∑
i∈I
∑
j∈J
m
(j)
i lnm
(j)
i . (8.13)
Note that
H(U |X) = −
∑
j∈J
∫
X
ζj ln (ζj) dµ , H(U |J ) = H(W |J ) = −
∑
j∈J
m(j) lnm(j)
so the marginal information due to U is
IU (X,J ) = −
∑
j∈J
m(j) lnm(j) +
∑
j∈J
∫
X
ζj ln (ζj) dµ . (8.14)
Note that s 7→ s ln s is a convex function. Since |~µ| = µ, |~µ(X)| := |~m| and m(j)i :=∫
ζjdµi we get by the Jensen’s inequality∫
X
ζj ln (ζj) dµ =
∑
i∈I
mi
∫
X
ζj ln (ζj)
dµi
mi
≥
∑
i∈I
m
(j)
i ln
m
(j)
i
mi
so (recalling
∑
j∈J m
(j)
i = mi )
∑
j∈J
∫
X
ζj ln (ζj) dµ ≥
∑
i∈I
∑
j∈J
m
(j)
i ln
(
m
(j)
i
mi
)
so by (8.13, 8.14) we verify (8.10). Recall that the Jensen’s inequality turns into an
equality iff ζj = m
(j)
i /mi a.e µi. Thus
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X
U
V
W
Figure 8.1: A diagram of the random variables vs. the spaces
The difference between the marginal information in W and the marginal in-
formation in U is the distortion
IU (J , X)− IW (I,J ) =
∑
j∈J
∫
X
ζj ln (ζj) dµ−
∑
i∈I
∑
j∈J
m
(j)
i ln
(
m
(j)
i
mi
)
≥ 0 .
The information gap can be made zero only if |I| ≥ |J | and the classifier U is
a deterministic one, i.e. ζj ∈ {0, 1}. In that case I ⊃ J and any choice of an
immersion τ : J → I implies that V = τ ◦U is an optimal choice to minimize
the information gap.
8.2.1 Minimizing the distortion
For a given r.v U subjected to the distribution µ¯, all possible distributions of W for a
given cardinality |I| are represented by points in ∆N (µ¯). In particular, we can look
for the optimal W which minimizes the information gap with respect to U in terms of
its distribution ~M0 ∈ ∆N (µ¯). Since m(j) are independent of U it follows, by (8.13),
that is ~M0 is a maximizer of
h( ~M) :=
∑
i∈I
∑
j∈J
m
(j)
i ln
(
m
(j)
i
mi
)
∀ ~M ∈∆N (µ¯)
where we recall (8.12). Thus
h( ~M) =
∑
i∈I
h(m¯i) , h(m¯) :=
∑
j∈J
m(j) lnm(j) − |m¯| ln(|m¯|) . (8.15)
Lemma 8.1. h is positively homogeneous (c.f. Definition A.0.8) and strongly convex
on the simplex ∆N (µ¯).
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Proof. Direct observation implies h(λm¯) = λh(m¯) for any λ ≥ 0, m¯ ∈ RJ .
Differentiating h twice in RJ++ we obtain
∂h
∂m(i)∂m(j)
= δji
(
m(i)
)−1
−
(∑
k∈J
m(k)
)−1
.
Given a vector α¯ = (α1, . . . αJ) ∈ RJ we obtain
∑
i,j∈J
∂h
∂m(i)∂m(j)
αiαj =
∑
j∈J
α2j
m(j)
− (
∑
j∈J αj)
2∑
j∈J m
(j)
. (8.16)
Using Cauchy-Schwartz inequality
∑
j∈J
αj =
∑
j∈J
αj√
m(j)
√
m(j) ≤
(∑
j∈J
α2j
m(j)
)1/2(∑
j∈J
m(j)
)1/2
which implies that (8.16) is non-negative. Moreover, an equality in Cauchy-Schwartz
implies α¯ = λm¯ for some λ > 0. It follows that h is strongly convex on the simplex
∆J(1). Since ∆N (µ¯) is constrained by
∑
i∈I m¯i = µ¯(X) it follows that h is strongly
convex in ∆N (µ¯).
From the convexity of h and (8.15) we obtain the convexity of IW (I,J ) as a
function of ~M on ∆N (µ¯). Since ∆N (µ¯) is a compact and convex set we obtain imme-
diately the existence of a maximizer ~M0 := {m(j)i,0} in the relative boundary of ∆N (µ¯).
Moreover, the set of maximizers is a convex subset of ∆N (µ¯).
Lemma 8.2. The maximizer ~M0 of h in ∆N (µ¯) is unique if and only if the vectors
(m¯i,0, h(m¯i,0)) ∈ RJ+1 , i = 1 . . . N are independent in RJ+1.
In particular, N ≤ J + 1 is a necessary condition for uniqueness of the maxi-
mizer of IW (I,J ).
Proof. By the strong convexity of h Lemma 8.1 we obtain that h( ~M) = h( ~M0) iff
there exist λ1, . . . λN > 0 such that m¯i = λim¯i,0 for i = 1, . . . N . If this is the case,
then h( ~M) =
∑
i∈I λih(m¯i,0). Thus∑
i∈I
λih(m¯i,0) = h( ~M0) . (8.17)
In addition, we recall from (8.12) that any ~M ∈∆N (µ¯) is subjected to the constraint∑
i∈I m¯i = µ¯(X). Hence
∑
i∈I λim¯i,0,= µ¯(X) which, together with (8.17) imply∑
i∈I
λi (m¯i,0, h(m¯i,0)) =
(
µ¯(X),h( ~M0)
)
. (8.18)
The system (8.17, 8.18) admits the solution λ1 = . . . = λN = 1, and this is the
unique solution of this system iff the vectors (m¯i,0, h(m¯i,0)), i ∈ I are independent in
RJ+1.
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Remark 8.2.1. The uniqueness of the maximizer ~M0 does not necessarily implies the
uniqueness of the optimal classifier V realizing the minimal information gap. In fact,
a classifier V is determined by the partition ~µ = (µ1, . . . µN ) of X, and the uniqueness
of ~M0 only implies that the corresponding partition must satisfy µi(X) = |m¯i,0| :=∑
j∈J m
(j)
i,0 .
Recall that ~M0 is a boundary point of ∆N (µ¯).
Theorem 8.1. Let ~M0 ∈ ∂∆N (µ¯) be a maximizer of h( ~M) in ∆N (µ¯) and satisfies
the condition of Lemma 8.2. Assume ζ¯ satisfies Assumption 6.2.1. Let ~z(i) ∈ RJ , i =
1, . . . N be given satisfying Assumption 6.2.2. If ~Z( ~M0) ∈ ∂~Z(∆N (µ¯)) (c.f. Definition
6.2.2) then the minimal information gap for a given cardinality N is realized is unique,
deterministic classifier ‘V . In particular, its distribution is given by a partition ~µ =
µb ~A, that is µi = µbAi where ~A = (A1, . . . AN ) is a strong partition.
The proof of this Theorem follows from Theorem 6.3 (ii). Note that ∂~Z(∆N (µ¯)) ⊂
∂~Z(∆N (µ¯)) (since ∆N (µ¯) ⊂ ∆N (µ¯)) and any subpartition corresponding to ~M ∈
∆N (µ¯) is necessarily a partition. @@@@@
8.2.2 The information bottleneck in the dual space
We are given a random variable U on the state space X × J as an input. As before,
we can view U as a classifier over the set of features X into the set of labels J .
A network get this classifier as an input, and (stochastically) represent the data
x ∈ X by internal states i ∈ I of the network. We assume that I is a finite set |I| = N .
As a result of the training we get a classifier on the set I × J , where I is the
reduction of the feature space X.
The objectives of the ”information bottleneck” as described by Tishbi and coau-
thors are
• Predictability: to preserve as much of the marginal information of the induced
classifier W as possible, that is, to minimize the information gap between U and
W .
• Compressibility: to minimize as much as possible the marginal information
stored in the classifier V .
In addition we include the possibility of a likelihood function θ : I ×X → R as in
section 8.1. So, we add another objective
• To increase as much as possible the expected likelihood of V as a classifier.
Now, we consider the Information Bottleneck (IB) variational problem. The IB was
originally introduced by Tishby and co-authors [43] who suggested to minimize1
P (V, β, γ) := IV (I, X)− βIW (I,J )− γE(θ(V )) (IB)
where β, γ ≥ 0 (in the current literature γ = 0).
The rational behind (IB) is as follows: The desired classifier V should induce
maximal marginal information on the induced W , as well as maximal likelihood. On
the other hand, the price paid for maximizing this information is the complexity of V
measured in terms of the marginal information stored (IV ).
1Compare with [1, 19], where β corresponds to β−1
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The limit of β large corresponds to maximal information in W (i.e. the minimal
information gap). Likewise, the limit of large γ emphasizes the importance of the
likelihood of V .
Let us calculate the marginal information IV (I, X):
H(V |X) = −
∑
i∈I
∫
X
ln
(
dµi
dµ
)
dµi
while
H(V |I) = H(W |I) = −
∑
i∈I
mi lnmi
so
IV (I, X) = −
∑
i∈I
mi lnmi +
∑
i∈I
∫
X
ln
(
dµi
dµ
)
dµi (8.19)
Finally, we recall that the expected likelihood of V is
E(θ(V )) :=
∑
i∈I
∫
X
θidµi := ~µ(~θ) .
Note that m(j) are independent of V . In terms of the distribution ~µ of V we obtain
P (V )− β∑j∈J m(j) lnm(j) ≡ P (~µ) where
P (~µ) =
∑
i∈I
∫
X
(
ln
(
dµi
dµ
)
− γθi
)
dµi
−
∑
i∈I
mi lnmi − β
∑
i∈I
∑
j∈J
m
(j)
i ln
(
m
(j)
i
mi
)
. (8.20)
Let
P1(~µ) :=
∑
i∈I
∫
X
(
ln
(
dµi
dµ
)
− γθi
)
dµi .
Here M
′
(N, J) as given in Definition 5.2.1, ~P := (~p1, . . . ~pN ).
Lemma 8.3.
inf
~µ∈Pw,ζ{ ~M}
P1(~µ) = inf
~P∈M′ (N,J)
{∫
X
ln
(
N∑
k=1
e−~pk·ζ¯+γθk
)
dµ+ ~P : ~M
}
+ 1
Proof. Recall that Pw,ζ{ ~M} 6= ∅ iff there exists a weak partition ~µ = (µ1, . . . µN ) of µ
such that
∫
X
ζjdµi = m
(j)
i and |~µ| = µ. In particular
sup
~P∈M′ (N,J),φ∈C(X)
∑
i∈I
∫
X
(
φ− ~pi · ζ¯
)
dµi + ~P : ~M−
∫
X
φdµ =
{
0 if ~µ ∈ Pw,ζ{ ~M}
∞ if ~µ 6∈ Pw,ζ{ ~M}
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where ~pi ∈ RJ , ~P = (~p1, . . . ~pN ) ∈ M′(N, J) and φ ∈ C(X). Then
sup
~P∈M′ (N,J),φ∈C(X)
∑
i∈I
∫
X
(
ln
(
dµi
dµ
)
− γθi + φ− ~pi · ζ¯
)
dµi + ~P : ~M−
∫
X
φdµ
=
{
P1(~µ) if ~µ ∈ Pw,ζ{ ~M}
∞ if ~µ 6∈ Pw,ζ{ ~M}
(8.21)
It follows that
inf
~µ∈Pw,ζ{ ~M}
P1(~µ) = inf
~µ
sup
~P,φ
∑
i∈I
∫
X
(
ln
(
dµi
dµ
)
− γθi + φ− ~pi · ζ¯
)
dµi + ~P : ~M−
∫
X
φdµ
where the supremum is over ~P ∈ M′(N, J), φ ∈ C(X) and the infimum is uncon-
strained By the Min-Max theorem
inf
~µ∈Pw,ζ{ ~M}
P1(~µ) = sup
~P,φ
inf
~µ
∑
i∈I
∫
X
(
ln
(
dµi
dµ
)
− γθi + φ− ~pi · ζ¯
)
dµi + ~P : ~M−
∫
X
φdµ
(8.22)
and, moreover,
inf
~µ∈Pw,ζ{ ~M}
P1(~µ) <∞ (8.23)
since Pw,ζ{ ~M} 6= ∅. We now consider the unconstrained infimum
Q1(φ, ~P) := inf
~µ
∑
i∈I
∫
X
(
ln
(
dµi
dµ
)
− γθi + φ+ ~pi · ζ¯
)
dµi (8.24)
We find that the minimizer of (8.24) exists, and takes the form
dµi
dµ
= eγθi−φ+~pi·ζ¯−1 . (8.25)
The condition |~µ| = µ implies that
φ+ 1 = ln
(∑
k∈I
eγθk+~pk·ζ¯
)
(8.26)
and from (8.22)
inf
~µ∈Pw,ζ{ ~M}
P1(~µ) = sup
~P
{
−
∫
X
ln
(
N∑
k=1
e~pk·ζ¯+γθk
)
dµ+ ~P : ~M
}
− 1
= − inf
~P
{∫
X
ln
(
N∑
k=1
e~pk·ζ¯+γθk
)
dµ− ~P : ~M
}
− 1 . (8.27)
Lemma 8.4.
inf
~P
{∫
X
ln
(
N∑
k=1
e~pk·ζ¯+γθk
)
dµ− ~P : ~M
}
> −∞
iff ~M ∈∆N (µ¯), where ∆N (µ¯) as defined in (5.1.2).
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Proof. Recall from Theorem 5.1 that ~M 6∈∆N (µ¯) iff
inf
~P∈M′ (N,J)
Ξ0ζ(
~P)− ~P : ~M = −∞ . (8.28)
where Ξ0ζ(
~P) =
∫
X
maxi ~pi · ζ¯dµ.
Since ln
(∑N
k=1 e
~pk·ζ¯+γθk
)
= maxi ~pi · ζ¯ +O(1) then (8.28) implies the bound.
Theorem 8.2. The minimal value of (IB) is the minimum of
− inf
~P
{∫
X
ln
(
N∑
k=1
e~pk·ζ¯+γθk
)
dµ− ~P : ~M
}
−
∑
i∈I
mi lnmi − β
∑
i∈I
∑
j∈J
m
(j)
i ln
(
m
(j)
i
mi
)
− 1 (8.29)
over ~M ∈ ∆N (µ¯). If the infimum in ~P0 ∈ M′(N, J) is attained for a minimizer
~M0 ∈ M+(N, J) then the distribution of the minimizer V of (IB) is given by the weak
partition
µi(dx) =
eγθi(x)+~p
0
i ·ζ¯(x)∑
k e
γθk(x)+~p
0
k
·ζ¯(x) µ(dx) . (8.30)
Proof. Follows from (8.20), Lemma 8.3 and Lemma 8.4. The minimizer ~µ follow from
(8.25, 8.26).
In the notation of [43] where γ = 0, the optimal distribution µi takes the form
dµi
dµ
= Z−1Mie−βDKL (8.31)
whereDKL(U |W ) is the Kullback-Leibler divergence [13] for the distribution of (U,W ),
and Z is the partition function which verifies the constraint ∑i∈I µi = µ. In our
notation
DKL(U |W ) =
∑
j∈J
ζj(x) ln
(
ζj(x)mi
m
(j)
i
)
.
To relate (8.30) with (8.31) we assume that the optimal ~M in (8.29) is a relative
internal point of ∆N (µ¯). Then we equate the derivative of (8.29) with respect to m
(j)
i
to zero , at the optimal ~P0, to obtain
p
(j),o
i = ln (mi) + β ln
(
m
(j)
i
mi
)
+ λ(j)
where λ(j) is the Lagrange multiplier corresponding to the constraint∑
i∈Im
(j)
i = m
(j). Since
∑
j∈J ζ
(j)(x) = 1 we get
~p0i · ζ¯ = lnmi + β
∑
j∈J ζj(x) ln
(
m
(j)
i
mi
)
+ λ¯ · ζ¯(x). Thus, (8.30) takes the form (where
γ = 0)
µi(dx) =
mi
Z e
β
∑
j∈J ζj(x) ln
(
m
(j)
i
mi
)
+λ¯·ζ¯(x)
µ(dx)
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where Z is the corresponding partition function. Now, we can add and subtract any
function of x to the powers of the exponents since any such function is canceled out
with the updated definition of Z. If we add the function x 7→ ∑j∈J ζj ln ζj and
subtract λ¯ · ζ¯ to get (8.31).
The representation (8.31) is valid only if the minimizer of (8.29) is a relative
interior point of ∆N (µ¯). From section 8.2.1 we realize that this is may not the
case if β is sufficiently large.
Part III
From optimal partition to
O.T and back
102
Chapter 9
Optimal transport for
scalar measures
A plan is the transport medium which conveys a person from the station of dreams to
the destination of success. Goals are the transport fees (Israelmore Ayivor)
9.1 General setting
So far we considered the transport problem from the source, given by a measure
space (X,µ) to a target given by discrete measure space (I, ~m). Here we consider the
extension where the target is a general measure space (Y, ν). We pose the following
assumption:
Assumption 9.1.1. X,Y are compact spaces, θ ∈ C(X,Y ) is non-negative and µ ∈
M(X), ν ∈M(Y ) are regular Borel measures.
We define
θ(µ, ν) := max
pi∈Π(µ,ν)
∫
X
∫
Y
θ(x, y)pi(dxdy) (9.1)
where
Π(µ, ν) := {pi ∈M(X × Y ) ;µ(dx) ≥ pi(dx, Y ), ν(dy) ≥ pi(X, dy) } . (9.2)
In the balanced case µ(X) = ν(Y ) we may replace Π by
Π(µ, ν) := {pi ∈M(X × Y ) ;µ(dx) = pi(dx, Y ), ν(dy) = pi(X, dy)} . (9.3)
The optimal pi is called an Optimal Transport Plan (OTP).
Example 9.1.1. If µ = αδx, ν = βδy . where α, β > 0 then Π(µ, ν) := {(α∧ β)δxδy}
is a single measure .
θ(αδx, βδy) = (α ∧ β)θ(x, y) .
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Example 9.1.2. If µ ∈M(X), and ν = ∑i∈Imiδyi . If µ(X) ≥∑i∈Imi
Π(µ, ν) = {
∑
i∈I
δyi(dy)⊗ µi(dx) , where
∫
X
µi = mi and
∑
i∈I
µi ≤ µ .}
In that case θ(µ, ν) corresponds to the under-saturated case (4.7). If
µ(X) ≤∑i∈Imi then
Π(µ, ν) = {
∑
i∈I
δyi(dy)⊗ µi(dx) , where
∫
X
µi ≤ mi and
∑
i∈I
µi = µ .}
then θ(µ, ν) corresponds to the over saturated case (4.5).
As we see from Example 9.1.2, these definitions also extend our definition of weak
partitions in Chapter 5 where Y := I := {1, . . . N} and ν := ∑i∈Imiδ(i).
9.2 Duality
Recall that in Chapter 4 (4.9,4.10) we considered strong (sub)partition, where the
maximizers of (9.1, 1.16) are obtained as the deterministic partition µi = µbAi. The
analogues of strong (sub)partitions in the general transport case is an Optimal Trans-
port Map (OTM)
T : X → Y such that, formally, the optimal plan pi takes the form piT (dxdy) =
µ(dx)δy−T (x)dy. Thus,
i) If µ(X) < ν(Y ) then piT ∈ Π(µ, ν) iff T#µ ≤ ν, that is, for any Borel set B ⊂ Y
µ(T−1(B)) ≤ ν(B). Equivalently∫
X
φ(T (x))dµ(x) ≤
∫
Y
φ(y)dν(y) ∀φ ∈ C(X) .
ii) If µ(X) > ν(Y ) then piT ∈ Π(µ, ν) iff T#µ ≥ ν, that is, for any Borel set B ⊂ Y
µ(T−1(B)) ≥ ν(B), Equivalently∫
X
φ(T (x))dµ(x) ≥
∫
Y
φ(y)dν(y) ∀φ ∈ C(X) .
iii) If µ(X) = ν(Y ) then Π(µ, ν) = Π(µ, ν) and piT ∈ Π(µ, ν) iff T#µ = ν, that is, for
any Borel set B ⊂ Y µ(T−1(B)) = ν(B), Equivalently∫
X
φ(T (x))dµ(x) =
∫
Y
φ(y)dν(y) ∀φ ∈ C(X) .
The way from the ”stochastic” OTP to the deterministic OTM which we did for
the semi-discrete case is concealed in the dual formulation. If the target space Y is
a finite space, then we obtained, under assumption 7.2.1 (in case J = 1 ), that the
optimal weak (sub)partition is given by the strong (sub)partition determined by the
prices p ∈ R|Y |.
To show the connection with Monge-Kantorovich Theory ([45], [46]), define
J θ := {(ξ, p) ∈ C(X)× C(Y ); ξ(x) + p(y) ≥ θ(x, y) ∀(x, y) ∈ X × Y } . (9.4)
CHAPTER 9. OPTIMAL TRANSPORT FOR SCALAR MEASURES 105
Consider first the saturation case µ(X) = ν(Y ). Then, for any pi ∈ Π(µ, ν) and any
(ξ, p) ∈ J θ, ∫
X×Y
θdpi ≤
∫
X×Y
[ξ(x) + p(y)]pi(dxdy) =
∫
X
ξdµ+
∫
Y
pdν , (9.5)
hence, in particular,
θ(µ, ν) ≤ inf
(ξ,p)∈J θ
∫
X
ξdµ+
∫
Y
pdν . (9.6)
Assume µ(X) > ν(Y ). Then (9.6) cannot be valid since the infimum on the right is
−∞. Indeed, we obtain for any constant λ that (ξ, p) ∈ J θ iff (ξ−λ, p+λ) ∈ J θ, and∫
X
(ξ − λ)dµ+
∫
Y
(p+ λ)dν =
∫
X
ξdµ+
∫
Y
pdν + λ(ν(Y )− µ(X))→ −∞
as λ→∞. However, (9.6) is still valid for pi ∈ Π(µ, ν) if we restrict the pair (ξ, p) to
(ξ, p) ∈ J θ such that ξ ≥ 0. Indeed, (9.5) implies that∫
X×Y
θdpi ≤
∫
X
ξdµˆ+
∫
Y
pdν
for any pi ∈ Π(µ, ν) where µˆ(dx) = pi(dx, Y ) ≤ µ satisfying µˆ(X) = ν(Y ). If ξ ≥ 0
then
∫
X
ξdµ ≥ ∫
X
ξdµˆ, thus
θ(µ, ν) ≤ inf
(ξ,p)∈J θ,ξ≥0
∫
X
ξdµ+
∫
Y
pdν (9.7)
holds in the case µ(X) > ν(Y ), for any pi ∈ Π(µ, ν).
Now, suppose (9.7) is satisfied with equality. Let νˆ > ν such that νˆ(Y ) < µ(X).
Since θ ≥ 0 by assumption then θ(µ, νˆ) ≥ θ(µ, ν) by definition. If (ξ, p) ∈ J θ, ξ ≥ 0
satisfies
∫
X
ξdµ+
∫
Y
pdν ≤ θ(µ, ν) +  for some  > 0 then from
∫
X
ξdµ+
∫
Y
pdνˆ ≥
θ(µ, νˆ) we obtain ∫
Y
p(dνˆ − dν) ≥ − .
Since we may take νˆ(Y ) as close as we wish to µ(X) (e.g. ν˜ = ν + αδy0 for any
α < µ(X)− ν(Y ) and any y0 ∈ Y ) we get
p ≥ −/(µ(X)− ν(Y )) .
Since  > 0 is arbitrary we obtain that the infimum must be attained at p ≥ 0. In
particular (compare with Proposition 4.6 and the remark thereafter)
Proposition 9.1. Suppose θ ≥ 0 , µ(X) > ν(Y ) and (9.7) is an equality. Then
θ(µ, ν) = inf
(ξ,p)∈J θ,ξ≥0,p≥0
∫
X
ξdµ+
∫
Y
pdν . (9.8)
By the same reasoning (flipping µ with ν) we obtained: If µ(X) < ν(Y ) and θ(µ, ν) =
inf(ξ,p)∈J θ,p≥0
∫
X
ξdµ+
∫
Y
pdν then (9.8) holds as well.
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It is remarkable that in the case of saturation µ(X) = ν(Y ), an equality in (9.7)
does not, in general, imply (9.8). Evidently, we may restrict J θ to either p ≥ 0 or
ξ ≥ 0 by replacing (ξ, p) with (ξ + λ, p − λ) for an appropriate constant λ, but not
both!
To remove the conditioning in Propositions 9.1 we use the corresponding equal-
ities in the saturation case. This is the celebrated duality theorem discovered by
Kantorovich [27] and Koopmans [28] - for which they shared the Nobel Memorial
Prize in economics.
Theorem 9.1. If µ(X) = ν(Y ),
θ(µ, ν) = inf
(ξ,p)∈J θ
∫
X
ξdµ+
∫
Y
pdν .
Remark 9.2.1. In the balanced case we can surely remove the assumption that θ is
non-negative. Indeed, we may always change θ by an additive constant. However, in
the imbalanced case µ(X) 6= ν(Y ), we cannot remove the assumption θ ≥ 0. If, e.g., θ
is a non-positive function then θ(µ, ν) = 0 by choosing pi = 0 in Π(µ, ν) (9.2).
We extend this theorem to the unbalanced cases as follows:
Theorem 9.2. Suppose µ(X) 6= ν(Y ). Then
θ(µ, ν) = inf
(ξ,p)∈J θ,ξ≥0,p≥0
∫
X
ξdµ+
∫
Y
pdν
holds.
Proof. We prove the first claim for θ in the case µ(X) > ν(Y ). The other claims follow
by symmetry.
By definition and the assumption θ ≥ 0 we obtain
θ(µ, ν) = sup
µ˜≤µ, µ˜(X)=ν(Y )
θ(µ˜, ν) .
By Theorem 9.1
θ(µ, ν) = sup
µ˜≤µ, µ˜(X)=ν(Y )
inf
(ξ,p)∈J θ
{∫
X
ξdµ˜+
∫
Y
pdν
}
Since X is compact, the set µ˜ ≤ µ, µ˜(X) = ν(Y ) is compact in M(X) with respect
to the C∗(X) topology. Hence, the MinMax Theorem implies
θ(µ, ν) = inf
(ξ,p)∈J θ
{(
sup
µ˜≤µ, µ˜(X)=ν(Y )
∫
X
ξdµ˜
)
+
∫
Y
pdν
}
. (9.9)
For a given ξ ∈ C(X) let A¯ξ(λ) := {x ∈ X; ξ(x) ≥ λ} and Aξ(λ) := {x ∈ X; ξ(x) >
λ}. The function λ 7→ µ(A¯ξ(λ)) is monotone non-increasing, lower semi continuous,
while λ 7→ µ(Aξ(λ)) is monotone non-increasing, upper semi continuous. In addition,
µ(Aξ(λ)) ≤ µ(A¯ξ(λ)) for any λ. Thus, there exists λ0 such that µ(A¯ξ(λ0)) ≥ ν(Y ) ≥
µ(Aξ(λ0)). Since µ is regular and contains no atoms, there exists a Borel set B ⊂ X
such that Aξ(λ0) ⊆ B ⊆ A¯ξ(λ0) and µ(B) = ν(Y ). Let µ¯ := µbB the restriction of µ
to B. We leave it to the reader to verify that µ¯ ≤ µ, µ¯(X) = ν(Y ) and
sup
µ˜≤µ, µ˜(X)=ν(Y )
∫
X
ξdµ˜ =
∫
B
ξdµ =
∫
X
ξdµ¯ .
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Since (ξ, p) ∈ J θ then ([ξ − λ0]+, p+ λ0) ∈ J θ as well. Since∫
X
[ξ − λ0]+dµ =
∫
X
ξdµ¯− λ0ν(Y ),
∫
Y
(p+ λ0)dν =
∫
Y
pdν + λ0ν(Y )
we get (
sup
µ˜≤µ, µ˜(X)=ν(Y )
∫
X
ξdµ˜
)
+
∫
Y
pdν =
∫
X
[ξ − λ0]+dµ+
∫
Y
(p+ λ0)dν .
Since [ξ − λ0]+ ≥ 0 on X and ([ξ − λ0]+, p+ λ0) ∈ J θ it follows that
inf
(ξ,p)∈J θ
{(
sup
µ˜≤µ, µ˜(X)=ν(Y )
∫
X
ξdµ˜
)
+
∫
Y
pdν
}
≥ inf
(ξ,p)∈J θ,ξ≥0
∫
X
ξdµ+
∫
Y
pdν ,
so
θ(µ, ν) ≥ inf
(ξ,p)∈J θ,ξ≥0
∫
X
ξdµ+
∫
Y
pdν .
On the other hand, by (9.6) we get
θ(µ, ν) ≤ inf
(ξ,p)∈J θ
∫
X
ξdµ+
∫
Y
pdν ≤ inf
(ξ,p)∈J θ,ξ≥0
∫
X
ξdµ+
∫
Y
pdν
so the equality is verified for θ(µ, ν) in the case µ(X) > ν(Y ). The claim the follows
from Proposition 9.1.
9.3 Deterministic transport
The subject of existence (and uniqueness) of a deterministic transport plan plays a
major part of the optimal transport literature. Here we only sketch the fundamental
ideas, extended as well to unbalanced transport.
The existence of optimal deterministic transport is related to the existence of
optimizers to the dual problem as given by Theorems 9.1 and 9.2.
Following the current literature in optimal transport (see, e.g. [45, 38]...) we define
the transform p ∈ C(Y )→ pθ ∈ C(X):
pθ(x) = sup
y∈Y
θ(x, y)− p(y) . (9.10)
Likewise the transform ξ ∈ C(X)→ ξθ ∈ C(Y ):
ξθ(y) = sup
x∈X
θ(x, y)− ξ(x) . (9.11)
Note that if X = Y and θ is a symmetric function (θ(x, y) = θ(y, x) ∀(x, y) ∈ X ×X)
then both definitions are reduced to the same one. In that case, the functions of the
form pθ are called θ−convex. We shall adopt this notation in the general case:
Definition 9.3.1. A function ξ ∈ C(X) is θX convex if ξ = pθ for some p ∈ C(Y ).
Likewise, p ∈ C(Y ) is θY convex if p = ξθ for some ξ ∈ C(X). We denote ΘX (res
ΘY ) the set of θX (resp. θY ) convex functions.
By the assumed compactness of X,Y and continuity (hence uniform continuity) of
θ, the θ−convex functions are always continuous. In particular:
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Proposition 9.2. .
(i) For any p ∈ C(Y ), pθ ∈ C(X) and (pθ, p) ∈ J θ. Likewise, for any ξ ∈ C(X),
ξθ ∈ C(Y ) and (ξ, ξθ) ∈ J θ.
(ii) For any p ∈ C(Y ) and y ∈ y, pθθ(y) := (pθ)θ(y) ≤ p(y). Likewise, for any
ξ ∈ C(X) and x ∈ X, ξθθ (x) := (ξθ)θ(x) ≤ ξ(x).
(iii) ξ is θXconvex iff ξ
θ
θ = ξ. Same implies for θY convex p. .
(iv) For any θX convex function ξ and any x1, x2 ∈ X,
ξ(x1)− ξ(x2) ≤ max
y∈Y
θ(x1, y)− θ(x2, y) .
Likewise, for any θY convex function p and any y1, y2 ∈ Y ,
p(y1)− p(y2) ≤ max
x∈X
θ(x, y1)− θ(x, y2) .
Proof. The proof follows directly from the definitions. We shall only present the proof
of the only if part in (iii) and leave the rest for the reader.
If ξ is θX convex then there exists p ∈ C(Y ) such that ξ = pθ. We show that
ξθθ := p
θθ
θ = p
θ ≡ ξ. From definition
pθθθ (x) = sup
y
inf
x
′ sup
y
′
θ(x, y)− θ(x′ , y) + θ(x′ , y′)− p(y′) .
If we substitute y = y
′
we get the inequality pθθθ (x) ≥ pθ(x). If we substitute x = x
′
we get the opposite inequality.
Proposition 9.2-(i) and Theorems 9.1, 9.2 enable us to reduce the minimization of
the dual problem from the set of pairs J θ to the set of θ−convex functions on either
X or Y .
Theorem 9.3. If µ(X) = ν(Y ) then
θ(µ, ν) = inf
ξ∈ΘX
∫
X
ξdµ+
∫
Y
ξθdν = inf
p∈ΘY
∫
X
pθdµ+
∫
Y
pdν ,
while if µ(X) < ν(Y ) and θ ≥ 0 then
θ(µ, ν) = inf
ξ∈ΘX ;ξ≥0
∫
X
ξdµ+
∫
Y
[ξθ]+dν
and if µ(X) < ν(Y ) then
θ(µ, ν) = inf
p∈ΘY ;p≥0
∫
X
[pθ]+dµ+
∫
Y
pdν .
9.3.1 Solvability of the dual problem
Let us start from the balanced case. Let p ∈ C(Y ), pθ ∈ C(X). Let y2 ∈ Y be a
maximizer in (9.10). Then
pθ(x1)− pθ(x2) ≤ θ(x1, y2)− p(y2)− pθ(x2) = θ(x1, y2)− p(y2)− [θ(x2, y2)− p(y2)]
= θ(x1, y2)− θ(x2, y2) ≤ max
y∈Y
|θ(x1, y)− θ(x2, y)| .
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Let us assume that X is a metric compact spaces, and dX the metric on X. It
follows that there exists a continuous, non-negative valued function σ on R+ such that
σ(0) = 0 and
max
y∈Y
|θ(x1, y)− θ(x2, y)| ≤ σ(dX(x1, x2))
In particular it follows that for any p ∈ C(Y ), pθ is subjected to a modulus of continuity
σ determined by θ:
|pθ(x1)− pθ(x2)| ≤ σ(dX(x1, x2)) ∀x1, x2 ∈ X.
If we further assume that Y is a compact metric space and dY the associated metric,
we obtain the same result for ξθ , where ξ ∈ C(X) (9.11):
|ξθ(y1)− ξθ(y2)| ≤ σ(dX(x1, x2)) ∀y1, y2 ∈ Y.
We may reduced now the sets Jθ, Jθ in Theorems 9.1, 9.2 to uniformly bounded
and equi-continuous pair of functions. Moreover, we may assume that the pairs are
bounded in supremum norm as well (why?). By the Arzela`-Ascoli Theorem we get
the uniform convergence of minimizing/maximizing sequence to an optimizer. Thus
we replace the inf by min and sup by max in Theorems 9.1, 9.2. In particular we
obtained:
Lemma 9.1. In the balanced case there exists (ξ0, p0) ∈ J θ such that ξ0 = pθ0, p0 =
(ξ0)θ and
θ(µ, ν) =
∫
X
ξ0µ(dx) +
∫
Y
p0ν(dy) . (9.12)
If µ(X) > ν(Y ) then there exists such a pair for which p0 ∈ C(Y ;R+) while if µ(X) <
ν(Y ) then ξ0 ∈ C(X;R+).
Lemma 9.2. Any optimal plan pi0 for θ(µ, ν) is supported in the set {(x, y) : ξ0(x) +
p0(y) = θ(x, y)}.
Proof. By Theorems 9.1 and 9.2 and Lemma 9.1 it follows that if pi0 is optimal then
θ(µ, ν) =
∫
X×Y
θ(x, y)pi0(dxdy) =
∫
X
ξ0dµ+
∫
Y
p0dν .
Balanced case: we get pi0 ∈ Π(µ, ν), so∫
X
∫
Y
ξ0(x) + p0(y)− θ(x, y)pi0(dxdy) = 0 .
Since ξ0(x) + p0(y) ≥ θ(x, y) we get the claim for the balanced case.
In the unbalanced case µ(X) < ν(Y ), let µ˜ ≤ µ be the X marginal of pi0. Then∫
X
ξ0dµ+
∫
Y
p0dν =
∫
X
ξ0dµ˜+
∫
Y
p0dν +
∫
X
ξ0(dµ− dµ˜)
=
∫
X×Y
[ξ0(x) + p0(y)]dpi0 +
∫
X
ξ0(dµ− dµ˜) ≥ θ(µ, ν)
where the last inequality follows from ξ0(x) + p0(y) ≥ θ(x, y) and ξ0 ≥ 0 via Theorem
9.2. It implies again that the support of pi0 is contained in the set {(x, y) : ξ0(x) +
p0(y) = θ(x, y)} and, in addition, that ξ0 = 0 on the support of µ− µ˜. The analogues
argument applies for the case µ(X) > ν(Y ).
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We now sketch the way to obtain existence and uniqueness of a deterministic
transport map pi0. For this we replace the assumption that X,Y are compact sets by
X = Y = Rd, but supp(µ), supp(ν) are compact subsets in Rd. In addition we assume
that θ ∈ C1(Rd × Rd) and the function y → ∇xθ(x, y) is injective for any x, i.e
∇xθ(x, y1) = ∇xθ(x, y2)⇒ y1 = y2 . (9.13)
Theorem 9.4. Assume the supports of both µ and ν are bounded in Rn, and that the
twist condition (9.13) is satisfied for θ. Let (ξ0, p0) be the dual pair verifying (9.12).
Then ξ0 is differentiable µ a.e. and there exists a measurable mapping T on supp(µ)
verifying
∇xθ(x, y) = ∇xξ0(x) µ a.e
where y = T (x). Moreover, any optimal plan pi ∈ Π(µ, ν) of u(µ, ν) is supported in
the graph of T :
sup(pi) ⊂ {(x, y); y = T (x)} .
In particular, such T satisfies
T#µ = ν, that is µ(T
−1(B)) = ν(B) ∀ B ⊂ Y measurable (9.14)
and this mapping is the solution of the Monge problem
max
S#µ=ν
∫
θ(x, S(x))dµ . (9.15)
Sketch of proof: Let (ξ0, p0) ∈ J θ be the optimal solution of the dual problem.
Assuming (x, y) ∈ supp(pi0) then by Lemma 9.2 we get that the equality ξ0(x)+p0(y) =
θ(x, y), while ξ0(z) + p0(y) ≥ θ(z, y) for any z by definition. If ξ0 is differentiable then
this implies ∇xξ0(x) = ∇xθ(x, y). By the twist condition (9.13), this determines y
and we denote y := T (x).
9.4 Metrics on the set of probability measures
Let us invert maximum to minimum in (9.1) we obtain
c(µ, ν) := min
pi∈Π(µ,ν)
∫
X
∫
Y
c(x, y)pi(dxdy)
where c ∈ C(X,×Y ) is now considered as a cost of transportation. This can be easily
observed as equivalent to the (9.1), upon choosing c = −θ. In the dual formulation
we have to invert the inequality in J θ and consider
J
c
:= {(ξ, p) ∈ C(X)× C(Y ); ξ(x) + p(y) ≤ c(x, y) ∀(x, y) ∈ X × Y } . (9.16)
If we restrict ourselves to the balanced case µ(X) = ν(Y ) then Theorem 9.1 takes the
form
c(µ, ν) = sup
(ξ,p)∈J
c
∫
X
ξdµ+
∫
Y
pdν .
Note, however, that if we assume that c is non-negative (as we did for θ in Assumption
9.1.1), then we have to invert the inequalities in the definition of Π(µ, ν) (9.2) in order
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to avoid a trivial minimizer pi = 0 in the imbalanced case µ(X) 6= ν(Y ) (see Remark
9.2.1).
In the special case of X = Y = Rd we may consider cq(x, y) = |x − y|q. Of
particular interest is the case q ≥ 1, which leads to the definition of metrics on the set
of probability measures on Rd of finite q moment:
M(q)1 := {µ ∈M1(Rd),
∫
|x|qdµ <∞} . (9.17)
Indeed, it turns out that
Wq(µ, ν) := cq(µ, ν)
1/q (9.18)
is a metric onM(q)1 , called (perhaps unjustly, see [44]) the Wasserstein metric [7, 45].
9.4.1 Special cases
Example 9.4.1. Suppose θ(x, y) = x · y is the inner product in Rd. Since
|x · y| ≤ (|x|2 + |y|2)/2, we get that θ(µ, ν) is bounded on M(2)1 . The connection with
W2 ia apparent via (9.18) for q = 2
W 22 (µ, ν) := inf
pi∈Π(µ,ν)
∫
X×X
|x− y|2pi(dx) =
∫
|x|2µ(dx) +
∫
|x|2ν(dx)− sup
pi∈Π(µ,ν)
∫
x · ydpi
and suppi∈Π(µ,ν)
∫
x · ydpi = θ(µ, ν). The definition θ(µ, ν) where θ(x, y) = x · y stands
for the statistical correlation between random variables distributed according to µ, ν.
Thus, the Wasserstein W2 metric is related to the matching of such two random vari-
able with maximal correlation.
In this special case θ(x, y) = x · y corresponding to the Wasserstein metric W2 we
get that the optimal mapping T is just the gradient of the function ξo:
T (x) = ∇xξ0(x) . (9.19)
In a pioneering paper, Brenier [7] considered the quadratic cost function c(x, y) =
|x− y|2, and proved that the optimal potential ξ0 is a convex function. In particular
Theorem 9.5. [7] For any pair of probability measures µ, ν ∈M(2)1 (Rd) (9.17) where
µ is absolutely continuous with respect to Lebesgue measure, there exists a unique
convex function ξ such that ∇ξ#µ = ν, and∫
|x−∇ξ(x)|2dµ <
∫
|S(x)− x|2dµ
for any S 6= ∇ξ satisfying S#µ = ν.
This result is one of the most quoted papers in the corresponding literature.
Corollary 9.4.1. Let µ ∈M(2)1 (Rd) is absolutely continuous with respect to Lebesgue
measure and φ : Rd → R is convex. Then T := ∇φ is a measurable mapping and
ν := ∇φ#µ ∈ M(2)1 . Moreover, T is the only solution of the Monge problem with
respect to the cost c(x, y) = |x− y|2 for µ, ν.
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Example 9.4.2. Suppose X = Y is a metric space and d the corresponding metric.
The metric Monge distance between µ and ν is defined as
d(µ, ν) := min
pi∈Π(µ,ν)
∫
X×X
d(x, y)pi(dxdy) .
Let us define
θ(x, y) = λ− d(x.y) (9.20)
where λ ≥ maxx,y∈X d(x, y) (here we take advantage on our assumption that X is a
compact space). Thus
d(µ, ν) = λ− θ(µ, ν) ≥ 0 .
Using (9.11)
ξθ(y) = max
x∈X
λ− d(x, y)− ξ(x) = λ−min
x∈X
d(x, y) + ξ(x) := λ− ξd(y) .
From its definition, ξd(y) = minx∈X d(x, y) + ξ(x) ∈ Lip(1) where Lip(1) is the set of
1−Lipschitz functions
ξd(x1)− ξd(x2) ≤ d(x1, x2) , x1, x2 ∈ X . (9.21)
Indeed, if z1 = arg min d(x1, ·) + ξ(·) then for any x2, z ∈ X
ξd(x2)− ξd(x1) ≤ d(x2, z)− ξ(z) + d(x1, z1)− ξ(z1) ,
and, by choosing z = z1 we get (9.21). Moreover, we easily observe that Lip(1) is a
self-dual space, i.e ξd = ξ if and only if ξ ∈ Lip(1).
From Theorem 9.3 it follows that
In the balanced case µ(X) = ν(X)
d(µ, ν) = sup
ξ∈Lip(1)
∫
X
ξd(ν − µ) ,
which is the celebrated Kantorovich Rubinstein dual formulation of the metric
Monge problem [45]. In particular we obtain that d(µ, ν) depends only on µ − ν,
and, in this sense, is a norm on the set of probability measures which lift the metric d
from the case space X to the set of probability measures on X. Indeed, we may identify
d(x, y) with d(δx, δy).
In the unbalanced case µ(X) > ν(X) we use (9.20) and Theorem 9.3 to obtain
d(µ, ν) := λν(X)− inf
ξ∈Lip(1),ξ≥0
∫
X
ξ(x)µ(dx) + [λ− ξ(x)]+ν(dx) ,
which holds for any λ > maxx,y∈X d(x, y). In particular we can take λ > maxX ξ so
[λ− ξ]+ = λ− ξ, and obtain
d(µ, ν) := − inf
ξ∈Lip(1),ξ≥0
∫
X
ξ(x)(µ(dx)−ν(dy)) = sup
ξ∈Lip(1),ξ≤0
∫
X
ξ(x)(µ(dx)−ν(dy)) .
If µ(X) > ν(X),
d(µ, ν) = sup
ξ∈Lip(1),ξ≤0
∫
X
ξ(x)(µ(dx)− ν(dy)) .
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Likewise µ(X) < ν(X)
If µ(X) < ν(X),
d(µ, ν) = sup
ξ∈Lip(1),ξ≥0
∫
X
ξ(x)(µ(dx)− ν(dy)) .
Remark 9.4.1. d is not extend to a norm (and neither a metric) on the set of positive
measures. Only its restriction ot the probability measures M1 is a norm.
9.4.2 McCann Interpolation
Let T be a measurable mapping in Euclidean space X. Let µ, ν ∈ M1(X), and
ν = T#µ. Define the interpolation of T with the identity I as Ts := (1 − s)I + sT ,
where s ∈ [0, 1]. This induces an interpolation between µ and ν via T as follows
µ(s) := Ts#µ , s ∈ [0, 1]
Evidently µ(0) = µ and µ(1) = ν, while µ(s) ∈M1(X) for any s ∈ [0, 1].
Suppose now T is the optimal Monge map for µ, ν ∈M(2)2 (Rd) with respect to the
quadratic cost c(x, y) = |x − y|2. By Theorem 9.5 T = ∇ξ for some convex function
ξ. Then Ts = ∇ξs where ξs(x) =
[
(1− s)|x|2/2 + sξ(x)] is a convex function for any
s ∈ [0, 1]. In particular, by Corollary 9.4.1, Ts = ∇ξs is the optimal mapping of µ to
µ(s), that is
W2(µ, µ(s)) =
√∫
|∇ξs(x)− x|2dµ .
Since ∇ξs(x)− x = s(∇ξ(x)− x) we get
W2(µ, µ(s)) = s
√∫
|∇ξ(x)− x|2dµ = sW2(µ, ν) . (9.22)
Likewise
W2(ν, µ(s)) = (1− s)W2(µ, ν) , (9.23)
and µ(s) is the only measure which minimize (1−s)W 22 (µ, λ)+sW 22 (ν, λ) over λ ∈M(2)1 .
This remarkable identity implies that the orbit µ(s) defined in this way is, in fact,
a geodesic path in the set M(2)1 . See [32, 26].
Chapter 10
Interpolated costs
10.1 Introduction
Assume there exists a compact set Z and a pair of functions
θ(1) ∈ C(X × Z;R+), θ(2) ∈ C(Y × Z;R+), such that
θ(x, y) := max
z∈Z
θ(1)(x, z) + θ(2)(y, z) . (10.1)
It is more natural, in the current context, to invert the point of view from
utility (which should be maximized) to a cost (which should be minimized).
Indeed, this is what we did in Section 9.4 and there is nothing new about it
whatsoever. All we need is to define the cost c(x, y) = −θ(x, y) and replace
maximum by minimum and v.v. In particular (10.2) is replaced by
c(x, y) := min
z∈Z
c(1)(x, z) + c(2)(y, z) . (10.2)
Example 10.1.1. If X = Y = Z is a compact convex set in Rd, r ≥ 1. Then
c(1)(x, i) = 2r−1|x− z|r, c(2)(y, i) = 2r−1|y− z|r verifies (10.2) for c(x, y) = |x−y|r.
If r > 1 then the maximum is obtained at the mid-point z = (x+ y)/2, and if r = 1 it
is obtained at any point in the interval τx+ (1− τ)y, τ ∈ [0, 1].
More generally, if α > 0 then
c(1)α (x, i) =
(1 + α1/(r−1))r
α+ αr/(r−1)
|x− z|r , θ(2)α (y, i) = α(1 + α
1/(r−1))r
α+ αr/(r−1)
|y − z|r ,
which reduces the the previous case if α = 1.
Example 10.1.2. Let X be a compact Riemannian manifolds and l = l(x, v) is a
Lagrangian function on the tangent space (x, v) ∈ TX, that is
• l ∈ C(TX)
• l is strictly convex on the fiber v for (x, v).
• l is superlinear in each fiber, i.e., lim‖v‖→∞ l(x,v)‖v‖ =∞ for any x ∈ X
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For any T > 0 define θT : X ×X → R as the minimal action
c(x, y) := cT (x, y) := min
w∈C1(0,T ;X),w(0)=x,w(1)=y
∫ 1
0
l(w(t)w˙(t))dt .
Then, for any 0 < T1 < T
c(x, y) = min
z∈X
cT1(x, z) + cT−T1(y, z)
so, by definition with c = cT we get c
(1)(x, z) = cT1(x, z) and c
(2)(y, z) = cT−T1(y, z).
Note that Example 10.1.1 is, indeed, a special case of Example 10.1.2, where
l(x, v) := ‖v‖r and T = 1. More generally, we can extend Example 10.1.1 to a
geodesic space X where d : X ×X → R is the corresponding metric:
dr(x, y) = min
z∈X
(1 + α1/(r−1))r
α+ αr/(r−1)
dr(x, z) +
α(1 + α1/(r−1))r
α+ αr/(r−1)
dr(y, z) . (10.3)
10.1.1 Semi-finite approximation: The middle way
Let Z = Zm := {z1, . . . zm} ⊂ Z is a finite set. Denote
cZm(x, y) := min
1≤i≤m
c(1)(x, zi) + c
(2)(zi, y) ≥ c(x, y) (10.4)
the (Zm) semi-finite approximation of c given by (10.2).
The Kantorovich lifting of cZm to the set of measures is given by
cZm(µ, ν) := inf
pi∈Π(µ,ν)
∫
X×Y
cZm(x, y)pi(dxdy) . (10.5)
An advantage of the semi-discrete method described above is that it has a dual
formulation which convert the optimization (10.5) to a convex optimization on Rm.
Indeed, we prove that for a given Zm ⊂ Z there exists a concave function Ξνµ,Zm :
Rm → R such that
max
~p∈Rm
Ξνµ,Zm(~p) = c
Zm(µ, ν) . (10.6)
and, under some conditions on either µ or ν, the maximizer is unique up to a uniform
translation ~p → ~p + β(1, . . . 1) on Rm. Moreover, the maximizers of Ξνµ,Zm yield a
unique congruent optimal partition.
The accuracy of the approximation of c(x, y) by cZm(x, y) depends, of course, on
the choice of the set Zm. In the special (but interesting) case X = Y = Z = Rd and
c(x, y) = |x−y|q, q > 1 it can be shown that, given a compact set K ⊂ Rd, for a fairly
good choice of Zm ⊂ K one may get cZm(x, y)− c(x, y) = O(m−2/d) for any x, y ∈ K.
From (10.4) and the above reasoning we obtain in particular
cZm(µ, ν)− c(µ, ν) ≥ 0 (10.7)
for any pair of probability measures, and that, for a reasonable choice of Zm, (10.7) is
of order m−2/d if the supports of µ, ν are contained in a compact set.
For a given m ∈ N and pair of probability measures µ, ν and , the optimal choice
of Zm is the one which minimizes (10.7). Let
φm(µ, ν) := inf
Zm⊂Z
cZm(µ, ν)− c(µ, ν) ≥ 0 (10.8)
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where the infimum is over all sets of m points in Z. Note that the optimal choice now
depends on the measures µ, ν themselves (and not only on their supports). A natural
question is then to evaluate the asymptotic limits
φ¯(µ, ν) := lim sup
m→∞
m2/dφm(µ, ν) ; φ(µ, ν) := lim inf
m→∞
m2/dφm(µ, ν) .
Some preliminary results regarding these limits are discussed in this chapter.
10.2 Optimal congruent partitions
Definition 10.2.1.
Given a pair of probability measures µ ∈ M1(X), ν ∈ M1(Y ) and m ∈ N, a
weak congruent m partition of (X,Y ) subject to (µ, ν) is a pair of weak partitions
~µ := (µ1, . . . µm), ~ν := (ν1, . . . νm) where µi ∈M(X), νi ∈M(Y ) such that
µi(X) = νi(Y ) 1 ≤ i ≤ m .
The set of all weak congruent m− partitions is denoted by SPwµ,ν(m). Since, by
assumption, nether µ nor µ contains atoms it follows that SPwµ,ν(m) 6= ∅ for any
m ∈ N.
Lemma 10.1.
cZm(µ, ν) = min
(~µ,~ν)∈SPwµ,ν(m)
∑
1≤i≤m
[∫
X
c(1)(x, zi)µi(dx) +
∫
Y
c(2)(y, zi)νi(dy
]
where cZm(µ, ν) as defined by (10.5) and (~µ, ~ν) ∈ SPwµ,ν(m).
Proof. First note that the existence of minimizer follows by compactness of the mea-
sures in the weak topology (see section 4.6.1).
Define, for 1 ≤ i ≤ m,
Γi := {(x, y) ∈ X × Y ; c(1)(x, zi) + c(2)(y, zi) = cZm(x, y)} ⊂ X × Y
Note that, in general, the choice of {Γi} is not unique. However, we may choose {Γi}
as measurable, pairwise disjoint sets in X × Y .
Given pi ∈ ΠYX(µ, ν), let pii be the restriction of pi to Γi. In particular
∑
1≤i≤m pii =
pi. Let µi be the X marginal of pii and νi the y marginal of pii. Then (~µ, ~ν) defined
in this way is in SPwµ,ν(m). Since by definition cZm(x, y) = c(1)(x, zi) + c(2)(y, zi) a.s.
pii,∫
X
∫
Y
cZm(x, y)pi(dxdy) =
∑
1≤i≤m
∫
X
∫
Y
cZm(x, y)pii(dxdy)
=
∑
1≤i≤m
∫
X
∫
Y
(c(1)(x, zi)pii(dxdy) +
∫
X
(c(2)(y, zi)pii(dxdy)pii(dxdy)
=
∑
1≤i≤m
[∫
X
c(1)(x, zi)µi(dx) +
∫
Y
c(2)(y, zi)νi(dy)
]
(10.9)
Choosing pi above to be the optimal transport plan we get the inequality
cZm(µ, ν) ≥ inf
(~µ,~ν)∈SPwµ,ν(m)
∑
1≤i≤m
[∫
X
c(1)(x, zi)µi(dx) +
∫
Y
c(2)(y, zi)νi(dy
]
.
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To obtain the opposite inequality, let (~µ, ~ν) ∈ SPwµ,ν(m) and set ri := µi(X) ≡ νi(Y ).
Define pi(dxdy) =
∑
1≤i≤m r
−1
i µi(dx)νi(dy). Then pi ∈ ΠYX(µ, ν) and, from (10.4)∫
X
∫
Y
cZm(x, y)pi(dxdy) =
∑
1≤i≤m
∫
X
∫
Y
cZm(x, y)r−1i µi(dx)νi(dy)
≤
∑
1≤i≤m
∫
X
(c(1)(x, zi) + c
(2)(y, zi))r
−1
i µi(dx)νi(dy)
=
∑
1≤i≤m
[∫
X
c(1)(x, zi)µi(dx) +
∫
Y
c(2)(y, zi)νi(dy)
]
(10.10)
and we get the second inequality.
Given ~p = (pz1 , . . . pzm) ∈ Rm, let
ξ
(1)
Zm
(~p, x) := min
1≤i≤m
c(1)(x, zi) + pi ; ξ
(2)
Zm
(~p, y) := min
1≤i≤m
c(2)(y, zi) + pi (10.11)
ΞZmµ (~p) :=
∫
X
ξ
(1)
Zm
(~p, x)µ(dx) ; ΞZmν (~p) :=
∫
Y
ξ
(2)
Zm
(~p, y)ν(dy) . (10.12)
ΞZmµ,ν (~p) := Ξ
Zm
µ (~p) + Ξ
Zm
ν (−~p) . (10.13)
For any ~r in the simplex ∈ ∆¯m(1) (recall section 0.3), let
(−ΞZmµ )∗(−~r) := sup
~p∈Rm
ΞZmµ (~p)− ~p · ~r. (10.14)
Analogously, for ν ∈M1(Y )
(−ΞZmν )∗(−~r) := sup
~p∈Rm
ΞZmν (~p)− ~p · ~r . (10.15)
Compare these with the function Ξ+ in section 4.4.
Lemma 10.2.
(−ΞZmµ )∗(−~r) = c(1)
µ, ∑
1≤i≤m
riδzi
 , (−ΞZmν )∗(−~r) = c(2)
ν, ∑
1≤i≤m
δz
 .
Proof. This is a special case (for the scalar case J = 1) of the partition problems
discussed in Section 7.1. See also [45]. It is also a special case of generalized partitions,
see Theorem 3.1 and its proof in [47].
Theorem 10.1.
sup
~p∈Rm
ΞZmµ,ν (~p) = c
Zm(µ, ν) . (10.16)
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Proof. From Lemma 10.1, Lemma 10.2 and Definition 10.2.1 we obtain
cZm(µ, ν) = inf
~r∈∆¯m(1)
[
(−ΞZmµ )∗(−~r) + (−ΞZmν )∗(−~r)
]
. (10.17)
Note that (−ΞZmµ )∗, (−ΞZmν )∗ as defined in ( 10.14, 10.15), are, in fact, the Legendre
transforms of −ΞZmµ , −ΞZmν , respectively. As such, they are defined formally on the
whole domain Rm (considered as the dual of itself under the canonical inner prod-
uct). It follows that (−ΞZmµ )∗(~r) = (−ΞZmν )∗(~r) = ∞ for ~r ∈ Rm − ∆m(1). Note
that this definition is consistent with the right hand side of ( 10.14, 10.15), since
c(1)(µ,
∑m
1 riδzi) = c
(2)(ν,
∑m
1 riδzi) = ∞ if
∑m
i=1 riδzi is not a probability measure,
i.e. ~r 6∈ ∆m(1).
On the other hand, ΞZmµ and Ξ
Zm
ν are both finite and continuous on the whole of
Rm. The Fenchel-Rockafellar duality theorem (see [45]- Thm 1.9) then implies
sup
~p∈Rm
ΞZmµ (~p) + Ξ
Zm
ν (−~p) = inf
~r∈Rm
(−ΞZmµ )∗(~r) + (−ΞZmν )∗(~r) . (10.18)
The proof follows from (10.13, 10.17).
An alternative proof:
We can prove (10.16) directly by constrained minimization, as follows: (~µ, ~ν) ∈ SPwµ,ν(m)
iff F (~p, φ, ψ) :=
∑
1≤i≤m
pi
(∫
X
dµi −
∫
Y
dνi
)
+
∫
X
φ(x)
µ(dx)− ∑
1≤i≤m
µi(dx)
+
∫
Y
ψ(y)
ν(dy)− ∑
1≤i≤m
νi(dy)
 ≤ 0
for any choice of ~p ∈ Rm, φ ∈ C(X), ψ ∈ C(Y ). Moreover, sup~p,φ,ψ F = ∞ unless
(~µ, ~ν) ∈ SPwµ,ν(m). We can then obtain from Lemma 10.1: cZm(µ, ν) =
inf
{µi∈M(X),νi∈M(Y )}
sup
~p∈Rm,φ∈C(X),ψ∈C(Y )
∑
1≤i≤m
[∫
X
c(1)(x, zi)µi(dx) +
∫
Y
c(2)(y, zi)νi(dy)
]
+ F (~p, φ, ψ)
= sup
~p∈Rm,φ∈C(X),ψ∈C(Y )
inf
{µi∈M(X),νi∈M(Y )}
∑
1≤i≤m
∫
X
(
c(1)(x, zi) + pi − φ(x)
)
µi(dx)
+
∑
1≤i≤m
∫
Y
(
c(2)(y, zi)− pi − ψ(y)
)
νi(dy) +
∫
X
φµ(dx) +
∫
Y
ψν(dy) . (10.19)
We now observe that the infimum on {µi, νi} above is−∞ unless c(1)(x, zi)+pi−φ(x) ≥
0 and c(2)(y, zi) + pi − ψ(y) ≥ 0 for any 1 ≤ i ≤ m. Hence, the two sums on the right
of (10.19) are non-negative, so the infimum with respect to {µi, νi} is zero. To obtain
the supremum on the last two integrals on the right of (10.19) we choose φ, ψ as large
as possible under this constraint, namely
φ(x) = min
1≤i≤m
c(1)(x, zi) + pi , ψ(y) = min
1≤i≤m
c(2)(y, zi)− pi
so φ(x) ≡ ξ(1)Zm(~p, x), ψ(y) ≡ ξ
(2)
Zm
(−~p, y) by definition via (10.11).
CHAPTER 10. INTERPOLATED COSTS 119
10.3 Strong partitions
We now define strong partitions as a special case of weak congruent m− partitions
(Definition 10.2.1).
Definition 10.3.1. Given a pair of probability measures µ ∈ M1(X), ν ∈ M1(Y )
and m ∈ N, a weak congruent m partition of (X,Y ) subject to (µ, ν) is a pair of
strong partitions ~A := (A1, . . . Am), ~B := (B1, . . . Bm) where Ai ⊂ X, Bi ⊂ Y are
measurable strong partitions of X,Y , correspondingly, such that
µ(Ai) = νi(Bi) 1 ≤ i ≤ m .
The set of all strong congruent m− partitions is denoted by SPµ,ν(m).
Assumption 10.3.1. .
a) µ(x; c(1)(x, zi)− c(1)(x, z′) = p) = 0 for any p ∈ R and any zi, z′i ∈ Zm.
b) ν(y; c(2)(y, zi)− c(2)(z′ , y) = p) = 0 for any p ∈ R and any zi, z′i ∈ Zm.
Let us also define, for ~p ∈ Rm
Ai(~p) := {x ∈ X; c(1)(x, zi) + pi = ξ(1)Zm(~p, x)}
Bi(~p) := {y ∈ Y ; c(2)(y, zi) + pi = ξ(2)Zm(~p, y)} .
(10.20)
Note that, by (10.11, 10.12)
ΞZmµ (~p) =
∑
1≤i≤m
∫
Ai(~p)
(c(1)(x, zi) + pi)µ(dx) (10.21)
likewise
ΞZmν (~p) =
∑
1≤i≤m
∫
Bi(~p)
(c(2)(y, zi) + pi)ν(dy) . (10.22)
Lemma 10.3. Under assumption 10.3.1 (a) (resp. (b))
i) For any ~p ∈ Rm, {Ai(~p)} (resp. {Bi(~p)}) induces essentially disjoint partitions of
X (resp. Y ).
ii) ΞZmµ (resp. Ξ
Zm
ν ) is continually differentiable functions on Rm,
∂ΞZmµ
∂pi
= µ(Ai(~p)) resp.
∂ΞZmν
∂pi
= ν(Bi(~p)) .
This Lemma is a special case of Lemma 4.3 in [W].
Theorem 10.2. Under assumption 10.3.1 there exists a unique minimizer ~r0 of
(10.17). In addition, there exists a maximizer ~p0 ∈ Rm of ΞZmµ,ν , and {Ai(~p0), Bi(−~p0)}
induces a unique, strong congruent corresponding partitions in X,Y satisfying µ(Ai) =
ν(Bi) := r0,i, and
pi0(dxdy) :=
m∑
1
(r0,i)
−11Ai(~p0)(x)1Bi(−~p0)(y)µ(dx)ν(dy) (10.23)
is the unique optimal transport plan for cZm(µ, ν).
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Proof. The proof is based on the differentiability of ΞZmµ,ν via Lemma 10.3 and Propo-
sition A.9. See the proof of Theorem 11.1 for details.
To prove that pi0 given by (10.23) is an optimal plan, observe that pi0 ∈ Π(µ, ν),
hence
cZm(µ, ν) ≤
∫
X
∫
Y
cZm(x, y)pi0(dxdy) .
Then we get, from (10.4)
cZm(µ, ν) ≤
∫
X
∫
Y
cZm(x, y)pi0(dxdy) ≤
∑
1≤i≤m
∫
Ai(~p0)×Bi(−~p0)
(c(1)(x, zi)µ(dx)+c
(2)(y, zi)ν(dy))
=
∑
1≤i≤m
(∫
Ai(~p0)
c(1)(x, zi)µ(dx) +
∫
Bi(−~p0)
c(2)(y, zi)ν(dy)
)
= ΞZmµ,ν (~p0) ≤ cZm(µ, ν)
where the last equality from Theorem 10.1. In particular, the first inequality is an
equality so pi0 is an optimal plan indeed.
10.4 Pricing in hedonic market
In adaptation to the model of Hedonic market [12] there are 3 components: The space
of consumers (say, X), space of producers (say Y ) and space of commodities, which
we take here to be a finite set Zm := {z1, . . . zm}. The function c(1) := c(1)(x, zi) is the
negative of the utility of commodity 1 ≤ i ≤ m to consumer x, while c(2) := c(2)(y, zi)
is the cost of producing commodity 1 ≤ i ≤ m by the producer y.
Let µ be a probability measure on X representing the distribution of consumers,
and ν a probability measure on Y representing the distribution of the producers.
Following [12] we add the ”null commodity” z0 and assign the zero utility and cost
c(1)(x, z0) = c
(2)(z0, y) ≡ 0 on X (resp. Y ). We understand the meaning that a
consumer (producer) chooses the null commodity is that he/she avoids consuming
(producing) any item from Zm.
The object of pricing in Hedonic market is to find equilibrium prices for the com-
modities which will balance supply and demand: Given a price pi for z, the consumer
at x will buy the commodity z which minimize its loss c(1)(x, zi)+pi, or will buy noth-
ing (i.e. ”buy” the null commodity z0) if min1≤i≤m c(1)(x, zi)+pi > 0), while producer
at y will prefer to produce commodity z which maximize its profit −c(2)(y, zi) + pi, or
will produce nothing if max1≤i≤m−c(2)(y, zi) + pi < 0. Using notation (10.11-10.13)
we define
ξ0X(~p, x) := min{ξ(1)Zm(~p, x), 0} ; ξ
0
Y (~p, y) := min{ξ(2)Zm(~p, y), 0} (10.24)
Ξ0µ(~p) :=
∫
X
ξ0X(~p, x)µ(dx) ; Ξ
0
ν(~p) :=
∫
Y
ξ0Y (~p, y)ν(dy) . (10.25)
Ξ0,νµ (~p) := Ξ
0
µ(~p) + Ξ
0
ν(−~p) . (10.26)
Thus, Ξ0,νµ (~p) is the difference between the total loss of all consumers and the total
profit of all producers, given the prices vector ~p. It follows that an equilibrium price
vector balancing supply and demand is the one which (somewhat counter-intuitively)
maximizes this difference. The corresponding optimal strong m−partition represent
the matching between producers of (Bi ⊂ Y ) to consumers (Ai ⊂ X) of z ∈ Z. The
introduction of null commodity allows the possibility that only part of the consumer
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(producers) communities actually consume (produce), that is ∪1≤i≤mAi ⊂ X and
∪1≤i≤mBi ⊂ Y , with A0 = X − ∪1≤i≤mAi (B0 = Y − ∪1≤i≤mBi) being the set of
non-buyers (non-producers).
From the dual point of view, an adaptation cZm0 (x, y) := min{cZm(x, y), 0} of (10.4)
(in the presence of null commodity) is the cost of direct matching between producer y
and consumer x. The optimal matching (Ai, Bi) is the one which minimizes the total
cost cZm0 (µ, ν) over all congruent sub-partitions as defined in Definition 10.3.1, with
the possible inequality µ(∪Ai) = ν(∪Bi) ≤ 1.
10.5 Dependence on the sampling set
So far we considered the sampling set Zm ⊂ Z as a fixed set. Now we consider the
effect of optimizing Zm within the sets of cardinality m in Z.
As we already know ( 10.4), cZm(x, y) ≥ c(x, y) on X × Y for any (x, y) ∈ X × Y
and Zm ⊂ Z. Hence also cZm(µ, ν) ≥ c(µ, ν) for any µ, ν ∈ M1 and any Zm ⊂ Z as
well. An improvement of Zm is a new choice Z
new
m ⊂ Z of the same cardinality m such
that cZ
new
m (µ, ν) < cZm(µ, ν).
In section 10.5.1 we propose a way to improve a given Zm ⊂ Z, once the optimal
partition is calculated. Of course, the improvement depends on the measure µ, ν.
In section 10.5.2 we discuss the limit m→∞ and prove some asymptotic estimates.
10.5.1 Monotone improvement
Proposition 10.1. Define Ξνµ,Zm on R
m with respect to Zm := {z1, . . . zm} ∈ Z as in
(10.13). Let (~µ, ~ν) ∈ SPwµ,ν(m) be the optimal partition corresponding to cZm(µ, ν).
Let ζ(i) ∈ Z be a minimizer of
Z 3 ζ 7→
∫
X
c(1)(x, ζ)µzi(dx) +
∫
Y
c(2)(ζ, y)νzi(dy) . (10.27)
Let Znewm := {ζ(1), . . . ζ(m)}. Then cZ
new
m (µ, ν) ≤ cZm(µ, ν).
Corollary 10.5.1. Let Assumption 10.3.1 (a+b), and ~p0 be the minimizer of Ξ
ν,Zm
µ in
Rm. Let {Ai(~p0), Bi(−~p0)} be the strong partition corresponding to Zm as in (10.20).
Then the components of Znewm are obtained as the minimizers of
Z 3 ζ 7→
∫
Ai(~p0)
c(1)(x, ζ)µ(dx) +
∫
Bi(−~p0)
c(2)(ζ, y)ν(dy) .
Proof. (of Proposition 10.1): Let Ξν,newµ be defined with respect to Z
new
m . By Lemma
10.1 and Theorem 10.1 Ξν,newµ (~p) ≤ Ξνµ(~p∗) := max~p∈Rm Ξν,Zmµ (~p) for any ~p ∈ Rm, so
maxRm Ξ
ν,new
µ (~p) ≡ cZ
new
m (µ, ν) ≤ max~p∈Rm Ξν,Zmµ (~p) ≡ cZm(µ, ν).
Remark 10.5.1. If X = Y = Z is an Euclidean space and c(x, y) = |x − y|2 then
znew is the center of mass of (Ai(~p0), µ) and (Bi(−~p0), ν):
znew :=
∫
Ai(~p0)
xµ(dx) +
∫
Bi(−~p0) yν(dy)
µ(Ai(~p0)) + ν(Bi(−~p0)) .
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Let
cm(µ, ν) := inf
Zm⊂Z ; #(Zm)=m
cZm(µ, ν) .
Let Zkm := {zk1 , . . . zkm} ⊂ Z be a sequence of sets such that zk+1i is obtained from Zkm
via (10.27). Then by Proposition 10.1
c(µ, ν) ≤ cm(µ, ν) ≤ . . . cZk+1m (µ, ν) ≤ cZkm(µ, ν) ≤ . . . cZ0m(µ, ν) .
Open problem: Under which additional conditions one may guarantee
lim
k→∞
cZ
k
m(µ, ν) = cm(µ, ν) ?
10.5.2 Asymptotic estimates
Recall the definition (10.8)
φm(µ, ν) := inf
Zm⊂Z
cZm(µ, ν)− c(µ, ν) := cm(µ, ν)− c(µ, ν) ≥ 0 .
Consider the case X = Y = Z = Rd and
c(x, y) = min
z∈Rd
h(|x− z|) + h(|y − z|)
where h : R+ → R+ is convex, monotone increasing, twice continuous differentiable.
Lemma 10.4. Suppose both µ and ν are supported on in a compact set K ⊂ Rd. Then
there exists D(K) <∞ such that
lim sup
m→∞
m2/dφm(µ, ν) ≤ D(K) . (10.28)
Proof. By Taylor expansion of z → h(|x − z|) + h(|y − z|) at z0 = (x + y)/2 we get
h(|x− z|) + h(|y − z|) =
2h(|x− y|/2) + 1
2|x− y|2 h
′′
( |x− y|
2
)
[(x− y) · (z − z0)]2 + o2(z − z0) .
Let now Zm be a regular grid of m points which contains the support K. The distance
between any z ∈ K to the nearest point in the grid does not exceed C(K)m−1/d, for
some constant C(K). Hence cm(x, y)− c(x, y) ≤ sup |h′′ |C(K)2m−2/d if x, y ∈ K. Let
pi0(dxdy) be the optimal plan corresponding to µ, ν and c. Then, by definition,
c(µ, ν) =
∫
X
∫
Y
c(x, y)pi0(dxdy) ; cm(µ, ν) ≤
∫
X
∫
Y
cm(x, y)pi0(dxdy)
so
φm(µ, ν) ≤
∫
X
∫
Y
(cm(x, y)− c(x, y))pi0(dxdy) ≤ sup |h
′′ |C(K)2m−2/d ,
since pi0 is a probability measure.
If h(s) = 2q−1sq (hence c(x, y) = |x− y|q) then the condition of Lemma 10.4 holds
if q ≥ 2. Note that if µ = ν then c(µ, µ) = 0 so φm(µ, µ) = infZm∈Z cZm(µ, µ). In
that particular case we can improve the result of Lemma 10.4 using Zador’s Theorem
for vector quantization.
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Theorem 10.3. [21, 51] Let f ∈ L1(Rd) be a density (with respect to Lebesgue) of a
probability measure (in particular f ≥ 0 and ∫Rd f = 1.) Let Then
lim
n→∞
mq/d min
Zm⊂Rd
∫
Rd
min
z∈Zm
|x− z|qf(z)dz = Cd,q
[∫
Rd
fd/(d+q)
](d+q)/d
.
Corollary 10.5.2. If c(x, y) = |x−y|q, q ≥ 2, X = Y = Z = Rd and ν = µ = f(x)dx
lim
m→∞
mq/dφm(µ, µ) = 2qCd,q
(∫
fd/(d+q)dx
)(d+q)/d
(10.29)
where Cd,q is some universal constant.
Proof. From (10.13), ΞZmµ,µ(~p) = Ξ
Zm
µ (~p) + Ξ
Zm
µ (−~p) is an even function. Hence its
maximizer must be ~p = 0. By Theorem 10.1
ΞZmµ,µ(0) = 2Ξ
Zm
µ (0) = c
Zm(µ, µ) . (10.30)
Using (10.11, 10.12) with c(1)(x, y) = c(2)(y, x) = 2q−1|x− y|q we get
ΞZmµ (0) = 2
q−1
∫
Rd
min
1≤i≤m
|x− z|qµ(dx) . (10.31)
Let now µ = fdx. Since, evidently, c(µ, µ) = 0 we get (10.29) from (10.31, 10.30) and
from Theorem 10.3.
Note that Corollary 10.5.2 does not contradict Lemma 10.4. In fact q ≥ 2 it is
compatible with the Lemma, and (10.28) holds with D(K) = 0 if q > 2. If q ∈ [1, 2),
however, then the condition of the Lemma is not satisfied (as h
′′
is not bounded near
0), and the Proposition is a genuine extension of the Lemma, in the particular case
µ = ν.
In the particular case q = 2 we can extend Corollary 10.5.2 to the general case
µ 6= ν, under certain conditions.
Let X = Y = Z = Rd, c(x, y) = |x − y|2, µ, ν ∈ M(2)2 (recall (9.18)). Assume
µ, ν are absolutely continuous with respect to Lebesgue measure on Rd. In that case,
Brenier Polar factorization Theorem 9.5 implies the existence of a unique solution to
the quadratic Monge problem, i.e a Borel mapping T such that T#µ = ν (9.19). Let
λ be the McCann interpolation between µ and ν corresponding to the middle point
s = 1/2 (see section 9.4.2). It turns out that λ is absolutely continuous with respect
to Lebesgue measure L as well. Let f := dλ/dL ∈ L1(Rd).
Theorem 10.4. Under the above assumptions,
lim sup
m→∞
m2/dφm(µ, ν) ≤ 4Cd,2
(∫
fd/(d+2)dx
)(d+2)/d
.
Proof. Let S1 to be the Monge mapping transporting λ to µ, and S2 the Monge
mapping transporting λ to ν. In particular µ = S1#λ, ν = S2,#λ and (recall c(·, ·) :=
W 22 (·, ·)) we get by (9.23, 9.22)
c(λ, µ) =
∫
|S1(z)− z|2dλ = c(λ, ν) =
∫
|S2(z)− z|2dλ = 1
4
c(µ, ν) . (10.32)
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Figure 10.1: Interpolation: z is the mid point between x to y = T (x).
Given 1 ≤ i ≤ m, let λ1, . . . λm be a weak m−partition of Λ. In particular∑m
1 λi = λ. Let zi be the center of mass of λi, so∫
zdλi = λi(Rd)zi . (10.33)
From (10.32) it follows
c(µ, ν) = 2
 ∑
1≤i≤m
∫
|S1(z)− z|2dλi +
∑
1≤i≤m
∫
|S2(z)− z|2dλi
 . (10.34)
Let µi := S1,#λi, νi := S2,#λi. In particular νi(Rd) = µi(Rd) = λi(Rd) so {µi}, {νi}
is a congruent weak partition (Definition 10.2.1). Form Lemma 10.1
cZm(µ, ν) ≤ 2
 ∑
1≤i≤m
∫
|x− zi|2µi(dx) +
∑
1≤i≤m
∫
|y − zi|2νi(dy)

= 2
∑
1≤i≤m
∫ {|S1(z)− zi|2 + |S2(z)− zi|2} dλi . (10.35)
Hence (10.8)
φZm(µ, ν) ≤ 2
∑
1≤i≤m
∫
Vi
[|S1(z)− zi|2 − |S1(z)− z|2] dλ
+2
∑
1≤i≤m
∫
Vi
[|S2(z)− zi|2 − |S2(z)− z|2] dλ
Using the identity
|Sκ(z)− zi|2 − |Sκ(z)− z|2 = |zi|2 − |z|2 − 2Sκ(z) · (zi − z)
for κ = 1, 2 we get
|S1(z)− zi|2 − |S1(z)− z|2 + |S2(z)− zi|2 − |S2(z)− z|2 =
2|zi|2 − 2|z|2 − 2(S1(z) + S2(z)) · (zi − z) = 2|zi|2 − 2|z|2 − 4z · (zi − z)
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where we used 1
2
(S1(z) +S2(z)) = z (c.f Fig 10.1). Then, (10.33) and the above imply∫ {|S1(z)− zi|2 − |S1(z)− z|2 + |S2(z)− zi|2 − |S2(z)− zi|2} dλi =
4
∫
|z|2dλi − 2λi(Rd)|zi|2 = 4
∫
|zi − z|2dλi .
together with (10.34, 10.35) and (10.8) implies
φm(µ, ν) ≤ 4
∑
1≤i≤m
∫
|z − zi|2dλi (10.36)
for any weak partition λ1, . . . λm. Taking the minimal weak partition it turns out, by
Corollary 10.5.2 that the right side of (10.36) is as small as 4Cd,2
(∫
fd/(d+2)dx
)(d+2)/d
where f is the density of λ.
10.6 Symmetric transport and congruent parti-
tions
The optimal transport between two RJ+ valued measures, discussed in Part II, can
be naturally generalized to an optimal transport between two general vector valued
measures. Here we replace the measures µ, ν by RJ+-valued measures
µ¯ := (µ(1), . . . µ(J)) ∈MJ(X), ν¯ := (ν(1), . . . ν(J)) ∈MJ(Y ) ,
and we denote µ = |µ¯| := ∑J1 µ(j), ν = |ν¯| := ∑J1 ν(j). The set Π(µ, ν) (9.3) is
generalized into
Π(µ¯, ν¯) := {pi ∈M(X × Y );
∫
X
dµ(j)
dµ
(x)pi(dxdy) = ν(j)(dy) , j = 1 . . . J} . (10.37)
where dµi/dµ, dνi/dν stands for the Radon-Nikodym derivative.
In general the set Π(µ¯, ν¯) can be an empty one. If Π(µ¯, ν¯) 6= ∅ then µ¯  ν¯ (c.f
Definition 5.3.2). The generalization of the Kantorovich problem (9.1) takes the form
θ(µ¯, ν¯) := max
pi∈Π(µ¯,ν¯)
∫
X
∫
Y
θ(x, y)pi(dxdy) . (10.38)
θ(µ¯, ν¯) =∞ if µ¯ 6 ν¯.
If J > 1 then θ(µ¯, ν¯) 6= θ(ν¯, µ¯) in general, even if µ¯ and ν¯ are living on the same
domain X and θ(x, y) = θ(y, x) for any x, y ∈ X. Indeed we obtain from (10.38 ) that
θ(ν¯, µ¯) =∞ if ν¯ 6 µ¯, while θ(µ¯, ν¯) <∞ if µ¯  ν¯. This is in contrast to the case J = 1.
Let Z be measure space and θ satisfies (10.1). Then we define
θ¯(µ¯, ν¯) := sup
λ¯≺µ¯∧ν¯
θ1(µ¯, λ¯) + θ2(ν¯, λ¯) . (10.39)
In particular
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If X = Y , θ1 = θ2 then θ¯(µ¯, ν¯) = θ¯(ν¯, µ¯) for any µ¯, ν¯. θ¯(ν¯, µ¯) <∞ if and only
if µ¯(X) = ν¯(X).
If J = 1 then θ¯(µ, ν) <∞ only if µ(X) = ν(Y ).
From now on we assume that Z is a finite space. One of the motivations for this
model is an extension of the hedonic market (section 10.4 ) to several commodities:
Consider a market of J = (1, . . . J) goods. The domain X is the set of consumers of
these goods, and µ(j) is the distribution of consumers of j ∈ J . Likewise, Y is the
set of manufacturers of the goods, and ν(j) is the distribution of the manufacturers of
j ∈ J .
In addition we presume the existence of N ”commodity centers”
ZN := {z1, . . . zN} .
Let θ
(j)
1 (x, zi) be the utility of the good j for a consumer x at the center zi, same as
θ
(j)
2 (y, zi) for a producer y of j at the center zi.
We may extend definition 10.3.1 of congruent N−partition to this setting:
A partition ~A = (A1, . . . AN ) of X and ~B = (B1, . . . BN ) of Y are congruent with
respect to µ¯ = (µ(1), . . . µ(J)), ν¯ = (ν(1), . . . ν(J)) if
µ(j)(Ai) = ν
(j)(Bi) 1 ≤ i ≤ N ; , 1 ≤ j ≤ J . (10.40)
Any such possible congruent partition represents a possible matching between the con-
sumers and the producers: all consumers in Ai and all producers in Bi are associated
with the single center zi. The balance condition (10.40) guarantees that the center zi
can satisfies the supply and demand for all goods J , simultaneously.
The total utility of such a congruent partition is
Θ({Ai}, {Bi}) :=
J∑
j=1
∑
z∈ZN
∫
Ai
θ
(j)
1 (x, z)µ
(j)(dx) +
∫
Bi
θ
(j)
2 (y, z)ν
(j)(dy)
≡
∑
z∈ZN
∫
Ai
θ1(x, z)µ(dx) +
∫
Bi
θ2(y, z)ν(dy) (10.41)
where
µ :=
J∑
j=1
µ(j) , ν :=
J∑
j=1
νj , θ1 :=
∑
j
θ
(j)
1 dµ
(j)/dµ , θ2 :=
∑
j
θ
(j)
2 dν
(j)/dν .
The efficient partition is the one which maximize the total utility among all possible
congruent partitions.
Other motivation concerns an application of Monge metric to colored images. The
Monge metric (often called the ”earth movers metric”) became very popular in com-
puter imaging in recent years. The general practice for black & white images is to
consider these images as probability measures on an Euclidean domain (say a rectan-
gle B), demonstrating the level degree of gray. The matching between the two images
is reduced to solving the Monge problem for the two corresponding measures µ, ν on
B, and is given by the optimal matching T : B → B in (1.15) where, in general,
θ(x, y) = −|x − y|2. The motivation is either to quantify the difference between two
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such images, or to interpolate between the two images in order to obtain a video
connecting two possible states.
If these measures are colored, then the general practice is to consider them as
probability measures in a lifted space B × C where the color space C is, in general, a
three dimensional domain representing the level of the RGB (Red-Green-Blue) values.
The matching is still given by a solution of the Monge problem (1.15) where, this time,
the measures are defined on B × C and the optimal matching is a mapping in this
space as well.
The alternative paradigm suggested by vectorized transport is to view the images
as vector valued (RGB) measures.
It is remarkable, as shown in Lemma 10.1, that the case of a single good (J = 1)
is reduced to an optimal transport of (X,µ) to (Y, ν) with respect to the utility
θZN (x, y) := max
z∈ZN
θ1(x, z) + θ2(y, z) .
This, unfortunately, is not the case for the vectorized case. However, Theorem 10.2
can be extended to the vectorized case, where we define
Ξ(1)(~P) ≡ µ
(
ξ(1)(·, ~P)
)
; ξ(1)(x, ~P) ≡ max
i
(θ1(x, zi) + ~pi · dµ¯/dµ(x)),
Ξ(2)(~P) ≡ ν
(
ξ(2)(·, ~P)
)
; ξ(2)(x, ~P) ≡ max
i
(θ2(y, zi) + ~pi · dν¯/dν(y)),
Ξ(~P) := Ξ(1)(~P) + Ξ(2)(−~P) .
The proof of the Theorem below is very similar to the proof of Theorem 10.2 so we
skip it.
Theorem 10.5. If any J ≥ 1 and under Assumption 10.3.1
max
{Ai},{Bi}
Θ({Ai}, {Bi}) = inf
~P
Ξ(~P; µ¯, ν¯) . (10.42)
where the infimum is over all N × J matrices ~P = {p(j)i } and maximum is over all
µ¯− ν¯ congruent partitions. If a minimizer ~P0 is obtained then the optimal congruent
partitions {A0i }, {B0i } satisfy
A0i = A
θ1
i (
~P0), B
0
i = A
θ2
i (−~P0)
where Aθi (~P) are defined as in (7.35) , where ζ¯ = dµ¯/dµ (resp. ζ¯ = dν¯/dν).
Part IV
Cooperative and
non-Cooperative partitions
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Chapter 11
Back to Monge: Individual
values
You don’t get paid for the hour. You get paid for the value you bring to the hour. Jim
Rohn
Theorems 7.8, 7.9 are the most general result we obtained so far, regarding the ex-
istence and uniqueness of generalized, strong (sup)partitions. In particular it provides
a full answer to the questions raised in Section 4.7, together with a constructive algo-
rithm via a minimization of a convex function for finding the optimal (sub)partitions.
What we need are just Assumptions 6.2.1 and (resp.) 7.2.1(i+ ii).
Yet, it seems that we still cannot answer any of these questions regarding the
Saturation and Over-Saturation cases for non-generalized (sub)partitions, discussed in
Sections 4.2-4.4.
Let us elaborate this point. Theorem 7.8 provides us with uniqueness only up to a
coalition’s ensemble. So, if the ensemble’s units are not singletons, the theorem only
gives us uniqueness up to the given ensemble. On the other hand, Theorem 7.9 (as well
as Theorem 7.10) provides uniqueness without reference to any coalition. However,
the assumption behind this Theorem require the fixed exchange ratios {~zi} defined in
section 6.2.2, and the corresponding Assumption 6.2.2. The Monge partition problem,
as described in Chapter 4, corresponds to the case ζ¯ is real valued (i.e. J = 1). This,
indeed, is equivalent to the case of fixed exchange rates in RJ , J > 1 where all ~zi ∈ RJ
equal each other. This, evidently, defies Assumption 6.2.2.
So, what about Theorem 7.7? It only requires Assumption 7.2.1 which, under the
choice ζ¯ ≡ 1, takes the form:
Assumption 11.0.1. .
i) For any i, j ∈ I and any r ∈ R, µ (x ∈ X ; θi(x)− θj(x) = r) = 0 .
ii) For any i ∈ I and any r ∈ R, µ (x ∈ X ; θi(x) = r) = 0 .
Hence, Theorem 7.7 can be applied for non-generalized (sub)partitions, granting
Assumption 11.0.1. However, this Theorem only guarantees the existence and unique-
ness of a strong (sub)partition for an interior points of ∆N (µ¯).
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Which of the points in ∆N (µ¯) are interior points? It is evident that under the
choice ζ¯ = 1 the US,S,OS condition (5.9,5.8,5.7) are reduced to (4.7,4.6,4.5). Hence,
an interior point must be a US point (4.7). In particular, we still cannot deduce the
uniqueness of stable partitions for (S) and (OS) capacities.....
But, alas, ”Despair is the conclusion of fools”.1 It turns out that we can still prove
this result, using only Assumption 11.0.1-(i).
We recall the setting of the Monge problem (Chapter 4). Here J = 1 so we set
M+(N, J) = M
′
(N, J) := R and ζ¯ = 1. In addition we make the following change of
notation from chapters 5-7.2: replace ~p by ~p = −~p. This notation is more natural if
we interpret ~p as the price vector of the agents. Under this change
~p 7→ Ξθ(~p) := µ
(
max
i∈I
(θi(·)− pi)
)
, (11.1)
Ξθ,+ (4.17):
~p 7→ Ξθ,+(~p) := µ
(
max
i∈I
[θi(·)− pi]+
)
. (11.2)
Recall N = |I| is the number of agents in I. Let ~m = (m1, . . .mN ) ∈ RN+ and
|~m| := ∑Ni=1 mi. In that case the definitions of ∆N and ∆N (Definition 5.1.2) are
reduced to
∆N (µ) := {~m ∈ RN+ ; |~m| = µ(X)}, ∆N (µ) := {~m ∈ RN+ ; |~m| ≤ µ(X)} . (11.3)
Theorem 11.1.
a) Let Assumption 11.0.1-(i). Let K ⊂ RN+ is a closed convex set such that |~m| ≥
µ(X) for any ~m ∈ K.
Then there exists an equilibrium price vector ~p0 , unique up to an additive trans-
lation
p0i → p0i + γ, i ∈ I , γ ∈ R (11.4)
which is a minimizer of
~p 7→ Ξθ(~p) +HK(~p)
on RN (recall (7.53). Moreover, the associated partition
~Aθ(~p0) := (Aθ1(~p
0), . . . , AθN (~p
0))
where
Aθi (~p
0) := {x ∈ X; θi(x)− p0i > max
j 6=i
θj(x)− p0j} (11.5)
is the unique optimal partition which maximizes θ( ~A) on OPNK∩∆N (µ).
b) Let Assumption 11.0.1-(i,ii). Let K ⊂ RN+ is a closed convex set such that K ∩
∆N (µ) 6= ∅.
Then there exists an equilibrium price vector ~p0 which is a minimizer of
~p 7→ Ξ+θ (~p) +HK(~p)
on RN . Moreover, the associated (sub)partition
~Aθ,+(~p0) := (Aθ,+1 (~p
0), . . . , Aθ,+N (~p
0)) ,
1 Benjamin Disraeli, The Wondrous Tale of Alroy, Part 10, Chapter 17.
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where
Aθ,+i (~p
0) := Aθi (~p
0)−Aθ0(~p0), Aθ0(~p0) := {x ∈ X; max
1≤j≤N
θj(x)−p0j ≤ 0} (11.6)
is the unique optimal sub-partition which maximizes θ( ~A) on OSPNK∩∆N (µ). If
µ(Aθ0(~p
0)) > 0 then the vector ~p0 is unique, and if µ(Aθ0(~p
0)) = 0 then ~p0 is
unique up to a negative additive translation
p0i → p0i − γ, i ∈ I , γ ∈ R+ . (11.7)
In particular, recalling Section 7.1.3 we obtain that, in spite of the unboundedness
of the equilibrium price ~p0 (11.4),
Corollary 11.0.1. There is no escalation for the Monge problem under Assumption
11.0.1.
Another conclusion which we obtain yields a unified representation in the under
saturation, saturation and over saturation cases. Here we consider K = {~s ∈ RN+ ;~s ≤
~m}, so HK(~p) = [~p]+ · ~m where [~p]+ := ([p1]+, . . . [pN ]+).
Corollary 11.0.2. Under Assumption 11.0.1, there exists a (sub)partition ~A0 such
that
θ( ~A0) = Σ
θ,+(~m) := min
~p∈RI
Ξθ,+(~p) + [~p]+ · ~m = Ξθ,+(~p0) + [~p0]+ · ~m .
Moreover, ~A0 = A
θ,+
i (~p
0) is given by (11.6).
The claim below is an extension, for Monge (sub)partitions, of Corollary 7.2.1
which uses the uniqueness result of the equilibrium vector ~p0 and Proposition A.9:
Corollary 11.0.3. Under Assumption 11.0.1, The function Σθ,+ is differentiable at
any interior point ~m ∈∆N (µ), and
∂Σθ,+
∂mi
= p0i ; i ∈ I
If ~m ∈∆N (µ) then Σθ,+ is differentiable in the ”negative” direction, i.e.
∂−Σθ,+
∂mi
:= − lim
↓0
−1
(
Σθ,(+)(~m− ~ei)− Σθ,(+)(~m)
)
= p0i (11.8)
while Σθ is differentiable on the tangent space of ∆N (µ), i.e.
lim
↓0
−1
(
Σθ,(+)(~m+ ~ζ)− Σθ,(+)(~m)
)
= ζ¯ · ~p0 (11.9)
for any ζ¯ = (ζ1, . . . ζN ) satisfying
∑
i∈I ζi = 0, ζi ≥ 0 if mi = 0.
Remark 11.0.1. The vector ~p0 defined in the saturated case by (11.8) is the maximal
price vector (11.7). It is the maximal price which the agents can charge such that any
consumer will attend some agent.
Remark 11.0.2. The two parts of the Theorem contain the three cases (recall (4.5,
4.6, 4.7)
US) The Under Saturated ~m ∈ int(∆N (µ)) in part (b) where K = {~m},
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S) The Saturated ~m in both (a) and (b) where ~m ∈∆N (µ), K = {~m}, and
OS) The Over Saturated where ~m 6∈∆N (µ). If the components θi are all non-negative
then case (a) is valid since the only maximizer of Σθ,+ is in ∆N (µ) (show it!).
Proof. of Theorem 11.1:
(a) The inequality (4.18) of Proposition 4.3 is valid also if we replace Ξθ,+ by Ξθ.
Indeed, (4.19) is extended to2
θi(x) ≤ ξ(~p, x) + pi where ξ(~p, x) := max
1≤j≤N
θj(x)− pj ,
so
θ( ~A) ≤ Ξθ(~p) +HK(~p) . (11.10)
holds for any ~A ∈ OSPNK and ~p ∈ RN . In case of an equality (11.10), Proposition 4.6
is valid as well.
Assume first K = {~m} where ~m is a saturated vector (~m ∈ ∆N (µ¯)). Then (4.18)
takes the form
θ( ~A) ≤ Ξθ(~p) + ~p · ~m . (11.11)
Note that Proposition 7.1 can be applied since Assumption 7.2.1(i) is compatible
with Assumption 11.0.1. In particular it follows that Ξθ is differentiable on RN . The
first equality in (7.42) is translated into
∂Ξθ
∂pi
(~p) = −
∫
Aθi (~p)
dµ . (11.12)
We now prove the existence of such a minimizer ~p0.
Observe that
Ξθ(~p+ α~1) = Ξθ(~p)− αµ(X) ; ~1 := (1, . . . 1) ∈ RN . (11.13)
In particular ∇Ξθ(~p) = ∇Ξθ(~p+ α~1) and, in the saturated case ~1 · ~m = µ(X):
Ξθ(~p) + ~p · ~m = Ξθ(~p+ α~1) + (~p+ α~1 · ~m) (11.14)
for any α ∈ R. So, we restrict the domain of Ξθ to
RN0 := {~p ∈ RN , ~p ·~1 = 0} . (11.15)
Let ~pn be a minimizing sequence of ~p 7→ Ξθ(~p)− ~p · ~m in RN0 , that is
lim
n→∞
Ξθ(~pn) + ~pn · ~m = inf
~p∈RN
Ξθ(~pn) + ~pn · ~m .
Let ‖~p‖2 := (∑i∈I p2i )1/2 be the Euclidean norm of ~p. If we prove that for any
minimizing sequence ~pn the norms ‖~pn‖2 are uniformly bounded, then there exists a
converging subsequence whose limit is the minimizer ~p0. This follows since Ξθ is, in
particular, a continuous function.
Assume there exists a subsequence along which ‖~pn‖2 →∞. Let ~̂pn := ~pn/‖~pn‖2.
Then
Ξθ(~pn) + ~pn · ~m :=
[
Ξθ(~pn)− ~pn · ∇~pΞθ(~pn)
]
+ ~pn ·
(
∇~pΞθ(~pn) + ~m
)
=
[
Ξθ(~pn)− ~pn · ∇~pΞθ(~pn)
]
+ ‖~pn‖2~̂pn ·
(
∇~pΞθ(~pn) + ~m
)
. (11.16)
2Note the change of notation from ~p to −~p between section 4.4 and here. This is because
~p is more natural as a price vector in section 4.4.
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Note that
Ξθ(~p)− ~p · ∇Ξθ(~p) =
∑
i∈I
∫
Ai(~p)
θidµ , (11.17)
so, in particular
0 ≤
∫
X
min
i∈I
θidµ ≤
[
Ξθ(~p)− ~p · ∇~pΞθ(~p)
]
=
∑
i∈I
∫
Ai(~p)
θi(x)dµ ≤
∫
X
max
i∈I
θidµ <∞ .
(11.18)
By (11.16- 11.18) we obtain, for ‖~pn‖2 →∞,
lim
n→∞
~̂pn ·
(
∇~pΞθ(~pn) + ~m
)
= 0 . (11.19)
Since ~̂pn lives in the unit sphere in R
N (which is a compact set), there exists a
subsequence for which ~̂pn → ~̂p0 := (pˆ0,1, . . . pˆ0,N ). Let P+ := maxi∈I p̂i,0 and
J+ := {i ; p̂0,i = P+}.
Note that for n→∞ along such a subsequence, pn,i−pn,k →∞ iff i ∈ J+, k 6∈ J+.
It follows that Aθk(~pn) = ∅ if k 6∈ J+ for n large enough, hence µ(∪i∈J+Aθi (~pn)) =
µ(X) = µ(X) for n large enough. Let µni be the restriction of µ to A
θ
i (~pn). Then the
limit µni ⇀ µi exists (along a subsequence) where n→∞. In particular, by (11.12)
lim
n→∞
∂Ξθ
∂pn,i
(~pn) = − lim
n→∞
∫
X
dµni = −
∫
X
dµi
while µi 6= 0 only if i ∈ J+, and ∑i∈J+ µi = µ. Since p̂0,i = P+ for i ∈ J+ is the
maximal value of the coordinates of ~̂p0, it follows that
lim
n→∞
~̂pn ·
(
∇~pΞθ(~pn) + ~m
)
= ~̂p0 · ~m− P+
∑
i∈J+
∫
X
dµi = ~̂p0 · ~m− P+µ(X) .
Now, by definition, ~̂p0 · ~m < P+µ(X) unless J+ = {1, . . . N}. In the last case we
obtain a contradiction of (11.15) since it implies ~̂p0 = 0 which contradicts ~̂p0 is in the
unit sphere in RN . If J+ is a proper subset of {1, . . . N} we obtain a contradiction to
(11.19). Hence ‖~pn‖2 is uniformly bounded, and any limit ~p0 of this set is a minimizer.
The proof of uniqueness of optimal partition is identical to the proof of this part
in Theorem 7.7 (see (7.44)). This also implies the uniqueness (up to a shift) of ~p0 via
(11.14).
To complete the proof we need to show that
~m ∈ K ∩∆N (µ) 7→ Σθ(~m) := min
~p∈RN
Ξθ(~p) + ~p · ~m (11.20)
admits a unique maximizer.
Recall that the function Ξθ is convex function on RN . Moreover, its partial deriva-
tives exists at any point in RN , which implies that its sub-gradient is s singleton. Its
Legendre transform takes finite values only on the simplex of saturated vectors ∆N (µ).
Indeed, by (11.13)
Ξθ(~p+ α~1) + (~p+ α~1) · ~m = Ξθ(~p) + α(
∑
i∈I
mi − µ(X)) ,
so
Ξθ,∗(~m) := sup
~p∈RN
~p · ~m− Ξθ(~p) =∞
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if ~m 6∈∆N (µ). In fact, we already know that ∆N (µ) is the essential domain of Ξθ,∗.
Now, K ∩ ∆N (µ) is a compact, convex set. The uniqueness of the maximizer
(11.20) follows if Ξθ,∗ is strictly convex on its essential domain ∆N (µ). This follows
from the differentiability of Ξθ and from Proposition A.9.
b) The proof of case (b) follows directly from the proof of case (a), where we add the
agent {0} to {1, . . . , N}, and set θ0 ≡ 0. The uniqueness of ~p0 = (p01, . . . p0N ) in that
case follows from the uniqueness up to a shift of (p00, p
0
1, . . . , p
0
N ), where we ”nailed”
this shift by letting p00 = 0.
11.1 The individual surplus values
The main conclusion we may draw from Theorem 11.1 is the existence of an ”individual
value” (i.v) for an agent. This is the value which the consumers attribute to their
agents. If the price vector of agents is ~p, then the individual value for agent i is
V θi (~p) :=
∫
Aθi (~p)
θidµ (11.21)
where Aθi (~p) = {x; θi(x)−pi = maxj 6=i[θj(x)−pj ]+}. Under the conditions of Theorem
11.1 we know that the partition is uniquely determined by the capacities ~m, so we may
consider the partition ~A and the individual values ~V as functions of the capacity vector
~m, rather than the price vector ~p. Thus, we sometimes refer to
Vi(~m) :=
∫
Aθi (~m)
θidµ
where Aθi (~m) = A
θ
i (~p(~m)).
Example 11.1.1. The case of a single agent:
For θ ∈ C(X) is the utility function of a single agent, let (Fig 11.1)
Aθp := {x ∈ X; θ(x) ≥ p} ,
mθ(p) := µ(A
θ
p) , Fθ(t) :=
∫ ∞
t
mθ(s)ds , Fθ(m) := inf
t∈R
[mt+ Fθ(t)] .
Note that Fθ is defined since θ is bounded on X, so mθ(t) = 0 for t > maxX θ.
Moreover, Fθ and Fθ are concave functions, and
−
∫ ∞
p
tdmθ(t) =
∫
Aθp
θdµ ≡ V θ(mθ(p)) .
Integration by parts and duality implies
−
∫ ∞
p
tdmθ(t) = pmθ(p) + Fθ(p) ≡ Fθ(mθ(p)) .
Substitute mθ(p) = m we obtain that the i.v for the single agent of capacity m is just
Fθ(m), so, for any m > 0,
V θ(m) = Fθ(m) ∀m ∈ (0, µ(X)] . (11.22)
Note that Fθ(m) = −∞ if m > µ(X).
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𝐴𝑝
𝜃
𝜃=p
Figure 11.1: Single agent
The equilibrium price p = pθ(m) corresponding to capacity m is the inverse of the
function mθ(p) and, by duality
pθ(m) =
dFθ(m)
dm
. (11.23)
Also, by definition, Fθ(0) = 0 so
lim
m→0
m−1V θ(m) =
d
dm
Fθ(0) = max
X
θ ,
as expected.
Example 11.1.2. The marginal case of two agents under saturation
Assume N = 2 and m1 + m2 = µ(X). Using the notation of Example 11.1.1 we
consider (Figure 11.2)
Aθ1−θ2p := {x ∈ X; θ1(x) ≥ θ2(x) + p} . (11.24)
The complement of this set is, evidently, Aθ2−θ1−p . Since A
+
0 = ∅ in the saturated case,
we obtain by Theorem 11.1 (a) that the equilibrium price is determined by any (p1, p2)
such that p = p2 − p1 verifies µ
(
Aθ1−θ2p
)
= m1. Since m2 = µ(X) −m1, it implies
that µ
(
Aθ2−θ1−p
)
= m2 as well.
However, the i.v is not given by (11.22) as in Example 11.1.1. In particular, in
the limit m1 → 0
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𝜃\theta דלקההאוושמןאכ .
𝐴𝑝
𝜃1−𝜃2
𝜃1
𝜃2
𝜃2 +p
Figure 11.2: Two agents in saturation
lim
m1→0
V1(m1)
m1
∈ Conv({θ1(x1)})
where {x1} is the set of maximizers of θ1 − θ2 and Conv(·) is the convex hull
of this set in R1.
Example 11.1.3. Suppose θ is a non-negative, continuous function on X verifying
µ(x; θ(x) = r) = 0 for any r ≥ 0. Let λN > λN−1 > . . . λ1 > 0 be constants. We
assume that θi := λiθ where µ(x; θ(x) = r) = 0 ∀r ∈ R (in particular ~θ = (θ1, . . . θN )
verifies assumption 11.0.1). Let ~m in th unit simplex ∆N (1).
From (4.14, 4.15) we obtain
A+0 (~p) ≡ {x; θ(x) < min
i∈I
λ−1i pi}
A+i (~p) ≡
{
x; min
j>i
pj − pi
λj − λi > θ(x) > maxj<i
pj − pi
λj − λi
}
−A+0 (~p) .
In particular, the partitions A+i (~p) consist of unions of level sets of the function θ.
At optimal partition we observe that the i.v of the ”top agent” N is just λN times
the i.v of a single agent whose utility function is θ and capacity mN , i.e, by (11.22)
VN (mN ) = λNFθ(mN )
where (recall (11.23))
AN (~m) := {x ∈ X; θ(x) ≥ pθ(mN )}
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is the level set of agent N . For any 1 ≤ i < N − 1 let Mi := ∑Nk=imk. We obtain
Vi(~m) = λi (Fθ(Mi)−Fθ(Mi+1)) . (11.25)
where
Ai(~m) := {x ∈ X; pθ(Mi+1) ≥ θ(x) ≥ pθ(Mi)} , (11.26)
is the level set of agent i.
The sum of i.v is, thus,
Σθ(~m) =
∑
i∈I
λi
∫
Ai
θdµ ≡
∑
i∈I
λi(Fθ(Mi)−Fθ (Mi+1)) , (11.27)
where MN+1 := 0.
11.2 Will wiser experts always get higher val-
ues?
Suppose that, after some education and training, one of the agents (say no.1) improves
her skill so the utility function she produces for her customers increases from θ1 to
θ˜1 ≥ θ1 on X. Assuming that the utilities of all other agents are unchanged, what is
the impact of this change on the i.v of agent 1?
For example, consider a system of two experts in saturation and that there is no
change in the other parameters of the problem (namely m1,m2, θ2).
We expect that the i.v of the first expert V˜1(~m) := V
θ˜1,θ2
1 (~m) will increase under
this change. Is it so, indeed?
Well, not necessarily! Suppose m1 << µ(X) and let x1 be a unique maximizer of
θ1 − θ2. By Example 11.1.2, V1 ≈ m1θ1(x1). Let now x˜1 be a unique maximizer of
θ˜1 − θ2. So V˜1 ≈ m1θ˜1(x˜1). But it may happen that θ˜1(x˜1) < θ1(x1), even though
θ˜1(x) > θ1(x) for any x ∈ X ! (Fig 11.3).
Definitely, there are cases for which an increase in the utility of a given expert
will increase its i.v, independently of his own capacity, as well as the utilities and
capacities of the other experts. In particular, we can think about two cases where the
above argument fails:
Case 1: θ˜1 = θ1 + λ where λ > 0 is a constant.
Case 2: θ˜1 = βθ1 where β > 2 is a constant.
In the first case the ”gaps” θ1 − θ2 and θ˜1 − θ2 preserves their order, so if x1 is a
maximizer of the first, it is also a maximizer of the second. In particular the optimal
partition is unchanged, and we can even predict that V˜1 = V1 +λm1 > V1 (c.f Theorem
11.2 below).
In the second case the order of gaps may change. It is certainly possible that
θ˜1(x˜1)− θ2(x˜1) > θ˜1(x1)− θ2(x1) (where x1, x˜1 as above), but, if this is the case, an
elementary calculation yields θ˜1(x˜1) > θ1(x1), so the above argument fails. Indeed, if
we assume both βθ1(x˜1)−θ2(x˜1) > βθ1(x1)−θ2(x1) and βθ1(x˜1) < θ1(x1), then (since
β ≥ 2), θ1(x1) − θ2(x1) < −θ2(x˜1) < θ1(x˜1) − θ2(x˜1) so x1 cannot be the maximizer
of θ1 − θ2 as assumed.
In fact, we can get the same result if either θ˜1 ≥ 2θ1 or if θ˜1 = βθ1 and β ≥ 1 (but,
remarkably, not in the case θ˜1 ≥ βθ1 where β < 2 !). This follows from the following
results:
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Type equation here.
/0/1
/̅0 − /1404̅0
∆/0
/0 − /1
/0(40)/̅0(4̅0 )
Figure 11.3: ∆θ1 = θ¯1 − θ1. Increasing θ1 implies decreasing V1.
Theorem 11.2. [48] Let ~θ := (θ1, . . . , θN ) and ~˜θ := (θ˜1, θ2, . . . , θN ). Assume both ~θ, ~˜θ
verify Assumption 11.0.1. Let ~m ∈ RN+ , V1 the i.v of agent 1 corresponding to ~θ and
the capacity ~m, and V˜1 the same corresponding to ~˜θ and the same capacity ~m.
i) If θ˜1 = βθ1 for a constant β > 0 then V˜1 ≥ βV1 if β > 1, V˜1 ≤ βV1 if β < 1.
ii) If ~m is either saturated or under saturated, and θ˜1 = θ1 + λ for a constant λ > 0
then V˜1 = V1 + λm1.
In Theorem 11.3 we expand on case (i) of Theorem 11.2 and obtain the somewhat
surprising result:
Theorem 11.3. Under the same conditions as Theorem 11.2
i) Suppose θ˜1 ≥ βθ1 where β > 1 is a constant. Then
V˜1 ≥ (β − 1)V1 . (11.28)
ii) For any β > 2, s > β − 1 there exists such a system (~θ, ~m) and (~˜θ, ~m), where ~m
is a saturation vector, such that θ˜1 ≥ βθ1, θ˜i = θi for i 6= 1, both ~θ, ~˜θ verify
Assumption 11.0.1, and
V˜1 < sV1 .
In particular, the inequality (11.28) is sharp in the case β > 2.
Corollary 11.2.1. The i.v of an agent cannot decrease if its utility θi is replaced by
θ˜i ≥ 2θi, without changing any of the capacities and the utilities of other agents.
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In Theorem 11.4 we obtain sharp conditions for the decrease of i.v, given an increase
of the corresponding utility:
Theorem 11.4. Under the assumption of Theorem 11.2, if ~m is either under saturated
or saturated,
i)If 1 < β < 2, λ ≥ 0 and
βθ1(x) ≤ θ˜1(x) ≤ βθ1(x) + λ , (11.29)
then
V˜1 ≥ V1 − m1λ(2− β)
β − 1 . (11.30)
ii) For any 1 < β < 2, λ > 0, s < (2 − β)/(β − 1) there exists a system (~θ, ~m)
and (~˜θ, ~m) such that βθ1 ≤ θ˜1 ≤ βθ1 + λ, θ˜i = θi for i 6= 1, both ~θ, ~˜θ verify
Assumption 11.0.1 such that
V˜1 < V1 −m1λs .
In particular, the inequality (11.30) is sharp in the case 1 < β < 2.
11.2.1 Proofs
The key Lemma is an adaptation of Lemma 7.1:
Lemma 11.1. Let a > 0 and ~θ := ~θ(x, t) : X × [0, a] → RN+ for any t ∈ [0, a]. Let
~θ and verifies Assumption 11.0.1 for t = 0 and t = a. Assume further that each
component t 7→ θi(x, t) is convex and differentiable on [0, a] for any x ∈ RN and
∂tθi := θ˙i ∈ L∞(X × [0, a])
for any i ∈ I. Then the function (~p, t) 7→ Ξ~θ(·,t)(~p) (11.1) is convex on RN × [0, a],
and, if its t derivative Ξ˙~θ(·,t)(p) exists at (~p, t) then
Ξ˙~θ(·,t)(p) =
∑
i∈I
∫
Ai(~p,t)
θ˙i(x, t)dµ . (11.31)
Here
Ai(~p, t) := {x ∈ X; θi(x, t)− pi > θj(x, t)− pj ∀j 6= i} . (11.32)
The same holds if we replace Ξθ by Ξθ,+ (11.2) and (11.32) by
A+i (~p, t) := {x ∈ X; θi(x, t)− pi > [θj(x, t)− pj ]+ ∀j 6= i} . (11.33)
Proof. The proof follows as in Lemma 7.1. Here we define
ξ : X × RN × [0, a]→ R , ξ(x, ~p, t) = max
i∈I
[θi(x, t)− pi]
and Ξθ(~p, t) :=
∫
X
ξ(x, ~p, t)µ(dx). Again, ξ is convex on RN × [0, a] for any x ∈ X so
Ξθ is convex on RN × [0, a] as well, while
ξ˙ =
{
θ˙(x, t) if x ∈ Ai(~p, t)
0 if ∃j 6= i, x ∈ Aj(~p, t)
implies (11.31).
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Proof. of Theorem 11.2
i) Let ~t := (t1, . . . tN ) ∈ RN . Let Θ(x, t) := (t1θ1(x), . . . tNθN (x)). Consider
Ξ(~p,~t) := ΞΘ . (11.34)
By Lemma 11.1, (~p,~t) 7→ ΞΘ is mutually convex on RN × RN , and
∂tiΞ
Θ(~p,~t) =
∫
Ai(~p,~t)
θidµ ≡ t−1i Vi(~t) (11.35)
where
Ai(~p,~t) := {x ∈ X; tiθi(x)− pi < tjθj(x)− pj ∀j 6= 1} , (11.36)
whenever ∂tiΞ
Θ exists. It follows that both
Σ(~m,~t) := min
~p∈RN
ΞΘ(~p,~t) + ~m · ~p (11.37)
in the US,S case, or
Σ(~m,~t) := max
~m≤~m
min
~p∈RN
ΞΘ(~p,~t) + ~m · ~p
in the OS case are convex with respect to ~t as well. Then
∂tiΣ =
∫
Ai(~p0,~t)
θidµ ≡ t−1i Vi(~t)
holds as well, where ~p0 := ~p0(~m,~t) is the unique equilibrium price vector (per-
haps up to an additive constant) guaranteed by Theorem 11.1 for the utility
vector Θ. Hence, for ~t(β) := (β, 1; . . . 1) we obtain
V1(~t(β))/β ≡ ∂βΣ(~m,~t(β)) ≥ ∂t1Σ(~m,~1) ≡ V1(~t(1)) ,
where V1(~t(1)) ≡ V1 and V1(~t(β)) ≡ V˜1 by (11.35).
ii) If θ1 → θ1 + λ then the optimal partition in the S, US cases is unchanged. Then
V˜1 :=
∫
A1
(θ1 + λ)dµ =
∫
A1
θ1dµ+ λ
∫
A1
dµ = V1 + λm1 .
Proof. of Theorem 11.3
i) Let σ := θ˜1 − βθ1 ≥ 0, α := β − 1 ≥ 0. Let a function φ : [0, 1] 7→ R satisfying
φ(0) = φ˙(0) = 0 and φ¨ ≥ 0 for any t ∈ [0, 1] , φ(1) = 1 . (11.38)
Define
θ(x, t) := (1 + αt)θ1(x) + σ(x)φ(t) . (11.39)
So
θ(x, 1) = θ˜1(x) (11.40)
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and θ is convex in t ∈ [0, 1] for any x. Also θ˙(x, t) = αθ1(x) +σ(x)φ˙(t). Let now
δ > 0. Then
θ(x, 1) ≥ θ˙(x, 1)− δ‖σ‖∞ (11.41)
provided
σ(x)φ˙(1) ≤ σ(x) + θ1(x) + δ‖σ‖∞ . (11.42)
Since θ1 and σ are non-negative, the later is guaranteed if φ˙(1) ≤ 1 + δ. So, we
choose φ(t) := t1+ for some  ∈ (0, δ]. This meets (11.38,11.42).
Let now
Σ(~m, t) := inf
~p∈RN
ΞΘ(~p, t) + ~p · ~m
where Θ(x, t) := (θ(x, t), θ2(x), . . . θN (x)). By Lemma 11.1, (~p, t) 7→ ΞΘ(~p, t) is
convex. So Σ is convex in t for a fixed ~m. In the OS case
Σ(~m, t) := sup
~m≤~m
inf
~p∈RN
ΞΘ(~p, t) + ~p · ~m
is convex (as maximum of convex functions) as well. By the same Lemma
Σ˙(~m, 0) =
∫
A1(0)
θ˙(, 0)dµ = α
∫
A1(0)
θ1dµ ≡ αV1 (11.43)
where A1(0) is the first component in the optimal partition associated with ~θ,
while, at t = 1 we obtain from convexity and (11.41)
Σ˙(~m, 1) =
∫
A1(1)
θ˙(x, 1)dµ ≤
∫
A1(1)
(θ(x, 1) + δ‖σ‖∞)dµ
≤
∫
A1(1)
θ(x, 1)dµ+ δµ(X)‖σ‖∞ (11.44)
where A1(1) is the first component in the optimal partition associated with
Θ(1, t) Since τ 7→ φ(τ) is convex, τ 7→ Σ(~m, τ) is convex as well by Lemma 11.1
and we get
Σ˙(~m, 1) ≥ Σ˙(~m, 0) . (11.45)
From (11.44, 11.45) ∫
A1(1)
θ(x, 1)dµ ≥ αV1 − δµ(X)‖σ‖∞ .
Now, recall β := 1 + α and θ(x, 1) := θ˜1 by (11.40), so
∫
A1(1)
θ(x, 1)dµ ≡ V˜1.
Since δ > 0 is arbitrary small, we obtain the result.
ii) Assume N = 2, m1 + m2 = µ(X). We show the existence of non-negative,
continuous θ1, θ2, x1, x2 ∈ X and λ > 0 such that, for given δ > 0
a) ∆(x) := θ1(x)− θ2(x) < ∆(x1) for any x ∈ X − {x1}.
b) ∆β(x) := βθ1(x)− θ2(x) < ∆β(x1) for any x ∈ X − {x1}.
c) ∆β(x2) + λ = ∆β(x1) + δ.
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We show that (a-c) is consistent with
sθ1(x1) > βθ1(x2) + λ (11.46)
for given s > β − 1.
Suppose (11.46) is verified. Let
θ0 :=
{
1− |x−x2|

if |x− x2| ≤ 
0 if |x− x2| >  (11.47)
(assuming, for simplicity, that X is a real interval). Set θ˜1 := βθ1 + λθ0. If  is
small enough then θ˜1−θ2 is maximized at x2 by (b,c), while θ1−θ2 is maximized
at x1 by (a). Letting M1 << 1 we find, by Example 11.1.2, that V1 ≈M1θ1(x1)
and V˜1 ≈M1(βθ1(x2) + λθ0(x2)) = M1(βθ1(x2) + λ). By (11.46) we obtain the
result.
So, we have only to prove that (11.46) is consistent with (a-c). We rewrite it as
s
β − 1 [∆β(x1)−∆(x1)] >
β
β − 1 [∆β(x2)−∆(x2)] + λ .
From (c) we obtain
s
β − 1 [∆β(x1)−∆(x1)] >
β
β − 1 [∆β(x2)−∆(x2)] + ∆β(x1)−∆β(x2) + δ ,
that is
(s−β+1)∆β(x1)−∆β(x2) > (s−β)∆(x2)+s(∆(x1)−∆(x2))+δ(β−1) . (11.48)
We now set ∆β(x1) and λ large enough, keeping δ,∆β(x2),∆(x1),∆(x2) fixed.
Evidently, we can do it such that (c) is preserved. Since s − β + 1 > 0 by
assumption, we can get (11.48).
Proof. of Theorem 11.4.
i) Let β = 1 + t where t ∈ (0, 1). We change (11.39) into
θ(x, t) := (1 + t)(θ1(x) + γ) + σ(x)φ(t) (11.49)
and
θ˜1(x) := (1 + t)θ1(x) + σ(x)φ(t) (11.50)
where γ > 0 is a constant and σ ≥ 0 on X. Then θ˙(x, t) = θ1(x) + γ+σ(x)φ˙(t),
and we obtain
θ(x, t) ≥ θ˙(x, t), t > 0; θ˙(x, 0) = θ1(x) + γ (11.51)
provided
σ(x)φ˙(t) ≤ σ(x)φ(t) + t(θ1(x) + γ) ; φ˙(0) = 0 . (11.52)
Since θ1, σ are non-negative, the later is guaranteed if
φ˙(t) ≤ φ(t) + tγ‖σ‖∞ ; φ˙(0) = 0 . (11.53)
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Since t < 1 (by assumption β := 1+t < 2), the choice φ(τ) := τ1+ for 0 ≤ τ ≤ t
and  > 0 small enough (depending on t) verifies (11.53) provided
‖σ‖∞ < γt/(1− t) . (11.54)
Hence we can let σ to be any function verifying (11.54). Then (11.49, 11.50)
imply
(1 + t)θ1(x) ≤ θ˜1(x) ≤ (1 + t)θ1(x) + γt
2+
1− t . (11.55)
Now, we note from the second part of (11.51) that
Σ˙(~m, 0) =
∫
A1(0)
θ˙(, 0)dµ =
∫
A1(0)
(θ1 + γ)dµ ≡ V1 + γm1 (11.56)
sinceA1(0) is independent of γ in the S, US cases. In addition, (11.49, 11.50,11.53)
imply
Σ˙(~m, t) =
∫
A1(t)
θ˙(, t)dµ ≤
∫
A1(t)
θ(·, t)dµ =
∫
A1(t)
(θ˜1 + (1 + t)γ)dµ
≡ V˜1 + (1 + t)γm1 ,
where A1(t) is the first component in the optimal partition associated with Θ.
Since τ 7→ φ(τ) is convex, τ 7→ Σ(~m, τ) is convex as well by Lemma 11.1 and we
get, as in (11.45)
Σ˙(~m, t) ≥ Σ˙(~m, 0) . (11.57)
where, again, we used that A1(t) is independent of γ and t > 0. Recalling
β := 1 + t, let λ := γ(β − 1)2/(2− β) and  small enough we get (11.29, 11.30),
using (11.55,11.56, 11.57).
ii) Assume N = 2, m1 +m2 = 1, that θ1−θ2 attains its maximum at x1, and x2 6= x1.
Let θ˜1 := βθ1 + λθ0 where θ0 as defined in (11.47). We assume, as in part (ii)
of the proof of Theorem 11.3, that x1 is a maximizer of βθ1 − θ2 as well.
Next, assume
βθ1(x1)− θ2(x1) < λ+ βθ1(x2)− θ2(x2) (11.58)
which implies, in particular, that x2 is the maximizer of θ˜1 − θ2 (see part (ii) of
the proof of Theorem 11.3). If, in addition,
θ1(x1)− βθ1(x2)− λ− s > 0 , (11.59)
then, from Example 11.1.2,
V1 ≈ θ1(x1)m1 > m1(θ˜1(x2) + s) ≈ V˜1 + sm1 (11.60)
if m1 is small, and the proof is obtained.
From (11.58) and since x1 is a maximizer of θ1 − θ2:
λ > (β − 1)(θ1(x1)− θ1(x2))
so (11.59) and (11.58) are compatible provided
λ > (β − 1)2θ1(x2) + (β − 1) [λ+ s] ,
namely
λ
2− β
β − 1 > (β − 1)θ1(x2) + s . (11.61)
Thus, if we assume further that, say, θ1(x2) = 0 (which is consistent with the
assumption that θ1, θ2 ≥ 0) then (11.61) is verified for s < λ(2− β)/(β − 1).
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Chapter 12
Sharing the individual value
Share it fairly but don’t take a slice of my pie (Pink-Floyd)
The i.v of an agent is the surplus she produces for her clients. The question we
are going to address is
How an agent shares her i.v with her clients?
We already now that, under a prescribed capacity vector ~m, the price that agent
i charges for her service is determined by pi. Recall
Ξθ,+(~p) :=
∫
X
max
i∈I
(θi(x)− pi)+dµ ; Σθ(~m) = min
~p∈RI
Ξθ,+(~p) + ~p · ~m . (12.1)
The relation between the capacity and price is given by
pi =
∂Σθ
∂mi
, mi = −∂Ξ
θ,+
∂pi
, (12.2)
provided Ξθ,+ and Σθ are differentiable.
The profit Pi of agent i fixing a price pi is just pimi. The residual profit of
her consumers is Ci := Vi − Pi, where Vi is the individual value.
Using the duality relation (12.2) we can determine the profit of the agent in terms
of either the prices ~p charged by the group of agents or in terms of the capacity vector
~m:
Pi(~p) := −pi ∂Ξ
θ,+
∂pi
; Pi(~m) = mi ∂Σ
θ
∂mi
, (12.3)
and we use Pi for both representations, whenever no confusion is expected.
There is, however, another possibility: In addition to (or instead of) the fixed,
flat price pi of her service the agent may charge a commission. This commission is a
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certain proportion, say qi ∈ [0, 1), of the gross profit θi(x) she makes for consumer x.
In that case, the profit of an agent i out of a single consumer x is just pi + qiθi(x),
while the net profit of this consumer is (1− qi)θi(x)− pi.
Given a price vector ~p = (p1, . . . pN ) ∈ RN+ and a commission vector ~q = (q1, . . . qN ) ∈
[0, 1)N , the part of the population not attending any agent is
Aθ0(~p, ~q) := {x ∈ X; max
j
(1− qj)θj(x)− pj ≤ 0} .
The population attending agent i is, then
Aθ,+i (~p, ~q) := A
θ
i (~p, ~q)−Aθ0(~p, ~q)
where
Aθi (~p, ~q) := {x ∈ X; (1− qi)θi(x)− pi > max
j 6=i
(1− qj)θj(x)− pj} (12.4)
(compare to (11.5, 11.6)).
The profit Pi of agent i fixing a price pi and commission qi is pimi + qiVi,
where
mi(~p, ~q) := µ
(
Aθi (~p, ~q)
)
, Vi(~p, ~q) :=
∫
Aθi (~p,~q)
θidµ .
The residual profit of her consumers is
Ci := (1− qi)Vi − pimi .
Can we express this profit in terms of ”potential functions” as in (12.3)? For this
we generalize (12.1) into
Ξθ,+(~p, ~q) :=
∫
X
max
i
((1− qi)θi(x)− pi)+dµ
and the dual function
Σθ(~m, ~q) := inf
~p∈RN
Ξθ,+(~p, ~q) + ~p · ~m .
The condition for differentiability of Ξθ,+ and Σ is the following generalization of
Assumption 11.0.1
Assumption 12.0.1. . For any i, j ∈ {1, . . . N} and any r ∈ R, α > 0
µ (x ∈ X ; θi(x)− αθj(x) = r) = 0 .
Under Assumption 12.0.1 we obtain that Ξθ,+ is differentiable in both variables,
provided ~q ∈ [0, 1)N . Recalling Corollary 11.0.3 we obtain that Σθ is also differentiable
with respect to ~m for fixed ~q ∈ [0, 1)N for any under saturated ~m, (and differentiable
in the negative direction for saturated ~m).1 Moreover, it can be shown that Σθ is also
1Recall, by Remark 11.0.1, that ~p(~m, ~q) := −∇−
~m
Σθ(~m, ~q) is, in the saturated case, the
maximal price vector charged by the agents.
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differentiable with respect to ~q for any ~m in the simplex ∆N (11.3), so the i.v of agent
i is given by either (~p, ~q) or (~m, ~q) representation as
Vi(~p, ~q) = −∂Ξ
θ,+
∂qi
; Vi(~m, ~q) = −∂Σ
θ
∂qi
.
Thus, we obtain the profit of agent i as a function of either (~p, ~q) or (~m, ~q):
Pi(~p, ~q) := −
(
pi
∂Ξθ,+
∂pi
+ qi
∂Ξθ,+
∂qi
)
; Pi(~m, ~q) = mi ∂Σ
θ
∂mi
− qi ∂Σ
θ
∂qi
. (12.5)
Note that (12.5) reduces to (12.3) if ~q = 0.
12.1 Maximizing the agent’s profit
It is, evidently, more natural for an agent to maximize her profit rather than her
individual value. Let us consider first the case of a single agent which does not collect
a commission. If the utility function for this agent is θ, the flat price she collect is a
maximizer of the function p→ P(p), where
P(p) = pµ(x; θ(x) ≥ p) .
Note that P is non-negative for any p ∈ R. Moreover, it is positive in the domain
0 < p < θ¯ := max θ. If (as we assume throughout this book) θ is a bounded continuous
function and X is compact then θ¯ is always obtained in X. However, the maximizer
many not be unique.
Example 12.1.1. Let (X,µ) = ([0, 1], dx) and θ is a positive on [0, 1), monotone
decreasing, θ(1) = 0. For p ∈ [0, θ(0)] we get m(p) = θ−1(p) so P(p) = pθ−1(p). Non
uniqueness of maxP(p) can be visualized easily. (see Fig 12.1).
If we also allow a commission q then the situation is changed dramatically.
Evidently, P(0, q) can approach the i.v (= ∫ 1
0
[θ(x)]+dx) arbitrary close as
q ↑ 1.
12.2 Several agents: Nash equilibrium
The case of several agents is much more complicated. Let Pi = Pi(~p, ~q) the profit
of the agents i for given price-commission vectors ~p, ~q. A natural definition of an
equilibrium is the Nash equilibrium. It is satisfied whenever each agent i chooses his
strategy (i.e his price-commission value (pi, qi)) to maximize his profit, assuming that
his choice does not affect the choices of other agents:
Definition 12.2.1. The vectors ~p = (p1, . . . pN ) ∈ RN , ~q = (q1, . . . qN ) ∈ [0, 1]N are
said to be in Nash equilibrium if
Pi(~p−i, p
′
i; ~q−i, q
′
i) ≤ Pi(~p, ~q)
for any p
′
i ∈ R, q
′
i ∈ [0, 1) and i ∈ I. Here ~p−i is the vector ~p where the i− coordinate
omitted. Same for ~q−i.
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Figure 12.1: The two gray rectangles maximizes the area of all rectangles below
the graph of θ in the positive quadrature whose edges are parallel to the axis.
If no commission is charged, the Nash equilibrium ~p is defined with respect to flat
prices only:
Pi(~p−i, p
′
i) ≤ Pi(~p)
where P(~p) := P(~p,~0).
An equivalent definition can be given in terms of the dual variable ~m (capacities)
and ~q. In this sense, the agents may control their capacities (instead of the flat prices)
and their commissions. Using this, we may assume the existence of capacity constraints
~m ≤ ~m∗, and define the constraint Nash equilibrium
Definition 12.2.2. The capacity vector ~m ≤ ~m∗ and commission vector ~q are said to
be in ~m∗-conditioned Nash equilibrium if
Pi(~m−i; , ~q−i, q
′
i) ≤ Pi(~m, ~q)
for any m
′
i ≤ m∗,i, q
′
i ∈ [0, 1) and i ∈ {1, . . . N}.
Again, if no commission is charged, the Nash equilibrium ~m ≤ ~m∗ conditioned on
~m∗ is defined with respect to the capacities which are determined by the flat prices:
Pi(~m−i,m
′
i) ≤ Pi(~m) ; ∀m
′
i ≤M∗,i
where P(~m) := P(~m,~0).
If, in addition, the functions Pi are differentiable as well, then we obtain the
necessary conditions for a Nash equilibrium:
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Proposition 12.1. If (~p0, ~q0) is a Nash equilibrium and Pi are differentiable at ~p0, ~q0
then
∂Pi/∂pi = ∂Pi/∂qi = 0 at (~p0, ~q0) .
If (~m0, ~q0) is a ~m∗-conditioned Nash equilibrium then
∂Pi/∂mi ≥ 0 ; ∂Pi/∂qi = 0 at (~m0, ~q0)
and ∂Pi/∂mi = 0 if m0,i < m∗,i.
Evidently, the same condition with respect to ~p (resp. ~m) holds if no commission
is imposed (~q0 = 0).
12.3 Existence of Nash equilibrium
In general, the existence of Nash equilibrium is not guaranteed. There are, however,
some cases in which a conditioned Nash equilibrium exists. For example, if the capaci-
ties ~m∗ are sufficiently small then we expect that, at least if no commission is imposed,
the ”saturated” capacities ~m0 = ~m∗ is an ~m∗-conditioned Nash equilibrium.
In general, however, there always exist a Nash equilibrium if we allow mixed states
[31].
12.4 Efficiency
A (sub)partition is called efficient if the sum of all i.v of all agents is maximized. Here
we pose no restriction on the capacities. Alternatively, a (sub)partition is efficient if
each consumer x attends the agent i which is best for him, provided the utility of this
agent is positive, i.e
Definition 12.4.1. A (sub)partition (A1, . . . AN ) is efficient iff
Ai := Ai(~0) ≡ {x; 0 < θi(x) = θ¯(x)} where θ¯(x) := max1≤j≤N θj(x).
We observe that, in the case of no commission, the efficiency condition is met if all
agents set their flat prices to zero. In that case, the sum of all i.v is maximized, and
Σθ := max{Σθ(~m) ; |~m| ≤ µ(X)} =
∫
X
[max
i∈I
θi(x)]+dµ ≡ Ξθ,+(~0) .
Evidently, such an efficiency is not in the best interest of the agents (even though it
is, of course, in the best interest of the consumers). An alternative definition, which is
more realistic from the agent’s point of view, is the Weak Efficiency: The case of weak
efficiency is obtained if all agents make a cartel, i.e. whenever all agents agree on a
common price p¯ = pi for any i ∈ {1, . . . N}. In that case the set of inactive consumers
which does not attend any agent is A0(p¯) = {x; θi(x)− p¯ ≤ 0}.
Definition 12.4.2. A sub-partition ~A := (A1, . . . AN ) is weakly efficient iff there
exists a common flat price p¯ such that any active consumer attends the agent best for
himself, i.e.
Ai := Ai(p¯, . . . p¯) ≡ {x; p¯ < θi(x) = θ¯(x)}.
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It leaves the agents the freedom to choose the common price p¯. If they choose p¯ in
order to maximize the sum of their profits, then this p¯ is determined by the optimal
price for a single agent whose utility function is θ¯:
p¯ = arg max
p
pµ
(
x; θ(x)− p ≥ 0) ,
See Example 12.1.1. If, on the other hand, the agents chose their common flat price p¯
in order to maximize the sum of their i.v, then, evidently,
p¯ = min
X
[θ(x)]+
which leads to a strong efficiency.
An additional, dual way to characterize a weakly efficient (sub)partitions is to
characterize a given total capacity m = |~m|:
Theorem 12.1. For any m < µ(X) there exists a weakly efficient subpartition ~¯A =
(A¯1, . . . A¯N ), µ(A¯i) := m¯i verifying
∑
i m¯i = m. The capacity vector ~m maximizes
Σθ =
∑
i Vi(mi) on {~m;
∑
imi ≤ m}, and the common price p¯ for this subpartition
minimizes
p 7→
∫
X
[θ¯(x)− p]+dµ+ pm .
Proof. Recall θ¯(x) := maxi θ(x) and
Σθ(~m) = min
~p∈RN
Ξθ,+(~p) + ~p · ~m .
Since [θ¯(x)− p]+ ≥ [θi]+(x)− p for any i and any p ∈ R, it follows from definition of
Ξθ,+ that for any ~m satisfying
∑N
i mi ≤ m:∫
X
[θ¯(x)− p]+dµ+ pM ≥ Ξθ,+(p~1) + p~1 · ~m .
In particular
min
p∈R
∫
X
[θ¯(x)− p]+dµ+ pm ≥ min
~p∈RN
Ξθ,+(~p) + ~p · ~m = Σθ(~m) . (12.6)
On the other hand, for the minimizer p¯ we get m = µ(x ∈ X; θ¯(x) > p¯). Let A¯i =
{x ∈ X; θi(x) > p¯} and m¯i := µ(A¯i). Then ∑i m¯i = m and∫
X
[θ¯(x)− p¯]+dµ+ p¯m =
∑
i
∫
A¯i
θidµ = Σ
θ(m¯1, . . . m¯N ) .
This implies the equality in (12.6) for ~m = (m¯1, . . . m¯N ).
To summarize:
A weakly efficient (sub)partitions is obtained by either a cartel sharing a com-
mon flat price, or by maximizing the sum of the individual values subjected
to a maximal total capacity
∑
imi ≤ m.
A natural question is
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Is a weakly efficient (sub)partition guaranteed by maximizing the sum of
agent’s profit (rather than the sum of their i.v)?
Unfortunately, answer to this question is negative, in general.
Example 12.4.1. Consider the case where the supports of all agent’s utility functions
are disjoint. The best price of agent i is then
pi = arg max pµ{x; θi(x) ≥ p} .
Evidently, there is no reason for all pi to be the same in that case!
12.4.1 Efficiency for agents of comparable utilities
The opposite situation for Example 12.4.1 is whenever the support of all agent’s utili-
ties are the same. A particular case is demonstrated in Example 11.1.3, where θi = λiθ,
0 ≤ λi < λi+1. By example 11.1.3
∂Σθ
∂mi
=
i∑
j=1
λj
(
F ′θ(Mj)−F
′
θ(Mj+1)
)
+ λiF
′
θ(Mi+1) , (12.7)
where we used Mj := ∑Ni=jmi. By (12.3) we obtain that the sum of the profit of all
agents, as a function of ~m, is
P(~m) :=
∑
i∈I
Pi(~m) =
∑
i∈I
mi
∂Σθ
∂mi
=
∑
i∈I
i∑
j=1
miλj
(
F ′θ(Mj)−F
′
θ(Mj+1)
)
+
∑
i∈I
miλiF
′
θ(Mi+1) =
N∑
j=1
(
N∑
i=j
mi
)
λj
(
F ′θ(Mj)−F
′
θ(Mj+1)
)
+
∑
i∈I
miλiF
′
θ(Mi+1) =
N∑
j=1
Mjλj
(
F ′θ(Mj)−F
′
θ(Mj+1)
)
+
∑
i∈I
(Mi −Mi+1)λiF
′
θ(Mi+1) =
∑
i∈I
Mi(λi − λi−1)F
′
θ(Mi) (12.8)
where we used λ0 =MN+1 ≡ 0. The maximum of P(~m) then follows for Mi =M0
for any i ∈ I, whereM0 is the maximizer of m 7→ mF ′θ(m). It implies that mN =M0
and mi = 0 for 1 ≤ i < N . Thus:
Under the assumption of Example 11.1.3, the agents maximize the sum of
their profits in the weakly effective state where all active consumers attend
the leading agent N .
The cartel state in the last example is not necessarily a Nash equilibrium. Indeed,
if p0 := F ′θ(M0) is the flat price of the leading agent N which maximizes his profit (as
a single agent), then the cartel state is a Nash equilibrium iff the ”second best” agent
N − 1 cannot attract some consumers if she set her price higher than p0, i.e. iff
λN−1 max
X
θ < p0 . (12.9)
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Indeed, if this inequality is reversed then the agent N − 1 can set a price p0 < p <
λN−1 maxX θ, attract the non-empty set of consumers AN−1 = {x;λN−1θ(x) > p}
and gain a positive profit pµ(AN−1). We obtained
Theorem 12.2. Under the conditions of Example 11.1.3, let p0 = F ′θ(M0) where
M0 is the maximizer of m 7→ mFθ(m) (equivalently, p0 is the minimizer of p 7→
pµ{x; θ(x) > p}). Then the price vector pN = p0, pi ≥ 0 for i < N is a Nash
equilibrium under flat prices strategy iff (12.9) is satisfied.
12.4.2 Efficiency under commission strategy
In general, however, it seems that under flat prices policy we cannot expect the cartel
strategy leading to a maximal sum of the profit of the agents to be a (weakly) effec-
tive state. The situation changes dramatically if the strategy of the agents involves
commissions. Then efficiency can always be obtained if all agents makes a cartel of
zero flat prices ~p = 0 and a common commission qi = Q ∈ [0, 1). Indeed, in that case
the (sub)partition is given by
Ai = {x; 0 < (1−Q)θi(x) = max
1≤j≤N
(1−Q)θj(x)}
which is identical to Definition 12.4.1.
It seems that the strategy of a cartel of commissions is a winning strategy for the
agents. Fortunately (for the consumers), it is never a Nash equilibrium. Indeed, if all
agents choose to collect a commission Q ≈ 1, then any agent can lower his commission
a little bit and attract all consumers!
What will be a Nash equilibrium in the case of Example 11.1.3 under a commission
policy? Suppose the leading agent N set up the commission qN = 1−λN−1/λN . Then,
for any choice qi ∈ (0, 1) for the other agents i 6= N , the leading agent get all consumers
and here profit is (λN −λN−1)µ(θ), while the profit of all other agents is zero. If agent
N increases her commission even just a little bit, the next agent N − 1 may charge a
sufficiently small (but positive) commission and win all the consumers! Since, in the
case qN = 1 − λN−1/λN all agents except N get a zero profit anyway, they can set
their commission arbitrarily at (0, 1).
In case of Example 11.1.3, the Nash equilibrium for the ”only commission”
strategy is qN = 1− λN−1/λN and qi ∈ (0, 1) for i = 1, . . . N − 1.
It seems, however, that an equilibrium in this class is not so safe for the leading
agent N . Indeed, agent N − 1 may declare his commission qN−1 = 0. Even though
she gains nothing from this choice, she competes with the leading agent N , since each
consumer is now indifferent to the choice between N − 1 or N . 2 Agent N − 1 may,
then, try to negotiate with N for an agreement to share her profit. See Chapter 13.
12.5 Free price strategy
Let us consider now the strategy by which each agent may choose here price arbitrarily:
she is allowed to differentiate the consumers according to their utility functions with
respect to all other agents.
2Note that in that case, however, Assumption 12.0.1 is not met.
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Let wi(x) the charge of agent i from consumer x. The partition is now defined by
A0(~w) := {x ∈ X; θi(x)− wi(x) ≤ 0, 1 ≤ i ≤ N} ,
Ai(~w) := {x ∈ X; θi(x)− wi(x) > θj(x)− wj(x) ∀j 6= i} −A0(~w) .
Note that if θi, wi are continuous functions then Ai(~w) are open sets for any i.
The notion of Nash equilibrium is naturally generalized to the case of free strate-
gies. However, the functions
~w 7→ Pi(~w) :=
∫
Ai(~w)
widµ
are not continuous with respect to ~w ∈ C(X;RN+ ). Indeed, the dichotomy set {x; θj(x)−
wj(x) = θi(x) − wi(x)}, i 6= j, is not necessarily of measure zero for any admissible
strategy ~w. This leads us to the following generalization:
Definition 12.5.1. Let Pi, i = 1, . . . N , be defined and continuous on an open subset
Q ⊂ C(X;RN+ ). Then ~w0 ∈ Q is a weak Nash equilibrium if, for any sequence ~wn ∈ Q
converging uniformly to ~w0 there exists a sequence of positive reals n ↓ 0 such that
Pi(~wn,−i, ζ) ≤ P(~wn) + n
for any ζ ∈ C(X,R+), i ∈ I such that (~wn,−i, ζ) ∈ Q is the price strategy where agent
i charges ζ(x) from a consumer x, while all other agents j 6= i retain their prices wj.
Such ~w0 is efficient if, along such a sequence, µ(Ai(~wn)∆Ai)→ 0 for i ∈ I where
Ai as given in Definition 12.4.1.
3
Another formulation of the weak Nash equilibrium is presented in the box below:
~w0 is a weak Nash equilibrium iff for any  > 0 there exists an −neighborhood
of ~w0 such that for any admissible strategy ~w in this neighborhood, no agent
can improve her reward more than  by changing the price she collects, provided
all other agents retain their pricing ~w.
The free price strategy contains, as special cases, the flat price strategy wi(x) = pi,
the commission strategy wi(x) = qiθi(x), qi ∈ (0, 1], and the mixed strategy wi(x) =
pi + qiθi(x).
We recall that the existence of a (pure-strategy) Nash equilibrium is not guar-
anteed, in the general case, for either the flat price, commission or mixed strategies.
Moreover, even in the case where such a Nash equilibrium exists, it is not efficient, in
general. In the case of a free price strategy, however, we can guarantee the existence
of a weak Nash equilibrium which is efficient.
12.5.1 Where Nash equilibrium meets efficiency
Let
wi(x) :=
{
θi(x)−maxj 6=i θj(x) if x ∈ Ai
0 if x 6∈ Ai , (12.10)
where Ai as given in Definition 12.4.1.
3Here A∆B := (A−B) ∪ (B −A) is the symmetric difference.
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Under the strategy (12.10), any consumer x obtain the utility of his ”best next
agent”, that is
max
j 6=i(x)
θj(x)
where i(x) := arg max1≤j≤N θj(x).
We leave the reader to prove the following Theorem:
Theorem 12.3. If µ{x; θi(x) = θj(x) = 0} = 0 for any i 6= j, then the free strategy
(12.10) is an efficient Nash equilibrium (in the sense of Definition 12.5.1).
The free strategy seems to be good news for the consumers. At least, it guarantees
that each consumer will get the utility of his next best agents, and verifies both the
stability under competitive behavior (in the sense that the weak Nash equilibrium
condition is satisfied) and efficiency. In the next chapter we shall see, however, that
this strategy does not survive a cooperative behavior of the agents.
Chapter 13
Cooperative partitions
Competition has been shown to be useful up to a certain point and no further, but
cooperation, which is the thing we must strive for today, begins where competition
leaves off (F.D.R)
13.1 Free-price strategy
Using a free price strategy discussed in section 12.5, we obtained a weak Nash equilib-
rium which is efficient via Theorem 12.3. However, the agents may beat this strategy
by forming a coalition. Let us elaborate this point.
Suppose that some agents J ⊂ I := {1, . . . N} decide to establish a coalition: they
offer any client x the maximal utility of the coalition members
θJ (x) := max
i∈J
θi(x) . (13.1)
So, the ”super-agent” J is now competing against the other agents I−J . The efficient
partition of X now takes the form
AJ := {x ∈ X; θJ (x) > [ max
i∈I−J
θi(x)]+} = ∪i∈JAi (13.2)
where Ai as given in Definition 12.4.1. The J component of the free price strategy
(12.10) corresponding to the set of agents {θJ , θi, i 6∈ J } is, via Theorem 12.3,
wJ (x) :=
{
θJ (x)−maxj 6=J θj(x) if x ∈ AJ
any positive value if x 6∈ AJ . (13.3)
Clearly, wJ (x) ≥ wj(x) for any x ∈ AJ and any j ∈ J . In particular, the profit of
the super-agent J (denoted as ν(J )) is not smaller than the combined profits of all
agents j ∈ J together (under the free price strategy):
ν(J ) :=
∫
AJ
wJ dµ ≥
∑
j∈J
∫
Aj
wjdµ , (13.4)
The inequality in (13.4) can be strong. Evidently, this profit is monotone in the
coalition, namely ν(J ′) ≥ ν(J ) whenever J ′ ⊃ J . In particular, if J = I (the grand
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coalition), then wI = θ¯+ ≡ maxi∈I [θi]+. In that case the grand coalition of agents
wins the whole surplus value ν(I) = ∫
X
θ¯+dµ, and, in particular, we get an efficient
partition.
Is the grand coalition, indeed, a stable position for the agents? It depends on how
the agents share the surplus value between themselves. A natural way of sharing is as
follows: each agent collects the surplus value in the domain in which she dominates,
that is
Pi =
∫
Ai
θ¯+dµ ≡
∫
Ai
[θi]+dµ
(recall Definition 12.4.1).
Notice that the agents my almost obtain such a sharing if they act individually, and
use the commission strategy wi = qθi, q ∈ (0, 1) for sufficiently small 1− q. However,
such a sharing it is not a Nash equilibrium by the argument in section 12.4.2, as any
agent may slightly lower her commission and attract the consumers of other agents.
At this point we leave the realm of Nash equilibrium and competitive game theory
and enter into the realm of Cooperative Games:
13.2 Cooperative games- a crash review
A cooperative game is a game where groups of players (”coalitions”) may enforce
cooperative behavior, hence the game is a competition between coalitions of players,
rather than between individual players.
This section is based on the monograph [20].
Definition 13.2.1. A cooperative game (CG game) in I := {1, . . . N} is given by a
reward function ν on the subsets of I:
ν : 2I → R+ , ν(∅) = 0 .
The set of imputations is composed of vectors ~x := (x1, . . . xN ) ∈ RN+ which satisfy
the following conditions ∑
i∈I
xi ≤ ν(I) . (13.5)
Definition 13.2.2. The core of a game ν : 2I → R+ (Core(ν)) is the collection of
all imputation vectors which satisfy
∀J ⊆ I,
∑
i∈J
xj ≥ ν(J ) . (13.6)
If the core is not empty then no sub-coalition J of the grand coalition I will be
formed. Indeed, if such a sub-coalition J is formed, its reward ν(J ) is not larger than
the sum of the imputations of its members, guaranteed by the grand coalition.
In many cases, however, the core is empty.
We can easily find a necessary condition for the core to be non-empty. Suppose
we divide I into a set of coalitions Jk ⊂ I , k = 1, . . .m such that Jk ∩ Jk′ = ∅ for
k 6= k′ and ∪mk=1Jj = I.
Proposition 13.1. For any such division, the condition
m∑
k=1
ν(Jk) ≤ ν(I) (13.7)
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is necessary for the grand coalition to be stable.
Proof. Suppose ~x ∈ Core(ν). Let ν˜(J ) := ∑i∈J xi. Then ν˜(J ) ≥ ν(J ) for any
J ⊆ I. If (13.7) is violated for some division {J1, . . .Jm}, then ∑mk=1 ν˜(Jk) ≥∑m
k=1 ν(Jk) > ν(I). On the other hand,
∑m
k=1 ν˜(Jk) =
∑
i∈I xi ≤ ν(I), so we get a
contradiction.
Note that super-additivity
ν(J1) + ν(J2) ≤ ν(J1 ∪ J2) ∀ J1 ∩ J2 = ∅ (13.8)
is a sufficient condition for (13.7). However, (13.8) by itself is not a sufficient condition
for the stability of the grand coalition.
Example 13.2.1. In case N = 3 the game ν(1) = ν(2) = ν(3) = 0, ν(12) = ν(23) =
ν(13) = 3/4, ν(123) = 1 is super-additive but its core is empty.
We may extend condition (13.7) as follows: A weak division is a function λ : 2I → R
which satisfies the following:
i) For any J ⊆ {1, . . . N}, λ(J ) ≥ 0.
ii) For any i ∈ I, ∑J⊆I;i∈J λ(J ) = 1.
A collection of such sets {J ⊂ I;λ(J ) > 0} verifying (i,ii) is called a balanced collection
[20].
We can think about λ(J ) as the probability of the coalition J . In particular, (ii)
asserts that any individual i ∈ I has a probability 1 to belong to some coalition J .
Note that any division {J1, . . .Jm} is, in particular, a weak division where λ(J ) = 1
if J ∈ {J1, . . .Jm}, and λ(J ) = 0 otherwise.
It is not difficult to extend the necessary condition (13.7) to weak subdivisions as
follows:
Proposition 13.2. For any weak subdivision λ, the condition∑
J∈2I
λ(J )ν(J ) ≤ ν(I) (13.9)
is necessary for the grand coalition to be stable.
The proof of Proposition 13.2 is a slight modification of the proof of Proposition
13.1.
However, it turns out that (13.9) is also a sufficient condition for the stability of
the grand coalition I. This is the content of Bondareva-Shapley Theorem
Theorem 13.1. [8, 41] The grand coalition is stable if and only if it satisfies (13.9)
for any weak division λ.
The condition of Theorem 13.1 is easily verified for super-additive game in case
N = 3.
Corollary 13.2.1. A super additive cooperative game of 3 agents (N = 3) admits a
non-empty core iff
ν(12) + ν(13) + ν(23) < 2ν(123) . (13.10)
Indeed, it can be shown that all weak subdivision for N = 3 are spanned by
λ(J ) = 1/2 if J = (12), (13), (23) ; λ(J ) = 0 otherwise ,
and the trivial ones.
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13.2.1 Convex games
A game ν is said to be convex if a larger coalition gains from joining a new agent at
least as much as a smaller coalition gains from adding the same agent. That is, if
J2 ⊃ J1 and {i} 6∈ J1 ∪ J2 then
ν(J2 ∪ {i})− ν(J2) ≥ ν(J1 ∪ {i})− ν(J1) . (13.11)
The inequality (13.11) follows if, for any J1,J2 ∈ 2I
ν(J1) + ν(J2) ≤ ν(J1 ∪ J2) + ν(J1 ∩ J2) . (13.12)
In fact, it turns out that (13.11) and (13.12) are equivalent. The last condition is called
super-modular (See sec. 7.4 in [34]). Note that super-modularity is stronger than
super-additivity (13.8). However, in contrast to super-additivity, super-modularity
does imply the existence of a non-empty core. Moreover, it characterizes the core in a
particular, neat way:
Let i1, . . . iN be any arrangement of the set I. For each such arrangement, consider
the imputations:
xi1 = ν({i1}), . . . xik = ν({i1, . . . ik})− ν({i1, . . . ik−1}) . . . . (13.13)
Theorem 13.2. (c.f. [14]) If the game is convex then any imputation (13.13) obtained
from an arbitrary arrangement of the agents is in the core. Moreover, the core is the
convex hull of all such imputations.
Example 13.2.2. Let (X¯, µ¯) be a finite measure space. Let us associate with each
agent i ∈ I a measurable set A¯i ⊂ X¯. For any J ⊂ I let
ν(J ) := µ¯ (X¯ − ∪j 6∈J A¯j) .
Lemma 13.1. The game defined in Example 13.2.2 is convex.
Proof. By the postulates of measure
ν(J ) = µ¯(X¯)− µ¯(A¯I−J ) .
where A¯J := ∪j∈J A¯j . Then
A¯I−(J1∪J2) ⊂ A¯I−J1 ∩ A¯I−J2 .
Indeed, x ∈ A¯I−(J1∪J2) iff there exists i ∈ I − (J1 ∪ J2) such that x ∈ A¯i, which
implies that x ∈ A¯I−J1∩A¯I−J2 . This inclusion can be strict since x ∈ A¯I−J1∩A¯I−J2
implies that there exists i ∈ I − J1 and j ∈ I − J2 such that x ∈ Ai ∩ Aj (but not
necessarily i = j).
On the other hand
A¯I−(J1∩J2) = A¯I−J1 ∪ A¯I−J2 . (13.14)
Hence
µ¯
(
A¯I−(J1∪J2)
) ≤ µ¯ (A¯I−J1 ∩ A¯I−J2) (13.15)
and
µ¯
(
A¯I−(J1∩J2)
)
= µ¯
(
A¯I−J1 ∪ A¯I−J2
)
.
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By the axioms of a measure we also get
µ¯
(
A¯I−J1 ∪ A¯I−J2
)
= µ¯
(
A¯I−J1
)
+ µ¯
(
A¯I−J2
)− µ¯ (A¯I−J1 ∩ A¯I−J2) .
Since
µ¯
(
A¯I−J1 ∪ A¯I−J2
) ≡ µ¯ (A¯I−(J1∩J2)) ≡ µ¯(X¯)− ν(J1 ∩ J2)
and
µ¯
(
A¯I−J1 ∩ A¯I−J2
) ≥ µ¯ (A¯I−(J1∪J2)) ≡ µ¯(X¯)− ν(J1 ∪ J2)
we obtained
ν (J1 ∪ J2) + ν (J1 ∩ J2) ≥ ν (J1) + ν (J2) .
13.3 Back to cooperative partition games
Let us re-examine the game described in Section 13.1. Here we defined
ν(J ) :=
∫
AJ
wJ dµ , (13.16)
see (13.4), where AJ , wJ as in (13.2, 13.3). Let us extend the space X to the graph
below the maximal utility function θ¯+, that is:
X¯ := {(x, s); x ∈ X, 0 ≤ s ≤ θ¯+(x) := max
i∈I
[θi(x)]+}
Let us further define
A¯j := {(x, s) ∈ X¯; 0 ≤ s ≤ [θj(x)]+} .
It follows that the game (13.16) is equivalent, under this setting, to the game described
in Example 13.2.2. From Lemma 13.1 and Theorem 13.2 we obtain:
Theorem 13.3. Under condition of Theorem 12.3, the cooperative game of free price
(13.16) is stable.
These are good news for the agents but very bad for the consumers! Indeed, the
stable grad coalition of the agents collects all the surplus to themselves (as ν(I) =∫
X
θ¯+dx) and leave nothing to the consumers. and the measure µ on X to a measure
µ¯(dxds) := µ(dx)ds on X¯. In order to defend the consumers we have to impose some
regulation on the agents:
Consumer’s based pricing is forbidden!
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13.3.1 Flat prices strategy: Regulation by capacity
Let us assume now that each agent has a limited capacity. So, µ(Ai) ≤ m0i where
Ai ⊂ X is the set of consumers of agent i. The agents may still form a coalition
J ⊂ I, and the capacity of J is just
m0J :=
∑
i∈J
m0i .
The utility of the coalition J is given by maximizing the utilities of its members, i.e.
θJ as defined (13.1).
We assume that for any coalition J ⊂ I, the rest of the agents form the
complement coalition J− := I − J .
Let us consider a cooperative game ν where the utility of a coalition ν(J ) is the
surplus value of this coalition, where competing against the complement coalition J−.
For this we consider
ΞJ (pJ , pJ−) :=
∫
X
max [(θJ(x)− pJ), (θJ−(x)− pJ−), 0] dµ(x) : R2 → R , (13.17)
and
Σ(m0J ,m
0
J−) = max
mJ≤m0J ,mJ−≤m0J−
[
min
(pJ ,pJ− )∈R2
ΞJ (pJ , pJ−) + pJmJ + pJ−mJ−
]
.
(13.18)
Proposition 13.3. Under the assumption of Theorem 11.1, there exists unique vec-
tors (mJ ,mJ−) which maximizes (13.18) and a unique (p
0
J , p
0
J−) which minimize
(pJ , pJ−) 7→ ΞJ (pJ , pJ−) + pJmJ + pJ−mJ− .
Proof. First note that
{x ∈ X; θJ(x)− θJ−(x) = r} ⊂ ∪j∈J,i∈J−{x ∈ X; θj(x)− θi(x) = r}
so Assumption 11.0.1 implies, for any r ∈ R,
µ(x; θJ (x)− θJ−(x) = 0) = 0 ; µ(x; θJ (x) = 0) = µ(x; θJ−(x) = 0) = 0 .
Hence, the conditions of Theorem 11.1 hold for this modified setting.
The partition (A0J , A
0
J−) is also given by
A0J := ∪i∈JAi(~p0)
where Ai(~p) as defined in (11.5) and p0,i = p
0
J if i ∈ J and p0,j = p0J− if j 6∈ J .
Indeed,
Ξθ,+(~p0) ≡ ΞJ (p0J , p0J−)
where Ξθ,+ given by (11.2). Thus, we may characterize the coalitions J as a cartel:
The coalitions J is obtained as a cartel where all members of this coalition
(and, simultaneously, all members of the complementary coalition J−) agree
on equal flat prices.
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Definition 13.3.1. Let A0J := AJ (p
0
J , p
0
J−), where
AJ(pJ , pJ−) := {x ∈ X; θJ (x)− pJ ≥ (θJ−(x)− pJ−)+}
and (p0J , p
0
J−) the unique minimizer as defined in Proposition 13.3.
The surplus-based coalition game ν subjected to a given capacity vector ~m0 ∈ RN+
is given by
ν(J ) :=
∫
A0J
θJ dµ .
Note that this game satisfies the following condition: For each J ⊂ I,
ν(J ) + ν(J−) ≤ ν(I) ∀ J ⊂ I , (13.19)
which is a necessary condition for super-additivity (13.8).
In general, however, thus game is not super-modular.
Example 13.3.1. Let us consider 3 agents corresponding to θ1 ≥ θ2 ≥ θ3. Assume
also m1,m2 << 1. Let x0 := arg max (θ1 − θ3) and x1 := arg max (θ1 − θ2). Since
ν({1}) is the surplus of agent 1 competing against agents 2+3, and θ2,3 := θ2∨θ3 ≡ θ2,
it follows by Example 11.1.2 (dealing in the case of two agents-low capacity) that
ν({1}) ≈ m1θ(x1). On the other hand θ1,2 = θ1 is competing against θ3 so, by the
same example, ν({1, 2}) ≈ (m1 +m2)θ1(x0). Thus, if
θ1(x1) >
m1 +m2
m1
θ1(x0)
then
ν({1, 2}) < ν({1}) ≤ ν({1}) + ν({2}) .
An alternative definition of a coalition game is based on the agent’s profit. In
that case there is an upper limit to the capacity of all agents, and each coalition J
maximizes its profit against the complement coalition J−:
Definition 13.3.2. Let m > 0. Given a coalition J ⊂ I, define the self profit coalition
game as
νP(J ) := mJ ∂
∂mJ
Σ(mJ ,mJ−)
where Σ as defined in (13.18).
Recall that νP(J )/mJ stands for the flat price of the first (super)agent J .
Surely we cannot expect the self-profit game to be super additive, in general. Even
the inequality (13.19) is not necessarily valid for such a game, even in the case of only
two agents (see Example 12.4.1).
13.3.2 Coalition games under comparable utilities
We obtained that both coalitions games given by Definitions 13.3.1, 13.3.2 are not
super-additive in general.
However, there is a special case, introduced in Example 11.1.3 for which we can
guarantee super-additivity and, moreover, even stability under certain additional con-
ditions (c.f Example 11.1.3).
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Assumption 13.3.1. There exists non-negative θ : X ∈ C(X) satisfying µ(x; θ(x) =
r) = 0 for any r ∈ R. The utilities θi are given by θi = λiθ where ~λ := (λ1, . . . λN ) ∈
RN+ such that 0 < λ1 < . . . < λN .
Proposition 13.4. Under assumption 13.3.1, for any ~m := (m1, . . .mN ) ∈ RN+ , the
surplus-based game ν is super-additive.
If, in addition, m 7→ m(Fθ(m))′ is monotone non decreasing on [0,M ] (see Exam-
ple 11.1.1) then the profit-based game is super-additive as well, provided
∑
i∈Imi ≤M
Proof. .
Surplus-based game:
From Example 11.1.3 (in particular from (11.27)) we obtain that the surplus of agent
i under optimal partition is
Vi ≡ λi (Fθ(Mi)−Fθ(Mi+1)) . (13.20)
It follows that, if {N} ∈ J ,
ν(J ) = λNFθ(mJ ) , (13.21)
while if {N} 6∈ J :
ν(J ) = λJ (Fθ(M)−Fθ(M −mJ )) . (13.22)
where λJ = maxi∈J λi < λN and M = mJ +mJ− ≡
∑
i∈Imi.
Let now J1,J2 ⊂ I such that J1 ∩ J2 = ∅ (in particular, mJ1 +mJ2 ≤M .
Assume first {N} 6∈ J1 ∪ J2. Then from (13.22)
ν(J1 ∪ J2) = λJ1 ∨ λJ2 (Fθ(M)−Fθ(M −mJ1∪J2)) =
λJ1 ∨ λJ2 (Fθ(M∗)−Fθ(M −mJ1 −mJ2)) . (13.23)
Now,
Fθ(M)−Fθ(M −mJ1 −mJ2) ≥ 2Fθ(M)−Fθ(M −mJ1)−Fθ(M −mJ2)
since
Fθ(M)−Fθ(M −mJ1) ≤ Fθ(M −mJ2)−Fθ(M −mJ1 −mJ2)
by concavity of Fθ. It follows form (13.23)
ν(J1 ∪ J2) ≥ λJ1 ∨ λJ2 [(Fθ(M)−Fθ(M −mJ1)) + (Fθ(M)−Fθ(M −mJ2))]
≥ λJ1 (Fθ(M)−Fθ(M −mJ1)) + λJ2 (Fθ(M)−Fθ(M −mJ2)) = ν(J1) + ν(J2) .
Next, if, say, {N} ∈ J1 then, using (13.21, 13.22)
ν(J1 ∪ J2) = λNFθ(mJ1 +mJ2) , ν(J1) = λNFθ(mJ1) ,
ν(J2) = λJ2 (Fθ(M)−Fθ(M −mJ2)) ,
so ν(J1 ∪ J2)− ν(J1)− ν(J2) ≥
λN [Fθ(mJ1 +mJ2)−Fθ(mJ1)−Fθ(M) + Fθ(M −mJ2)] ≥ 0 ,
again, by concavity of Fθ and since M ≥ mJ1 +mJ2 .
Case of Profit-based game:
From (11.27) with the two agents (λ1θ,m1), (λ2θ,m2) where λ2 > λ2 we get
Σθ(m1,m2) = λ1 (Fθ(m1 +m2)−Fθ(m2)) + λ2Fθ(m2) .
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Assume first N 6∈ J1 ∪ J2. Then, we substitute (m1,m2) for either (mJ1 ,M −mJ1),
(mJ2 ,M −mJ2) and (mJ1∪J2 , 1−m(J1∪J2)) we get
νP(J1) = mJ1λJ1 (Fθ)
′
(M), νP(J2) = mJ2λJ2 (Fθ)
′
(M)
and
νP(J1 ∪ J2) = mJ1∪J2λJ1∪J2 (Fθ)
′
(M) ≡ λJ1 ∨ λJ2(mJ1 +mJ2)(Fθ)
′
(M) ,
In particular, we obtain
νP(J1∪J2)−νP(J1)−νP(J2) = (λJ1 ∨ λJ2(mJ1 +mJ2)− λJ1mJ1 − λJ2mJ2) (Fθ)
′
(M) > 0
(unconditionally!).
Assume now that N ∈ J2. In particular λN > λJ1 . Thus, under the same setting:
νP(J1) = m1∂Σθ/∂m1 = mJ1λJ1 (Fθ)
′
(M) ,
νP(J2) = m2∂Σθ/∂m2 = mJ2
(
λJ1 (Fθ)
′
(M) + (λN − λJ1) (Fθ)
′
(mJ2)
)
,
νP(J1 ∪ J2) = mJ1∪J2
(
λJ1 (Fθ)
′
(M) + (λJ2 − λJ1) (Fθ)
′
(mJ1∪J2)
)
= (mJ1 +mJ2)
(
λJ1 (Fθ)
′
(M) + (λN − λJ1) (Fθ)
′
(mJ1 +mJ2)
)
.
It follows that νP(J1 ∪ J2)− νP(J1)− νP(J2) =
(λJ2 − λJ1)
(
(mJ1 +mJ2) (Fθ)
′
(mJ1 +mJ2)−mJ2 (Fθ)
′
(mJ2)
)
≥ 0
by assumption of monotonicity of m 7→ m (F ∗θ )
′
(m) on [0,M ], and mJ ,mJ− ∈ [0,M ].
Under the assumption of Proposition 13.4 we may guess, intuitively, that the grand
coalition is stable if the gap between the utilities of the agents is sufficiently large (so
the other agents are motivated to join the smartest one), and the capacity of the wisest
agent (N) is sufficiently small (so she is motivated to join the others as well). Below
we prove this intuition in the case N = 3:
Proposition 13.5. Under the assumption of Proposition 13.4 and N = 3,
λ3
λ2
>
Fθ(m1 +m2)
Fθ(m2) + Fθ(m1)
is a necessary and sufficient for the stability of the grand coalition in the surplus game.
Here Fθ is as defined in Example 11.1.3.
Proof. From Corollary 13.2.1 and Proposition 13.4 we have only to prove (13.10).
Now, ν(123) = λ3Fθ(µ(X)), ν(13) = λ3(Fθ(µ(X))−Fθ(m2)), ν(23) = λ3(Fθ(µ(X))−
Fθ(m1)) and ν(12) = λ2Fθ(m1 +m2). The result follows from substituting the above
in (13.10).
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Theorem 13.4. Assume m 7→ m (Fθ)
′
(m) is non-decreasing on [0,M ] where M =
m1 +m2 +m3. Assume further that
α (Fθ)
′
(m2) + β (Fθ)
′
(m1) < (Fθ)
′
(m1 +m2 +m3) (13.24)
where
α := (m1+m3)(λ3−λ2)
2m1(λ3−λ2)+(m2+m3)(2λ3−λ2) ,
β := (m2+m3)(λ3−λ1)
2m1(λ3−λ2)+(m2+m3)(2λ3−λ2) .
Then the self-profit game ν as given in Definition 13.3.2 is stable.
Recall that Fθ is a concave function, hence (Fθ)
′
(m1 +m2 +m3) is smaller than
both (Fθ)
′
(m1), (Fθ)
′
(m2). Hence 0 < α+β < 1 is a necessary condition for (13.24).
Check that this condition is always satisfied (since λ3 > λ2).
Proof. Again, the super-additivity is given by Proposition 13.4.
νP(123) = (m1 +m2 +m3)λ3 (Fθ)
′
(m1 +m2 +m3) .
ν(13) = (m1 +m3)
[
λ2 (Fθ)
′
(m1 +m2 +m3) + (λ3 − λ2) (Fθ)
′
(m2)
]
,
ν(23) = (m2 +m3)
[
λ1 (Fθ)
′
(m1 +m2 +m3) + (λ3 − λ1) (Fθ)
′
(m1)
]
,
while
νP(12) = (m1 +m2)λ2 (Fθ)
′
(m1 +m2 +m3) .
Thus
2νP(123)− ν(12)− ν(13)− ν(23) =
(Fθ)
′
(m1 +m2 +m3) [2m1(λ3 − λ2) + (m2 +m3)(2λ3 − λ2)]−
(m1 +m3)(λ3 − λ2) (Fθ)
′
(m2)− (m2 +m3)(λ3 − λ1) (Fθ)
′
(m1)
and the result follows by (13.10) as well.
Appendix A
Convexity
For the completeness of exposition we introduce basic notion from the theory of convex
functions. We only consider linear spacesM
′
over the reals R of finite dimension. This
restriction, which is sufficient for our purpose, will render the reference to any topology.
In fact, topology enters only trough the definition of the dual space of M
′
, M+, that
is, the space of all continuous linear functionals on M
′
, and denote the duality pairing
by
(~P : ~M) : M
′ ×M+ → R .
Since, as we know, all norms are equivalent on a linear space of finite dimension, it
follows that the notion of a continuous functional is norm-independent. Even though
we distinguish between the space M
′
and its dual M+ (which are isomorphic), we do
not distinguish weak, weak-* and strong (norm) convergence of sequences in the spaces
M
′
and M+, respectively . The notion of open, closed sets and interior, cluster points
of sets are defined naturally in terms of a generic norm.
The basic notion we consider is that of a convex function
Ξ : M
′ → R ∪ {∞} := Rˆ .
The fundamental definition is
Definition A.0.1. Ξ is a convex function on M
′
if for any ~P1, ~P2 ∈ M′ and any
s ∈ [0, 1]:
Ξ(s~P1 + (1− s)~P2) ≤ sΞ(~P1) + (1− s)Ξ(~P2) .
Ξ is strictly convex at ~P0 if for any ~P1 6= ~P2 and s ∈ (0, 1) such that ~P0 := s~P1 +
(1− s)~P2
Ξ(~P0) < sΞ(~P1) + (1− s)Ξ(~P2) .
Note that we allow Ξ to obtain the value {∞} (but not the value {−∞}), and we use,
of course, the rule r +∞ =∞ for any r ∈ R. The essential domain of Ξ (ED(Ξ)) is
the set on which Ξ admits finite values:
ED(Ξ) := {~P ∈ M′ ; Ξ(~P) ∈ R }.
Remark A.0.1. In this book we usually assuming that Ξ is real valued for any ~P ∈ M′
(i.e. ED(Ξ) = M
′
). This, however, is not true for the Legendre transform of Ξ defined
below on the dual space M+. Since we treat (M
′
,Ξ) and (M+,Ξ∗) on the same footing,
we allow Ξ to take infinite values as well.
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Another closely related notion is Lower-Semicontinuity:
Definition A.0.2. Ξ is Lower-Semi-Continuous (LST) at a point ~P0 ∈ M′ iff for
any sequence ~Pn converging to ~P0:
lim inf
n→∞
Ξ(~Pn) ≥ Ξ(~P0) .
Ξ is said to be LST if it is LSC at any ~P ∈ M′ .
In particular, if Ξ(~P0) =∞, then Ξ is LSC at ~P0 iff limn→∞ Ξ(~Pn) =∞ for any
sequence ~Pn → ~P0.
The notion of a convex set is also pretty natural:
Definition A.0.3. A set A ⊂ M′ is convex iff for any ~P1, ~P2 ∈ A and any s ∈ [0, 1],
s~P1 + (1− s)~P2 ∈ A.
A point ~P ∈ A is an extreme point iff it is not contained in the interior of any
interval contained in A, i.e. there exists no ~P1 6= ~P2, both in A and α ∈ (0, 1) such
that ~P = α~P1 + (1− α)~P2.
There are two natural connections between convex functions and convex set, as
well as between points of strict convexity and extreme points. The first corresponds
to the definition of a characteristic function of a set:
Definition A.0.4. A characteristics function corresponding to a set A ⊂ M′ is
χA(~P) :=
{
0 if ~P ∈ A
∞ otherwise
The second corresponds to the definition of a supergraph
Definition A.0.5. The supergraph of a function Ξ : M
′ → Rˆ is the set
SG(Ξ) := {(~P, r) ∈ M′ × R; Ξ(~P) ≥ r} .
In particular, GR(Ξ) does not contain the line ~P× R whenever Ξ(~P) =∞.
From these definitions we can easily obtain:
Proposition A.1. .
• A ⊂ ~P is a convex set iff χA is a convex function. ~P ∈ A is an extreme point
iff is a strictly convex point of χA.
• Ξ is a convex function on M′ iff SG(Ξ) is a convex set in M′×R. ~P is a strictly
convex point of Ξ iff (~P,Ξ(~P)) is an extreme point of SG(Ξ).
From Definitions A.0.2 and A.0.5 we also get the connection between LSC and
closed sets:
Proposition A.2. A function Ξ on M
′
is LSC at any point ~P ∈ M′ iff SG(Ξ) is
closed on M
′ × R.
Warning: Not any convex function is LSC at any point of its essential domain. For
example, consider a convex and open set A ⊂ M′ such that any point on the boundary
of its closure Ac is an extreme point of Ac (e.g, A is the open ball in Rn). Let Ξ = 0
on A, Ξ =∞ on ∼ Ac and Ξ takes arbitrary real values on the boundary of A. Then
Ξ is convex on M
′
and its essential domain is Ac. Still, Ξ is not LSC, in general, at
points on the boundary of A. However:
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Proposition A.3. If Ξ is convex on M
′
then it is continuous at any inner point of
its essential domain.
We recall that both convex and closed sets enjoy the property of being preserved
under intersections:
Proposition A.4. If {Aα} is a collection of closed (resp. convex) sets, then ∩αAα
is a closed (resp. convex) set as well.
Using Propositions A.1, A.2, A.4 we obtain
Proposition A.5. If {Ξβ} is a collection of USC (resp. convex) functions on M′ ,
then Ξ¯(~P) := supβ Ξβ(
~P) is a LSC (resp. convex) function as well.
Another nice property of convex sets are the preservation under projection. Let
M
′
= M
′
1×M
′
2 and the projection Proj1 : M
′ → M′1 is defined as Proj(~P1, ~P2) := ~P1.
One can easily verify that, if A ⊂ M′ is a convex set in M′ , then Proj1(A) is convex
in M
′
1 as well (note that the same statement does not hold for closed sets!).
Proposition A.6. Let Ξ : M
′
1 ×M
′
1 → Rˆ be a convex function. Then
Ξ(~P1) := inf
~P2∈M′2
Ξ(~P1, ~P2)
is convex on M
′
1.
Indeed, we observe that SG(Ξ) is the projection from M
′
1 ×M
′
2 ×R of SG(Ξ) into
M
′
1 × R, and apply Proposition A.1.
Let now {Ξβ} be a collection of affine functions on M′ , i.e. Ξβ(~P) := γ(β) + ~P :
~Γ(β), where γ(β) ∈ R and ~Γ(β) ∈ M+.
Ξβ(~P) = ~P 7→ sup
β
[
γ(β) + ~P : ~Γ(β)
]
∈ R ∪ {∞}
is a convex function.
If then ~P 7→ Ξ(~P) := supβ Ξβ(~P) is convex. In particular if {Ξβ} is a collection of
affine functions, that is, Fβ(~P) = γ(β) + ~P : ~Γ(β) where γ(β) ∈ R ,~Γ(β) ∈ M+. Since
affine functions are, in particular, both convex and closed (USC), then Proposition A.5
implies that the supremum of Fβ over β is also convex and closed. In particular, if the
set of elements β are points in the dual space M+, ~Γ( ~M) := ~M and Γ( ~M) := −Σθ( ~M)
is any function on M+, then
Ξ(~m) := sup
~P∈M′
[
~P : ~M− Σθ( ~M)
]
. (A.1)
is a convex function on M+. Thus, the operation (A.1) defines a transformation
from the functions on the space M+ to a convex functions on the dual space M
′
.
In particular, if we consider only LSC-convex functions Σθ in (A.1), it defines the
Legendre Transform from LST convex functions on M+ to LSC convex functions on
its dual space M
′
. Since a finite dimensional linear space is reflexive (i.e. M
′
is the
dual of M+ as well as M+ is the dual of M
′
), we can represent the Legendre transform
as a transformation from LSC convex functions Ξ on M
′
to LSC convex functions Ξ∗
on M+ as well:
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Definition A.0.6. The Legendre Transform (LT) of a LSC convex function Ξ on M
′
is the LSC convex function Ξ∗ on M+ given by
Ξ∗( ~M) := sup
~P∈M′
~P : ~M− Ξ(~P) .
In particular we obtain that
Ξ(~P) + Ξ∗( ~M) ≥ ~P : ~M (A.2)
for any ~P ∈ M′ , ~M ∈ M+.
The two-way duality relation between M
′
and M+ implies the possibility to define
Ξ∗∗ := (Ξ∗)∗ as a LSC convex function on M
′
. It is an elementary exercise to prove
that
Ξ∗∗(~P) ≤ Ξ(~P) (A.3)
for any ~P ∈ M′ . In fact, (A.3) holds for any function Ξ : M′ → Rˆ (not necessarily
convex or LSC). However, if Ξ is both convex and LSC on M
′
then we get an equality
in (A.3):
Proposition A.7. If Ξ : M
′ → Rˆ is convex and LSC on M′ then Ξ∗∗ = Ξ.
For the proof of Proposition A.7 see, e.g. [37].
Next, we define the subgradient of a function on a linear space M
′
:
Definition A.0.7. The subgradient of a function Ξ : M
′ → Rˆ is defined for any ~P
in the essential domain of Ξ as
∂~PΞ := { ~M ∈ M+; Ξ(~P1)− Ξ(~P) ≥ (~P1 − ~P) : ~M , ∀ ~P1 ∈ M
′ } ⊂ M+ .
Note that we only defined ∂~PΞ for
~P in the essential domain of Ξ. The reason is
to avoid the ambiguous expression ∞−∞ in case both Ξ(~P) = Ξ(~P1) =∞.
It can easily be shown that ∂~PΞ is a closed and convex set for any LSC function
Ξ. However, it can certainly be the case that the subgradient is an empty set. If,
however, Ξ is also convex then we can guarantee that ∂~PΞ is non-empty:
Proposition A.8. [37] If Ξ is LSC and convex then the subgradient ∂~PΞ is non-empty
for any ~P ∈ Int (ED(Ξ)). If ~M ∈ Int (ED(Ξ∗)) then there exists ~P ∈ Int (ED(Ξ))
such that ~P ∈ ∂ ~MΞ∗ and ~M ∈ ∂~PΞ. In particular, the equality
Ξ(~P) + Ξ∗( ~M) = ~P : ~M (A.4)
holds iff both ~M ∈ ∂~PΞ and ~P ∈ ∂ ~MΞ∗.
In particular, ~P is a minimizer of Ξ if and only if 0 ∈ ∂~PΞ (and, of course, ~M is a
minimizer of Ξ∗ if and only if 0 ∈ ∂ ~MΞ∗).
Next, there is a relation between differentiability of a convex function and the
strict convexity of its Legendre transform:
Proposition A.9. A LSC convex function Ξ is differentiable at ~P ∈ M′ if and only
if ∂~PΞ is a singleton, if and only if its directional derivatives exist on a spanning set
of directions. In that case ∂~PΞ is identified with the gradient of Ξ: ∂~PΞ = {∇Ξ(~P)}.
Moreover, in that case Ξ∗ is strictly convex at ~M0 = ∇Ξ(~P), namely, for any α ∈ (0, 1)
and any ~M1 6= ~M2 verifying ~M0 = α ~M1 + (1− α) ~M2:
Ξ∗( ~M0) < αΞ
∗( ~M1) + (1− α)Ξ∗( ~M2) .
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Let us see the proof of the last statement.
Let { ~M0} = ∂~P0Ξ. Assume there exists α ∈ (0, 1) and ~M1 6= ~M2 in the essential
domain of Ξ∗ such that ~M0 = α ~M1 + (1− α) ~M2 and
Ξ∗( ~M0) = αΞ
∗( ~M1) + (1− α)Ξ∗( ~M2) . (A.5)
Then from (A.4)
Ξ(~P0)− ~P0 : ~M0 = Ξ(~P0)− ~P0 : (α ~M1 + (1− α) ~M2) = −Ξ∗( ~M0) . (A.6)
and from (A.2):
Ξ(~P0)− ~P0 : ~M1 ≥ −Ξ∗( ~M1) ; Ξ(~P0)− ~P0 : ~M2 ≥ −Ξ∗( ~M2) . (A.7)
Summing α times the first inequality and (1−α) times the second inequality of (A.7)
we get
Ξ(~P0)− ~P0 : (α ~M1 + (1− α) ~M2)) ≥ αΞ∗( ~M1) + (1− α)Ξ∗( ~M2) = Ξ∗( ~M0) .
From (A.6) we get that the two inequalities in (A.7) are, in fact, equalities:
Ξ(~P0)− ~P0 : ~M1 = −Ξ∗( ~M1) ; Ξ(~P0)− ~P0 : ~M2 = −Ξ∗( ~M2) .
Then Proposition A.8 implies that ~M1, ~M2 ∈ ∂~P0Ξ. In particular Ξ is not differen-
tiable at ~P0, in contradiction. Hence (A.5) is violated.
Another property of closed convex functions is the following:
Proposition A.10. If {Ξn} is a sequence of LSC convex functions on M′ and the
limit limn→∞ Ξn := Ξ holds pointwise on M
′
, then Ξ is convex and for any interior
point ~P of the essential domain of Ξ,
∂~PΞ ⊂ lim infn→∞ ∂~PΞn .
It means that for any ~M ∈ ∂~PΞ there exists a subsequence ~Mn ∈ ∂~PΞn converging, as
n→∞, to ~M.
Let us consider the special case where Ξ, apart from being convex and LSC, is also
positively homogeneous function of order 1:
Definition A.0.8. A function Ξ on M
′
is positively homogeneous of order 1 (PH) if
for any real r ≥ 0 and ~P ∈ M′ :
Ξ(r~P) = rΞ(~P) . (A.8)
Proposition A.11. If Ξ is convex, LSC and PH on M
′
then there exists a closed
convex set K ⊂ M+ such that Ξ∗ = χK on M+. In particular,
Ξ(~P) ≡ χ∗(~P) := sup
~M∈K
~P : ~M .
Proof. Since, in particular, Ξ(0) = 0 then Ξ∗( ~M) ≡ sup~P∈M′ ~P : ~M − Ξ(~P) ≥ 0 for
any ~M ∈ M+. . Moreover, we observe by (A.8) that if there exists ~M ∈ M+ for which
~P : ~M − Ξ(~P) > 0 then Ξ∗( ~M) = ∞. Indeed Ξ∗( ~M) ≥ supr≥0 r[~P : ~M − Ξ(~P)]. It
follows that Ξ∗ is the characteristic function of some K ⊂ M+. Since it is, in addition,
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a convex and LSC function, it follows from Proposition A.1 that K is convex and
closed. By Proposition A.7
Ξ(~P) = χ∗K(~P) ≡ sup
~M∈M+
~P : ~M− χ(~P) = sup
~M∈K
~P : ~M
by definition of the characteristic function χK.
From Propositions A.1, A.9 we obtain
Proposition A.12. ~P0 6= 0 is a differentiable point of a LSC, convex and PH function
Ξ iff ~M0 = ∇Ξ(~P0) is an extreme point of the corresponding closed and convex set K
satisfying χ∗K = Ξ.
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